This week, the CEOs of Amazon, Apple, Facebook, and Google appeared before Congress to justify their market power. The House Antitrust Subcommittee wanted to present findings from its investigation into whether the firms stifle competition.

Ť他本周，亚马逊，苹果，脸谱的首席执行官，而谷歌在国会似乎证明他们的市场力量。 众议院反托拉斯小组委员会希望提出其对公司是否扼杀竞争的调查结果。

Lawyers like myself have worried the Committee would waste time with ignorant and irrelevant questions. In the past, Congress has struggled with basic facts, like how Facebook makes money without charging users (“Senator, we run ads”). That happened on Wednesday, with one representative unclear on Apple’s commission for in-app purchases, and many Republicans spending their time decrying censorship against conservatives.

像我这样的律师一直担心委员会会浪费时间来解决无知和无关紧要的问题。 过去，国会一直在努力应对基本事实，例如Facebook如何在不向用户收费的情况下赚钱 (“参议员，我们投放广告”)。 这发生在周三，一位代表不清楚苹果在应用程序内购买的佣金，许多共和党人花费时间谴责对保守派的审查。

But if you cut out the spectacle, you’ll see that most members of Congress came prepared to ask informed, perceptive questions about how these large companies have stifled competition. The important issues were raised, and skepticism of the companies’ power was bipartisan.

但是，如果您裁掉眼镜，您会发现大多数国会议员都准备好就这些大公司如何遏制竞争提出知情而敏锐的问题。 提出了重要问题，对公司权力的怀疑是两党的。

Many members of Congress came prepared to ask informed, perceptive questions about how these large companies have stifled competition.

许多国会议员准备问有关这些大公司如何扼杀竞争的知情的问题。

Here are the most important takeaways for each company:

这是每个公司最重要的要点：

亚马孙 (Amazon)

问题 (The Issues)

Amazon controls a large share of e-commerce sales through its sites, where Amazon sells products it makes alongside third-parties selling their products. Amazon’s large share of online shopping could give Amazon unfair power to raise prices or extract unfair terms from third-party sellers. Antitrust law prohibits a company with significant power in one market from using that power to gain an unfair advantage in another market. So if Amazon’s marketplace is so large that companies have no choice but to sell there, Amazon would have leverage to demand sellers pay for advertising to show up in search results.

亚马逊通过其网站控制着很大一部分电子商务销售，在该网站上，亚马逊出售自己生产的产品，而第三方则销售其产品。 亚马逊在网上购物中的份额很大，可能赋予亚马逊不公平的权力以提价或从第三方卖家中提取不公平的条款。 反托拉斯法禁止在一个市场上拥有重要权力的公司利用该权力在另一个市场上获得不公平的优势。 因此，如果亚马逊的市场如此之大，以至于公司别无选择，只能在那儿销售，那么亚马逊将有能力要求卖方支付广告费用以显示在搜索结果中。

These concerns led the committee to ask Amazon for documents about topics such as how Amazon uses data from third-party sellers to develop new products and whether Amazon gives favorable treatment to its own products.

这些担忧导致委员会要求亚马逊提供有关主题的文件 ，例如亚马逊如何使用第三方卖家的数据来开发新产品以及亚马逊是否对其自己的产品给予优惠待遇。

证词 (The Testimony)

Almost every question to Amazon CEO Jeff Bezos was specifically about Amazon’s power over online commerce and whether Amazon has harmed competitors. The fact that the Subcommittee understood Amazon’s business practices and knew what questions to ask are a bad sign for Amazon, but a good sign for customers hoping for a more competition in online shopping.

几乎对亚马逊首席执行官杰夫·贝佐斯(Jeff Bezos)的每个问题都是关于亚马逊在在线商务方面的实力以及亚马逊是否损害了竞争对手。 小组委员会了解亚马逊的商业惯例，知道要问什么问题，这对亚马逊来说是一个坏兆头，但对于希望在在线购物中展开更多竞争的客户来说，则是一个好兆头。

Bezos admitted that:

贝索斯承认：

1. Amazon controls almost half the e-commerce market.

1.亚马逊控制着几乎一半的电子商务市场。

A common way to defend antitrust charges is to define your “market” very broadly. At the hearing, Bezos argued that Amazon controls less than 1% of the “global retail market,” but that definition of “retail” included any consumer spending, such as restaurants and bars.

捍卫反托拉斯指控的一种常见方法是非常广泛地定义您的“市场”。 在听证会上，贝索斯辩称，亚马逊控制着不到1％的“全球零售市场”，但“零售”的定义包括餐馆和酒吧等任何消费者支出。

Citing a third-party analyst used by Amazon, Rep. Joe Neguse showed that Amazon accounts for almost 50% of e-commerce sales. Bezos conceded that number, but said that online shopping is just a “channel” rather than a market.

众议员Joe Neguse援引亚马逊使用的第三方分析师的话说，亚马逊几乎占了电子商务销售额的50％。 贝索斯承认了这个数字，但表示在线购物只是一个“渠道”，而不是市场。

2. Amazon uses data from third-party sellers to build competing products.

2.亚马逊使用来自第三方卖家的数据来构建竞争产品。

When deciding what new product to make and sell, Amazon has claimed it prohibits employees from looking at data from individual sellers and only looks at aggregated data by product category (like “laundry detergent”). Under questioning, Bezos admitted that Amazon does not enforce its policy and that Amazon categories are sometimes so narrow that only one or two companies sell those products. So, even if Amazon enforced its policy, it essentially uses individual seller data to determine what products to sell.

亚马逊声称在决定生产和销售哪种新产品时，它禁止员工查看单个卖家的数据，而仅按产品类别(例如“洗衣粉”)查看汇总数据。 在受到质疑时，贝索斯承认亚马逊没有执行其政策，而且亚马逊的类别有时是如此狭窄，以至于只有一两家公司出售这些产品。 因此，即使亚马逊执行了其政策，它实际上也使用了个人卖家数据来确定要出售的产品。

3. Amazon used its power to kill a competitor and raise diaper prices.

3.亚马逊利用其力量杀死竞争对手并提高尿布价格。

In 2010, Amazon bought the website Diapers.com, a major competitor for diaper sales. At the hearing, Rep. Mary Scanlon showed internal emails where Amazon worried it was losing sales because Diapers.com had lower fulfillment costs. Instead of fixing its own diaper fulfillment costs, Amazon used profits from its other business lines to run promotions and poach diaper customers. Amazon was losing $200 million a month, but once Diapers.com lost enough customers, Amazon acquired them for cheap. Then the promotions went away, and diaper prices on Amazon shot up.

2010年，亚马逊收购了尿布销售的主要竞争对手网站Diapers.com。 在听证会上，众议员Mary Scanlon在内部电子邮件中显示了亚马逊担心由于Diapers.com的履行成本较低而失去销售的情况。 亚马逊没有固定自己的尿布履行成本，而是利用其他业务线的利润来开展促销活动并挖走尿布客户。 亚马逊每月亏损2亿美元，但是一旦Diapers.com失去了足够的客户，亚马逊便以便宜的价格收购了他们。 然后促销活动消失了，亚马逊上的尿布价格猛涨。

苹果 (Apple)

问题 (The Issues)

To get on the App Store, apps selling digital services must use Apple’s payment services, with Apple keeping 30%. Since the majority of app spending happens on the App Store, Apple has significant market power that could be leveraged to help Apple’s other business. For example, Apple can boost Apple Music by making Spotify pay a direct competitor 30% of its revenue.

要进入App Store，销售数字服务的应用必须使用Apple的支付服务，而Apple保留30％的费用。 由于大多数应用程序支出都发生在App Store上，因此Apple具有强大的市场力量，可以用来帮助Apple的其他业务。 例如，苹果可以通过让Spotify向直接竞争对手支付其收入的30％来提升Apple Music。

To study this problem, Congress requested Apple provide information about Apple’s App Store moderation practices and requirement that apps use in-app payments.

为了研究此问题， 国会要求 Apple提供有关Apple App Store审核惯例以及要求应用程序使用应用程序内付款的信息。

证词 (The Testimony)

Similar to Bezos, Apple CEO Tim Cook faced tough questions about Apple’s habit of competing with its app developers and use of App Store approval to gain leverage in other areas.

与Bezos相似，苹果首席执行官蒂姆·库克(Tim Cook)面临着一个严峻的问题，即苹果与应用程序开发人员竞争的习惯以及使用App Store批准来在其他领域获得影响力。

We learned that:

我们了解到：

1. App developers (including Facebook) fear Apple’s power to kill their businesses.

1.应用程序开发人员(包括Facebook)担心苹果杀死其业务的能力。

Because Apple has the final say over what can be in the App Store, it could completely kill an app-based business. One representative quoted an internal Facebook document where Facebook said it feared Apple could “choke off” its apps from the App Store. (Apple did that in 2019 to Facebook’s internal employee apps and threatened Uber with the same.)

由于苹果公司对应用程序商店中的内容拥有最终决定权，因此它可能会完全扼杀基于应用程序的业务。 一位代表引用了一份Facebook内部文件，其中Facebook表示担心苹果可能会“扼杀”来自App Store的应用程序。 (苹果公司这样做，在2019年Facebook的内部员工应用程序和威胁尤伯杯同用。)

Another representative quoted complaints from ClassPass and Airbnb that Apple demanded a cut of their virtual fitness and cooking classes. Since these companies are trying to survive in the pandemic, threatening a shutdown appeared to be “pandemic profiteering.”

另一位代表引用了ClassPass和Airbnb的抱怨，称苹果要求削减其虚拟健身和烹饪课程。 由于这些公司正试图在大流行中生存，因此威胁关闭将是“大流行牟取暴利”。

2. Developers think Apple’s 30% cut is too high.

2.开发人员认为苹果30％的降幅太高了。

Rep. Jamie Raskin quoted one developer who pays 25% of her revenue in taxes and 30% to Apple, leaving 45% of revenue to pay for business expenses and provide a living. Another representative made Cook admit that nothing could stop Apple from increasing its fees to 50%.

众议员杰米·拉斯金(Jamie Raskin)引用了一位开发商的话，该开发商将其收入的25％缴纳了税款，并将30％的收入缴纳给了苹果公司，剩下的45％的收入用于支付商业开支和谋生。 另一位代表让库克承认，没有什么可以阻止苹果将其费用提高到50％。

In response, Cook claimed Apple was in a “streetfight” for developers, who could develop on many platforms. Cook suggested unhappy developers could instead make apps for Android, Xbox, or PlayStation. Oh, yeah, let me call an Uber on my Xbox.

作为回应，库克声称苹果正在为开发人员“打架”，他们可以在许多平台上进行开发。 库克建议不满意的开发人员可以改用Android，Xbox或PlayStation开发应用程序。 哦，是的，让我在Xbox上呼叫Uber。

3. As a platform operator, Apple bans copycat apps but makes its own.

3.作为平台运营商，苹果禁止模仿应用程序，但自行开发。

One representative noted Apple does not follow its own rules. Apple’s developer guidelines warns developers against making “copycat” apps, but Apple expressly reserves the right to make apps with the same functionality as popular ones.

一位代表指出，苹果没有遵守自己的规则。 苹果公司的开发人员指南警告开发人员不要制作“模仿者”应用程序，但苹果公司明确保留制作具有与流行功能相同功能的应用程序的权利。

As an example, several representatives noted that the App Store used to have many parental control apps limiting phone time for children. Apple then created its own version, Screen Time for iOS. After Screen Time Launched, the third-party apps were removed for alleged privacy issues, though later reinstated without changes.

例如，一些代表指出，App Store曾经有许多家长控制应用程序限制了儿童的电话时间。 苹果随后创建了自己的版本，即iOS的Screen Time 。 屏幕时间启动后，第三方应用由于涉嫌的隐私问题而被删除，不过后来又恢复了原状。

脸书 (Facebook)

问题 (The Issues)

Facebook acquires competing social media services before they can threaten Facebook’s marketshare, and it copies competitors it cannot acquire. Systematically acquiring your competitors to control a market is illegal. Congress’s document requests focused mostly on Facebook’s acquisitions of Instagram and WhatsApp.

Facebook会在竞争性社交媒体服务威胁到Facebook的市场份额之前就收购它们，并复制它无法收购的竞争对手。 系统地收购竞争对手以控制市场是非法的。 国会的文件要求主要集中在Facebook对Instagram和WhatsApp的收购上。

证词 (The Testimony)

Mark Zuckerberg got a lot of questions, many of which were irrelevant. But the relevant questions were sharp because Facebook’s own documents were so damning.

马克·扎克伯格(Mark Zuckerberg)提出了很多问题，其中许多都是无关紧要的。 但是相关的问题很尖锐，因为Facebook自己的文件太糟糕了。

Facebook’s documents showed that:

Facebook的文件显示：

1. Facebook uses acquisitions to get rid of competitors.

1. Facebook通过收购来摆脱竞争对手。

Facebook documents showed it had a deliberate strategy of buying its competitors. As Republican Matt Gaetz pointed out, Facebook emails showed the company was willing to spend 10% of its market cap to acquire competitors in a “digital land grab.”

Facebook的文件显示，它有故意收购竞争对手的策略。 正如共和党人马特·盖茨(Matt Gaetz)所指出的那样，Facebook电子邮件显示该公司愿意将其市值的10％用于“数字土地争夺”中收购竞争对手。

Before buying Instagram, Zuckerberg wrote in an email that Instagram can meaningfully hurt us,” though after acquisition he noted that “One thing about startups is that you can often acquire them.” As a representative summarized, “In your own words, you purchased Instagram to neutralize a competitive threat.”

在购买Instagram之前，扎克伯格在一封电子邮件中写道，Instagram可能对我们造成重大伤害，”尽管他被收购后指出“关于初创企业的一件事是，您经常可以收购它们。” 正如一位代表总结的那样，“用您自己的话说，您购买Instagram是为了消除竞争威胁。”

“In your own words, you purchased Instagram to neutralize a competitive threat.”

“用您自己的话说，您购买了Instagram以消除竞争威胁。”

Like Bezos, Zuckerberg tried to redefine the market to show Facebook had countless competitors. He claimed that Facebook’s market is “connecting with people,” so Facebook competes with any method of human communication. Unfortunately, Facebook’s own presentations showed it viewed its market as “all social media” and dominated that market.

像贝佐斯一样，扎克伯格试图重新定义市场，以表明Facebook拥有无数竞争对手。 他声称Facebook的市场正在“与人联系”，因此Facebook可以与任何人类交流方法竞争。 不幸的是，Facebook自己的演示显示它将其市场视为“所有社交媒体”并主导了该市场。

2. Facebook copies the competitors who don’t sell.

2. Facebook复制不销售的竞争对手。

In another internal email, Facebook said moving fast helped it copy competitors before they could get big and become a threat. Rep. Pramila Jayapal quoted the email and asked point blank, “Do you copy your competitors?”

在另一封内部电子邮件中，Facebook表示，快速采取行动有助于在竞争对手壮大并成为威胁之前复制竞争对手。 众议员Pramila Jayapal引用了电子邮件，并问空白：“您复制竞争对手吗？”

Zuckerberg: “We’ve certainly adapted features.”

扎克伯格：“我们当然调整了功能。”

(During the hearing, a Facebook engineer texted a reporter, “We’re literally copying TikTok right now.”)

(在听证会上，一名Facebook工程师向记者发了短信： “我们现在正在字面上抄袭TikTok。”)

The possibility of copying encouraged Instagram to sell. Zuckerberg told Instagram the companies could either be partners or competitors, which Instagram founder Kevin Systrom interpreted as a threat Facebook would go into “destroy mode.” Facebook’s dual strategies of buying competitors or activating “destroy mode” against holdouts convinced Jayapal that Facebook was a “case study in monopoly power.”

复制的可能性鼓励Instagram出售。 扎克伯格告诉Instagram，这些公司可以是合作伙伴，也可以是竞争对手。Instagram创始人凯文·西斯特罗姆(Kevin Systrom)将其解释为Facebook可能进入“破坏模式”的威胁。 Facebook的双重策略，即购买竞争对手或激活反对派的“破坏模式”，使贾亚帕尔确信Facebook是“垄断力量的案例研究”。

“When the dominant platform threatens its potential rivals, that should not be a normal business practice. Facebook is a case study, in my opinion, in monopoly power.”

“当主导平台威胁其潜在竞争对手时，这不应该是正常的商业惯例。 我认为，Facebook是案例研究，具有垄断权。”

谷歌 (Google)

问题 (The Issues)

Most online searches are performed on Google, and Google controls most online display advertisements. Using dominance in those markets to boost Google services in other markets like Google Shopping would be an antitrust problem. Google was requested to provide information about its acquisition of other advertising companies and its treatment of Google services in search ranking.

大多数在线搜索都是在Google上执行的，而Google控制着大多数在线展示广告。 利用这些市场的主导地位来提升Google购物等其他市场的Google服务将是一个反托拉斯问题。 要求 Google提供有关其收购其他广告公司以及其在搜索排名中对Google服务的处理方式的信息。

证词 (The Testimony)

Google CEO Sundar Pichai faced tough questions about how much of the web Google controls. Congress showed that:

Google首席执行官Sundar Pichai面临有关Google控制多少网络的棘手问题。 国会表明：

1. Google controls all parts of an advertising transaction.

1. Google控制广告交易的所有部分。

Google owns almost all of the software websites use to place and sell advertisements on their site, and it owns the services advertisers use to find space to put their ads. Google also owns the exchange where both sides negotiate on price. One representative noted that Google essentially negotiates against itself and can charge high prices to advertisers, pay low prices to websites running ads, and pocket the difference. Multiple representatives blamed Google’s control over prices for local journalism dying, since the outlets could not support themselves on ads.

Google拥有几乎所有用于在其网站上放置和销售广告的软件网站，并且拥有广告客户用来查找放置广告的空间的服务。 谷歌还拥有双方在价格上进行谈判的交易所。 一位代表指出，谷歌本质上是与自己进行谈判，可以向广告客户收取高价，向运行广告的网站支付低价，并差价。 多位代表指责Google对当地新闻业垂死的价格控制，因为这些网点无法在广告中维持生计。

2. Google may use privacy as a justification to shut out other advertising companies.

2. Google可能以隐私为由拒绝其他广告公司。

Because privacy laws like the GDPR require companies handling private information to share as little as possible, Google cites them when it restricts access to user data, which incidentally makes Google’s advertising tools more valuable. For example, Google blocked third-party ads from being served on YouTube, requiring advertisers to go through Google. A representative at the hearing pressed Pichai on how that conveniently boosts Google’s ad business, though Pichai did not directly admit it. Pichai similarly did not directly respond to whether Chrome phasing out third-party cookies would allow Google to monitor web activity for advertising (through the browser) while third-party ad networks were shut out.

由于像GDPR这样的隐私法要求处理私人信息的公司尽可能少地共享信息，因此Google在限制访问用户数据时引用了这些信息，这顺便使Google的广告工具更有价值。 例如，谷歌阻止第三方广告在YouTube上投放，这要求广告商必须通过谷歌。 听证会上的一位代表向Pichai敦促Pichai如何方便地促进Google的广告业务，尽管Pichai没有直接承认。 同样，Pichai也没有直接回应Chrome 淘汰第三方Cookie是否会允许Google在第三方广告网络被关闭的情况下(通过浏览器)监视网络广告活动。

Ultimately, each company in the hearing could only cite each other as competition. Apple and Google control the only smartphone platforms. Facebook wants to overtake both YouTube for video and Amazon for shopping. When giants only compete with other giants, they are too big.

ültimately，每家公司在听证会上只能引用彼此竞争。 苹果和谷歌控制着唯一的智能手机平台。 Facebook希望赶超YouTube视频和亚马逊购物。 当巨人仅与其他巨人竞争时，它们太大了。

Where will Congress go from here?

国会将从这里去哪里？

The committee next plans to issue a bipartisan report and propose legislation. Congress can’t just pass a law ordering Facebook to break up, but it can define anti-competitive behavior and provide for regulatory oversight.

该委员会下一步计划发布两党报告并提出立法。 国会不仅可以通过一项命令Facebook解散的法律，而且可以定义反竞争行为并提供监管监督。

Congress can’t just pass a law ordering Facebook to break up.

国会不能仅仅通过一项命令Facebook解散的法律。

One approach would be to strengthen the Federal Trade Commission. The FTC has the power to punish “unfair methods of competition,” but it can’t write regulations or issue fines until the second time a company breaks the law. If the FTC could write regulations, it could define unfair practices for marketplaces like Amazon and the App Store.

一种方法是加强联邦贸易委员会。 FTC 有权惩罚“不正当竞争手段”，但直到公司第二次违反法律时，它才能制定法规或罚款。 如果FTC可以制定法规，则可以为亚马逊和App Store等市场定义不公平的做法。

Congress could also provide regulatory oversight of online advertising. Google acts as a mini stock market for ad buyers and sellers, but there is no equivalent to the SEC to prohibit self-dealing. A federal agency could have oversight authority to ensure Google and similarly situated companies behave appropriately.

国会还可以对在线广告进行监管。 Google充当广告买卖双方的小型证券市场，但没有等同于SEC的自我交易禁令。 联邦机构可以拥有监督权，以确保Google和处于类似地位的公司行为适当。

Finally, Congress could support the FTC and Department of Justice’s antitrust enforcement efforts, either through additional funding for investigations or sharing evidence it has gathered for use by the agencies. I’m personally skeptical the DOJ will be proactive, but it is theoretically possible. Plus, Republicans on the committee seem skeptical of substantively modifying antitrust law, but they may be open to a bipartisan bill providing additional support for enforcing current law.

最后，国会可以通过额外的调查资金或共享其已收集供各机构使用的证据，来支持FTC和司法部的反托拉斯执法工作。 我个人怀疑美国司法部会很积极，但是从理论上讲这是可能的。 另外，委员会上的共和党人似乎对实质性修改反托拉斯法持怀疑态度，但他们可能对两党法案持开放态度，该法案为执行现行法律提供了额外的支持。

There are a lot of takes on this hearing, from derision to optimism to focus on the irrelevant spectacle. But at the end of the day, the committee members showed far more understanding of the internet and digital technology than Congress has shown in the past. That’s something to toast.

从嘲笑到乐观，再到无关紧要的眼镜 ，听证会上有很多事情。 但最终，委员会成员对互联网和数字技术的了解比国会过去显示的要多得多。 那是敬酒的东西。