By Gaby Goldberg & Jordan Odinsky

盖比·戈德堡和乔丹·奥丁斯基

None of us are new to the idea of hype and exclusivity around drops and launches. Streetwear brands like Supreme and Yeezy are in the business of scarcity, where limited product releases supercharge the traditional supply-and-demand model, and where influencers, celebrities and fans alike create an “echo chamber of excitement.” Gaming and lifestyle brand 100 Thieves has become one of the hottest names in competitive gaming, in part due to its limited and highly sought-after drops of branded hoodies and t-shirts. Even dating apps like The League have built their brand around selectiveness and exclusivity, typically waiting to launch in new cities until hitting a large enough waitlist to maintain an approval rate of 20–30%.

对于滴剂和滴剂的炒作和排他性，我们谁都不陌生。 诸如Supreme和Yeezy之类的街头服装品牌正处于稀缺行业 ，在有限的产品发布中，传统的供需模式变得更为强大，而有影响力的人，名流和粉丝同样创造了“兴奋的回声室”。 游戏和生活方式品牌100 Thieves已成为竞争性游戏中最热门的品牌之一，部分原因是其品牌连帽衫和T恤衫数量有限且广受欢迎。 甚至像The League这样的约会应用程序也都围绕选择性和排他性建立了自己的品牌，通常等待着在新城市中推出，直到达到足够大的等待名单以保持20％至30％的批准率。

It has some psychological ground, too: according to Rene Girard’s mimetic theory, we tend to want things simply because other people want them. Human desire is not an autonomous process but a collective one — this is how we decide what we care about. On top of this, life inside the velvet rope is, well, pretty good. There’s a real, psychological fulfillment of being “in” with the crowd and stoking envy among those around you. The idea of being “in” is an economy in itself: streetwear drops, exclusive social clubs, and now, as we’ve seen, viral consumer social products, which we’ll be focusing on for this piece.

它也有一定的心理基础：根据雷内·吉拉德(Rene Girard)的模仿理论 ， 我们倾向于想要事物仅仅是因为其他人想要它们。 人类的渴望不是一个自主的过程，而是一个集体的过程-这就是我们决定自己关心的事情的方式 。 最重要的是，天鹅绒绳内的生活还不错 。 与人群“共处”并在周围的人中引起嫉妒是一种真正的心理上的满足。 “融入”的想法本身就是一种经济：街头装扮下降，高档的社交俱乐部，以及如今(如我们所见)的病毒式消费社交产品，我们将在本文中重点介绍。

There’s a new playbook for consumer and enterprise businesses alike on how to execute a successful launch. In this piece, we’ll analyze some of the most viral, successful launches in recent months and dissect the different strategies used. How were these launches successful in their own ways, and how did they each create their own version of a velvet rope?

对于如何执行成功的发布，有一个面向消费者和企业的新手册。 在本文中，我们将分析近几个月来一些最流行，最成功的产品，并剖析所使用的不同策略。 这些发射如何以自己的方式成功完成，它们各自如何创建自己的天鹅绒绳版本？

欢迎来到TestFlight (Welcome to TestFlight)

The playbook starts with TestFlight, an app that allows startups to soft-launch their own products before publicly hitting the App Store. Until recently, TestFlight was mainly employed as a place for a company’s inner circle to test an app, give feedback, and share bugs. Due to its “invite-only” nature, however, TestFlight has recently become a popular mechanism to stoke curiosity and build hype.

该手册以TestFlight开头，该应用程序允许初创公司在公开发布到App Store之前对其产品进行软启动。 直到最近，TestFlight一直主要用作公司内部圈子测试应用程序，提供反馈和共享错误的场所。 但是，由于其“仅邀请”性质，TestFlight最近已成为引起好奇心和进行炒作的流行机制。

This wouldn’t be a piece on TestFlight launch strategies if we didn’t start with Clubhouse, an audio-social app capturing the zeitgeist of the current Silicon Valley tech bubble. Founded by Paul Davidson and Rohan Seth, Clubhouse is still in beta with less than 5,000 users. It’s worth around $100M in valuation. Where can you find Clubhouse on the Internet? Well, nowhere, really: there’s no landing page besides a link to the waitlist, and it’s not on the app store. Instead, users receive invitations to try the TestFlight beta privately on a case-by-case basis after joining an increasingly long waitlist. (Side note: For more information about Clubhouse, check out this comprehensive guide.)

如果我们不从Clubhouse (这是一个捕捉当前硅谷技术泡沫的时代精神)的音频社交应用开始的话，这对TestFlight的发布策略来说就不算什么。 Clubhouse由Paul Davidson和Rohan Seth创立，目前仍处于测试阶段，用户数不到5,000。 它的估值约为1亿美元。 在互联网上哪里可以找到Clubhouse？ 好吧，真的没有地方：除了到候补名单的链接之外，没有登陆页面，并且不在应用程序商店中。 取而代之的是，用户在加入越来越长的候补名单后会收到邀请，可以逐案地私下尝试TestFlight beta。 ( 旁注：有关Clubhouse的更多信息，请查看此综合指南 。)

Clubhouse didn’t employ this hush-hush launch strategy by accident. In fact, the founders launched another audio app, Talk Show, before Clubhouse (and there were plenty of other audio-social apps out there, too: Anchor, Bumpers, and TTYL, to name a few). The Clubhouse founders knew how to make this launch strategy successful, and they planned ahead. For years, they built up leverage by creating relationships with some of the most influential VCs and founders around the world. They also capitalized on word-of-mouth: buzz and momentum for Clubhouse came entirely from early fans and users. There wasn’t a paid ad in sight, and you didn’t see any Quibi-like user acquisition strategies floating around the tech Twitterverse (but more on Quibi later). Perhaps most surprisingly, Clubhouse didn’t even have a launch on Product Hunt. This secrecy was part of their success.

俱乐部会所没有偶然采用这种悄悄的发射策略。 实际上，创始人在Clubhouse之前推出了另一个音频应用程序Talk Show (还有很多其他音频社交应用程序： Anchor，Bumpers和TTYL ，仅举几例)。 俱乐部会所的创建者知道如何成功实施这一发布策略，因此他们提前进行了计划。 多年来，他们通过创建具有全球一些最具影响力的风险投资和创始人的关系， 建立了杠杆作用 。 他们还利用口碑 ：俱乐部的嗡嗡声和动力完全来自早期的粉丝和用户。 看不到付费广告，您也看不到技术Twitterverse周围有任何类似Quibi的用户获取策略(但稍后会在Quibi上更多)。 也许最令人惊讶的是，Clubhouse甚至没有在Product Hunt上发布产品。 这种保密是他们成功的一部分。

There are myriad products that experience explosive launch day growth, yet quickly cool off and become an afterthought as time goes on. Clubhouse stands out from this group, steadfastly remaining top-of-mind among the tech community since their private launch in mid-April. The genius of Clubhouse’s launch strategy lies in its social status machine: like the most successful cult brands, Clubhouse has set itself radically apart from the rest by consistently maintaining that it is only for the select few.

有些产品的发布日经历了爆炸性的增长，但是随着时间的流逝，它们很快就会冷却下来并成为事后的想法。 自从4月中旬私人发布以来，Clubhouse在这一群体中一直脱颖而出，一直稳居科技界的首位。 Clubhouse推出战略的天才在于它的社会地位机器：与最成功的邪教品牌一样，Clubhouse通过始终坚持只为少数几个选择，使自己与其他品牌截然不同。

候补名单 (The Waitlist)

Clubhouse garnered a massive waitlist of potential users hoping to pass through the velvet ropes of its Testflight doors. Their waitlist was a trickle-down invite model, becoming the modern-day version of a bouncer asking, “Which two friends do you want to bring in?” However, Clubhouse is only one example out of the many companies who have employed waitlists to build a similar sense of hype and exclusivity.

俱乐部会所吸引了大量潜在用户，他们希望通过其Testflight门的天鹅绒绳索来等待。 他们的候补名单是a流邀请模式，成为了现代的保镖询问，“您想带两个朋友吗？” 但是，Clubhouse只是众多雇用候补名单以建立类似的炒作和排他性意识的公司中的一个例子。

In early February, Basecamp co-founders Jason Fried and David Heinemeier Hansson promised to bring a much-needed renovation to email as we know it with the launch of HEY, a simplified, potent email service that forces you to start from scratch. Within 24 hours of Fried’s Twitter announcement, HEY had already garnered around 13,000 people on its invite waitlist. Now, about six months later, the list is hovering over 100,000 signups.

2月初， Basecamp的联合创始人Jason Fried和David Heinemeier Hansson承诺通过推出HEY (一种简单而有效的电子邮件服务，迫使您从头开始)来对电子邮件进行急需的翻新。 在Fried的Twitter声明发布后的 24小时内，HEY已经在其邀请候补名单上吸引了大约13,000人 。 现在，大约六个月后，该列表的注册人数已超过100,000。

HEY is a premium product, with no free tier besides a 14-day free trial. Instead, HEY users pay $99/year (with no option to pay monthly) for 100 GB of storage. For a two-character address (think ab@hey.com), the price jumps to $999/year. For a waitlist that long, it must be worth it, right? That’s not for us to decide — but we do know that the waitlist was effective in getting people excited.

HEY是一种高级产品，除了14天的免费试用期外，没有免费套餐。 取而代之的是，HEY用户需要为每年100 GB的存储空间支付99美元/年(不选择每月支付)。 对于两个字符的地址(请考虑到ab@hey.com)，价格将跃升至每年999美元。 对于这么长的候补名单，必须值得，对吗？ 这不是我们要决定的-但我们确实知道候补名单可以有效地使人们兴奋。

These waitlist case studies all tend to start the same way, with a Request early access or Grab an invite! call to action. They tend to end the same way, too: a Typeform asking for your name and email, and then… deafening silence. As customer acquisition costs rise, startups employ waitlists as a way to onboard small numbers of high-intention users, as opposed to large vanity numbers of low-intention users. This was clear in HEY, as well as in products like Superhuman and Pitch — when Superhuman launched, for example, the only way to get past the waitlist was to get an invite from someone already onboarded to the product.

这些候补案例研究都倾向于以相同的方式开始，即请求抢先访问或获取 邀请！ 呼吁采取行动。 它们也往往以相同的方式结尾：一个Typeform询问您的姓名和电子邮件，然后……震耳欲聋。 随着客户获取成本的上升，初创公司采用候补名单来吸引少量的高意愿用户，而不是大量的低意愿用户。 这在HEY以及Superhuman和Pitch之类的产品中都很明显-例如，当Superhuman推出时，唯一通过等待列表的方法是从已经加入该产品的人员那里获得邀请。

It’s important for startups to employ some kind of filtering method to bucket potential users into low, medium, and high-intention users. These surveys and filters typically assess potential users’:

对于初创公司而言，采用某种过滤方法将潜在用户划分为低，中和高意图用户非常重要。 这些调查和过滤器通常会评估潜在用户的：

• Role and seniority within an organization

  组织中的角色和资历

• Level of social status (by requesting social links, like a Twitter URL)

  社会地位级别(通过请求社交链接，例如Twitter URL)

• Current workflows and operating systems

  当前的工作流程和操作系统

• Eagerness to use the product and familiarity with the pain point

  渴望 使用产品并熟悉痛点

Another case study of brands using waitlists to test consumer demand is the 2018 launch of Robinhood’s high-yield checking account. Robinhood set out to test both growth and consumer demand in one shot by developing a “social waitlist:” users were encouraged to share their unique signup link to move themselves further up the list. The result was a wave of word-of-mouth virality, with 90,000+ people joining the waitlist shortly after it went live. Spoiler alert: after the viral initial launch, it never got off the ground.

品牌使用候补名单测试消费者需求的另一个案例研究是Robinhood的高收益支票账户于2018年推出。 Robinhood着手通过开发“社交候补列表”来一次测试增长和消费者需求：鼓励用户共享其独特的注册链接，以将自己进一步移至列表上方。 结果是口口相传的浪潮，在候补名单上线后不久，就有90,000多人加入了候补名单。 扰流板警报 ：病毒初次发射后， 它从未脱落 。

In short? Waitlists are a popular launch strategy, but they aren’t one-size-fits-all. Enterprise startups typically leverage waitlists while they stack their user base with impressive logos, thus increasing landing page signup conversion rate when they launch publicly. Consumer startups use waitlists to create network effects and ensure the product is sticky before opening up for business. As a general rule of thumb, waitlists should be used until startups see product market fit markers (more on that here), and retired as the startup scales.

简而言之？ 候补名单是一种流行的启动策略，但并非千篇一律。 企业初创企业通常在其用户群中堆放令人印象深刻的徽标时利用候补列表，从而在公开启动时提高了登陆页面注册转换率。 消费类初创企业使用候补名单来创建网络效果，并在开始营业之前确保产品具有粘性。 作为一般经验法则，应使用等待列表，直到初创企业看到产品适合市场的标记( 此处有更多信息 )，并随着初创企业的规模而退休。

蓝色检查现象(影响者) (The Blue Check Phenomenon (Influencer))

We get an especially fresh take on exciting product launches from MSCHF, a Brooklyn-based ideas factory known for “capturing meme lightning in a bottle.”

我们特别兴奋地从位于布鲁克林的创意工厂MSCHF推出令人兴奋的产品发布，该工厂以“ 在瓶中捕获模因闪电 ”而闻名。

“We build what we want. We don’t care,” says MSCHF head of commerce Daniel Greenberg. “If we can make people a fan of the brand and not the product, we can do whatever the f — k we want.” MSCHF sets aside no budget for advertisements and marketing, and conducts no user testing of its products. Instead, they partner with “blue check” influencers like Future, NBA athletes, and MrBeast (YouTuber with over 37 million subscribers) to add virality to their tongue-in-cheek products. MSCHF’s Drop 25, a $1,000 multi-brand collab shirt, sold out in less than an hour.

“我们建立自己想要的东西。 我们不在乎。” MSCHF商业主管 Daniel Greenberg说。 “如果我们可以使人们成为品牌的拥护者，而不是产品的拥护者，那么我们可以做任何我们想做的事情。” MSCHF不留广告和营销预算，也不对产品进行用户测试。 相反，他们与诸如Future ， NBA运动员和MrBeast (拥有超过3700万订阅者的YouTuber)之类的“蓝色支票”影响者合作，为他们的舌头产品增加了病毒性。 MSCHF的Drop 25 ，价值1,000美元的多品牌协作衬衫，在不到一个小时的时间内就卖光了。

The same “blue check phenomenon” is seen with gaming and lifestyle brand 100 Thieves, which boasts Drake and Scooter Braun as two of its high-profile co-owners, and Cash App, Red Bull, Totinos, and Rocket Mortgage as commercial sponsors.

游戏和生活方式品牌100 Thieves看到了同样的“蓝图现象”，该公司以Drake和Scooter Braun作为其两个著名的共同所有者 ，而Cash App，Red Bull，Totinos和Rocket Mortgage作为商业赞助商。

This trend is common in consumer & software products, too: companies like Clubhouse and Atoms have also employed influencer marketing as part of a larger launch strategy. When Clubhouse launched, they made sure to get positive press from a number of Twitter “blue check” influencers, like Oprah, Ashton Kutcher, Chris Rock, and Mark Cuban. And when Atoms was just getting started, they capitalized on positive public feedback from notable Twitter personalities, like Alexis Ohanian, Anthony Pompliano, and Ashley Mayer.

这种趋势在消费者和软件产品中也很常见： Clubhouse和Atoms等公司也已经采用影响者营销作为更大的发布策略的一部分。 当Clubhouse推出时，他们确保获得来自Twitter的众多“蓝格子”影响者的积极舆论，例如Oprah，Ashton Kutcher，Chris Rock和Mark Cuban 。 当Atoms刚刚起步时，他们利用了Twitter知名人士(如Alexis Ohanian ， Anthony Pompliano和Ashley Mayer)的积极公众反馈。

公共建筑 (Building In Public)

One of the most well-known leaders of the “building in public” phenomenon is Austen Allred, Founder & CEO of Lambda School. Allred largely built his company on Twitter, and those who followed him got to see him build Lambda in real time. Each tweet strategically related to Allred’s bold vision of reforming the higher education landscape; Allred encouraged his followers to engage and publicly brainstorm with him. Allred didn’t celebrate Lambda’s wins alone — he and his followers were all part of the same team. Like the underdog on a baseball team, Allred was the face of Lambda School and the underdog of the tech community. Each time he got on base, the crowd went wild.

Lambda School的创始人兼首席执行官奥斯汀·艾德雷德 ( Austen Allred)是“公共建筑”现象最著名的领导人之一。 Allred在Twitter上主要建立了他的公司，而跟随他的人也看到了他实时建立Lambda。 每条推文都与艾雷德(Allred)改革高等教育的大胆构想具有战略意义； Allred鼓励他的追随者与他互动并公开集思广益。 Allred并没有一个人庆祝Lambda的胜利-他和他的追随者都是同一支球队的成员。 就像棒球队的失败者一样，Allred是Lambda学校和科技界失败者的面Kong。 每当他进驻基地时，人群就会疯狂。

More recently, the tech Twitter community watched a similar journey with Domm, Founder & CEO of Fast. He met his cofounder Allison Barr Allen through a cold DM, hired “probably half [his] team through Twitter,” and even made connections with VCs and angels through Twitter, leading Fast to a $20M Series A round in March. As Domm explained during an interview with The Takeoff, Twitter “can be amazing at driving community support and building teams, a community of investors, or a community of users and early adopters.”

最近，高科技Twitter社区注视着类似的旅程Domm的创始人兼首席执行官快 。 他通过一个冷淡的DM与他的联合创始人艾里森·巴尔·艾伦(Allison Barr Allen)会面，并通过Twitter雇用了“ 他的团队的大约一半 ”，甚至通过Twitter与风险投资家和天使投资人建立了联系，使Fast在三月份获得了2000万美元的A轮融资。 正如Domm在接受 The Takeoff的采访中解释的那样，Twitter“在推动社区支持和建立团队，投资者社区或用户和早期采用者社区方面令人惊叹。”

What does this “building in public” phenomenon actually look like in action? For both Allred and Domm, it looked like vulnerability and authenticity. Their playbook for building in public looked something like this:

这种“公开建设”现象实际上在行动中是什么样的？ 对于Allred和Domm来说，它看起来像漏洞和真实性。 他们在公共场所搭建的剧本看起来像这样：

• Share real quotes & screenshots of feedback from users

  共享真实报价和用户反馈的屏幕截图

• Propose interesting product ideas and ask the community for feedback

  提出有趣的产品构想，并要求社区提供反馈

• Articulate roadblocks the company is facing and how to overcome them

  明确指出公司面临的障碍以及如何克服这些障碍

• Give insight into largely unknown aspects of the company/product

  深入了解公司/产品的未知方面

• Share “sneak peeks” and vague product updates for things to come

  分享“偷窥”和模糊的产品更新 ，以备将来之需

• Post screenshots of internal Slack messages showcasing company culture

  发布内部Slack消息的屏幕快照 ，展示公司文化

• Tell emotional stories about your company to pull at followers’ heartstrings

  讲出有关您公司的情感故事 ，吸引追随者的注意

• Quote Tweet someone describing a problem and respond “We are fixing this at …”

  引用某人描述问题的推文，然后回复“我们正在解决此问题……”

钱袋 (Moneybags)

Next in the playbook is Moneybags: paid marketing… and lots of it. Especially in recent months, we’ve watched from afar as some consumer products employed aggressive launch strategies but ultimately resulted in major flops… or nothing at all.

剧本中的下一个是Moneybags：付费行销……还有很多。 尤其是在最近几个月中，我们一直在观察一些消费产品采用了激进的发布策略，但最终导致了重大失败……或根本没有失败。

For example, short-form TV app Quibi predicted 7.2 million subscribers by year-end. They launched on April 6th — now, they’re on pace for just 2 million, as millions deleted the service after their three-month free trial was over.

例如，简短的电视应用Quibi预测到年底将有720万订户。 他们于4月6日推出了服务-现在，他们的进度仅为200万，因为在为期三个月的免费试用期结束后，数百万人删除了该服务。

Or think of Elliot, which invested huge sums of money into its marketing strategy, but ultimately had nothing to show for it.

试想一下艾略特(Elliot) ，该公司在其营销策略中投入了巨额资金，但最终却无所作为。

According to their pitch, Elliot was “going to be the anti-Shopify — an international e-commerce platform that focused on smaller businesses in an increasingly globalized world.” Elliot branded itself as hip and transparent, securing ad placements in newsletters like Lean Luxe and gaining traction on Twitter through inspirational (and easily shareable) threads.

按照他们的观点 ，埃利奥特“ 将成为反Shopify —一个国际电子商务平台，专注于日益全球化的世界中的小型企业 。” Elliot将自己的品牌塑造为时髦而透明的品牌，在Lean Luxe等新闻通讯中确保了广告位置，并通过鼓舞人心(且易于共享)的线程在Twitter上赢得了关注。

Elliot rode the direct-to-consumer wave of marketing first, product second, spending $800,000 on marketing, according to a court document from last January. Investor checks rolled in, and excitement began to build for their planned launch on June 18. When the day finally came, however, things began to unravel: the launch was abruptly pushed back to December 25th, and a few days later, the CEO announced that he was stepping down. Within 24 hours, Elliot was shut down completely in a “triage scenario” — with many employees learning of the demise through social media before any internal channels. Their fall from greatness was just as public as their rise up in the first place.

根据去年1月的一份法庭文件，艾略特(Elliot) 率先进行了直接面向消费者的营销，其次是产品，在营销上花费了80万美元。 投资者的检查开始了，计划于6月18日启动的项目开始引起人们的兴奋。然而，当这一天终于到来时，事情开始瓦解：启动被突然推迟到12月25日，几天后，首席执行官宣布他正在下台。 在24小时之内，Elliot在“分流方案”中被完全关闭 -许多员工在没有任何内部渠道的情况下通过社交媒体了解了死亡情况。 他们从伟大中堕落就像他们一开始的崛起一样公开。

外卡 (Wild Card)

Lastly, of course, a piece centered around launch strategies and virality would no longer be complete without a reference to itiswhatitis (@itiseyemoutheye on Twitter), a mysterious meme that flooded the tech Twitter timeline in late June, leveraging the relentless hype of exclusive consumer apps. It reached top Product of the Day on Product Hunt, and its website accumulated over 20,000 email signups. Perhaps most importantly, itiswhatitis raised over $200,000 in donations to racial justice charities from people who “hoped to get special treatment within [the] fabled waitlist.” As written in this Product Hunt Daily Digest, itiswhatitis wasn’t a startup, or even a product. It was a statement, highlighting the influence of secrecy and exclusivity on the entire Silicon Valley tech community — and it will forever be an important case study of consumer virality in its rawest form.

最后，当然，围绕发布策略和病毒式传播的内容如果不提及itiswhatitis (Twitter上的@itiseyemoutheye )，就不会再完整了，这是一个神秘的模因，它在6月下旬充斥了技术Twitter时间轴，并利用了独家消费者的不懈炒作。应用。 它在“ 产品搜索”中达到了“当日最佳产品”，其网站累计注册了20,000多个电子邮件。 也许最重要的是，抗炎药从“ 希望在传说中的候补名单中获得特殊待遇的人”向种族司法慈善机构募集了超过20万美元的捐款 。 就像在《 产品日报》摘要中所写的那样，炎性不是初创企业，甚至不是产品。 这份声明强调了保密性和排他性对整个硅谷技术社区的影响-这将永远是最原始形式的消费者病毒式传播的重要案例研究。

As we’ve seen, there are myriad ways to launch a consumer product. At the end of the day, however, what’s the moral of the story? To begin, the launch isn’t everything: the hype cycle of exclusivity surrounding product launches only works when the shipping cycle is in sync. If the hype and shipping cycles aren’t working in parallel, and if the product itself isn’t there, then the launch strategy is useless. That said, if the product is ready to be launched, remember that viral consumer product launches don’t just happen by accident. Instead, it’s the combination of exclusivity + platform (in many of these cases, Twitter) that can skyrocket a concept from zero to hero with the right approach.

正如我们所看到的，有无数种发布消费产品的方法。 归根结底，这个故事的寓意是什么？ 首先， 发布还不是全部 ：围绕产品启动的排他性炒作周期仅在运输周期同步时才起作用。 如果炒作和出货周期不能同时进行，并且产品本身不存在，那么发布策略将毫无用处。 就是说，如果准备好要发布该产品，请记住， 病毒式消费产品的发布并非偶然。 相反，它是排他性 + 平台 (在许多情况下为Twitter)的组合，可以通过正确的方法将概念从零猛增到英雄。

Editor’s Note: In this conversation, it’s also important to note that most launch strategies don’t address the role of the unfair advantage, where a consumer product founder is someone of note and has their own exclusive access to people/resources not accessible to the general public. To highlight just some of these:

编者注：在本次对话中，还需要注意的是，大多数启动策略并没有解决不公平优势的作用，在这种情况下，消费产品的创建者是值得注意的人，并且他们拥有对无法访问的人员/资源的专有访问权限。公众。 要突出其中的一些：

• Superhuman was built by a second-time founder of a successful product bought by LinkedInSuperhuman是由LinkedIn的成功创始人的第二次创始人创建的
• Hey was built by Basecamp founders with a huge existing audience嗨，是由Basecamp创始人在现有的庞大受众群体中打造的
• Clubhouse was built by seasoned founders and tech minds, surrounded by an already-elite circle俱乐部会所由经验丰富的创始人和技术思想家共同打造，周围已经是精英阶层