linux user32.lib,USER32!__ClientLoadLibrary定位

2024-05-03 01:26:46

保护软件一般都直接用新的函数指针替换CallBack表中__ClientLoadLibrary对应的位置

对于Ring3的应用程序，fs:[0]的地址指向的是TEB结构，这个结构的开头是一个NT_TIB结构，NT_TIB结构的0x18偏移处是一个Self指针，指向这个结构自身，也就是指向TEB结构的开头。

TEB结构的0x30偏移是一个指向PEB的指针。PEB又是一个结构，这个结构的0x2偏移处是一个UChar，名叫BeingDebugged，当进程被调试时，此值为1，未被调试时此值为0

因此以下代码逐行执行后的结果：

mov eax,dword ptr fs:[18h];eax=TEB的指针

mov eax,dword ptr [eax+30h];eax＝PEB的指针

movzx eax,byte ptr [eax+2h];eax=PEB.BeingDebugged(byte扩展为dword)

TEB和PEB结构的详细内容可以在windbg内核调试状态下使用dt _TEB、dt _PEB命令来察看。

0:000> x user32!*__ClientLoadLibr*

77d28023 USER32!__ClientLoadLibrary =

可以看出TEB结构的0x30偏移是一个指向PEB的指针

0:001> dt _TEB @$teb

testDemo!_TEB

+0x000 NtTib : _NT_TIB

+0x01c EnvironmentPointer : (null)

+0x020 ClientId : _CLIENT_ID

+0x028 ActiveRpcHandle : (null)

+0x02c ThreadLocalStoragePointer : (null)

+0x030 ProcessEnvironmentBlock : 0x7ffdd000 _PEB

而KernelCallbackTable表在PEB的ox2c处:

0:001> dt _PEB @$peb

testDemo!_PEB

+0x000 InheritedAddressSpace : 0 ''

+0x001 ReadImageFileExecOptions : 0 ''

+0x002 BeingDebugged : 0x1 ''

+0x003 SpareBool : 0 ''

+0x004 Mutant : 0xffffffff

+0x008 ImageBaseAddress : 0x00400000

+0x00c Ldr : 0x00251ea0 _PEB_LDR_DATA

+0x010 ProcessParameters : 0x00020000 _RTL_USER_PROCESS_PARAMETERS

+0x014 SubSystemData : (null)

+0x018 ProcessHeap : 0x00150000

+0x01c FastPebLock : 0x7c99d600 _RTL_CRITICAL_SECTION

+0x020 SparePtr1 : 0x7c921000

+0x024 SparePtr2 : 0x7c9210e0

+0x028 EnvironmentUpdateCount : 1

+0x02c KernelCallbackTable : 0x77d12970

不同版本的window系统KernelCallbackTable函数列表位置不同：以下是XPSP3的：

0:001> r @$peb

$peb=7ffdd000

0:001> dds 0x77d12970

77d12970 77d27f3c USER32!__fnCOPYDATA

77d12974 77d587b3 USER32!__fnCOPYGLOBALDATA

77d12978 77d28ec8 USER32!__fnDWORD

77d1297c 77d2b149 USER32!__fnNCDESTROY

77d12980 77d5876c USER32!__fnDWORDOPTINLPMSG

77d12984 77d5896d USER32!__fnINOUTDRAG

77d12988 77d3b84d USER32!__fnGETTEXTLENGTHS

77d1298c 77d58c42 USER32!__fnINCNTOUTSTRING

77d12990 77d285c1 USER32!__fnINCNTOUTSTRINGNULL

77d12994 77d58b0f USER32!__fnINLPCOMPAREITEMSTRUCT

77d12998 77d2ce26 USER32!__fnINLPCREATESTRUCT

77d1299c 77d58b4d USER32!__fnINLPDELETEITEMSTRUCT

77d129a0 77d4feec USER32!__fnINLPDRAWITEMSTRUCT

77d129a4 77d58b8b USER32!__fnINLPHELPINFOSTRUCT

77d129a8 77d58b8b USER32!__fnINLPHELPINFOSTRUCT

77d129ac 77d589ad USER32!__fnINLPMDICREATESTRUCT

77d129b0 77d4f65c USER32!__fnINOUTLPMEASUREITEMSTRUCT

77d129b4 77d2be16 USER32!__fnINLPWINDOWPOS

77d129b8 77d2d063 USER32!__fnINOUTLPPOINT5

77d129bc 77d2bd0d USER32!__fnINOUTLPSCROLLINFO

77d129c0 77d3e285 USER32!__fnINOUTLPRECT

77d129c4 77d2bf4c USER32!__fnINOUTNCCALCSIZE

77d129c8 77d2bd0d USER32!__fnINOUTLPSCROLLINFO

77d129cc 77d589ff USER32!__fnINPAINTCLIPBRD

77d129d0 77d58a66 USER32!__fnINSIZECLIPBRD

77d129d4 77d30d41 USER32!__fnINDESTROYCLIPBRD

77d129d8 77d2aca1 USER32!__fnINSTRINGNULL

77d129dc 77d2aca1 USER32!__fnINSTRINGNULL

77d129e0 77d1e68c USER32!__fnINDEVICECHANGE

77d129e4 77d58cd7 USER32!__fnINOUTNEXTMENU

77d129e8 77d593f5 USER32!__fnLOGONNOTIFY

77d129ec 77d58728 USER32!__fnOUTDWORDDWORD

0:001> dds 77d129ec

77d129ec 77d58728 USER32!__fnOUTDWORDDWORD

77d129f0 77d58728 USER32!__fnOUTDWORDDWORD

77d129f4 77d586e5 USER32!__fnOUTDWORDINDWORD

77d129f8 77d58acc USER32!__fnOUTLPRECT

77d129fc 77d285c1 USER32!__fnINCNTOUTSTRINGNULL

77d12a00 77d58b8b USER32!__fnINLPHELPINFOSTRUCT

77d12a04 77d285c1 USER32!__fnINCNTOUTSTRINGNULL

77d12a08 77d5882b USER32!__fnSENTDDEMSG

77d12a0c 77d2c2f5 USER32!__fnINOUTSTYLECHANGE

77d12a10 77d30214 USER32!__fnHkINDWORD

77d12a14 77d4f92a USER32!__fnHkINLPCBTACTIVATESTRUCT

77d12a18 77d4f86c USER32!__fnHkINLPCBTCREATESTRUCT

77d12a1c 77d58dce USER32!__fnHkINLPDEBUGHOOKSTRUCT

77d12a20 77d316a3 USER32!__fnHkINLPMOUSEHOOKSTRUCTEX

77d12a24 77d58d54 USER32!__fnHkINLPKBDLLHOOKSTRUCT

77d12a28 77d58d91 USER32!__fnHkINLPMSLLHOOKSTRUCT

77d12a2c 77d278ab USER32!__fnHkINLPMSG

77d12a30 77d58d17 USER32!__fnHkINLPRECT

77d12a34 77d4f065 USER32!__fnHkOPTINLPEVENTMSG

77d12a38 77d58eb9 USER32!__ClientCopyDDEIn1

77d12a3c 77d58efb USER32!__ClientCopyDDEIn2

77d12a40 77d58f5e USER32!__ClientCopyDDEOut1

77d12a44 77d58f2d USER32!__ClientCopyDDEOut2

77d12a48 77d2eb09 USER32!__ClientCopyImage

77d12a4c 77d58f92 USER32!__ClientEventCallback

77d12a50 77d319f6 USER32!__ClientFindMnemChar

77d12a54 77d228f3 USER32!__ClientFontSweep

77d12a58 77d58e4c USER32!__ClientFreeDDEHandle

77d12a5c 77d282ff USER32!__ClientFreeLibrary

77d12a60 77d1f4b2 USER32!__ClientGetCharsetInfo

77d12a64 77d58e83 USER32!__ClientGetDDEFlags

77d12a68 77d58fdc USER32!__ClientGetDDEHookData

0:001> dds 77d12a68

77d12a68 77d58fdc USER32!__ClientGetDDEHookData

77d12a6c 77d4f9f5 USER32!__ClientGetListboxString

77d12a70 77d1ec46 USER32!__ClientGetMessageMPH

77d12a74 77d216eb USER32!__ClientLoadImage

77d12a78 77d28023 USER32!__ClientLoadLibrary

77d12a7c 77d2ec03 USER32!__ClientLoadMenu

77d12a80 77d1ee0d USER32!__ClientLoadLocalT1Fonts

77d12a84 77d209e4 USER32!__ClientLoadRemoteT1Fonts

77d12a88 77d5907b USER32!__ClientPSMTextOut

77d12a8c 77d590d1 USER32!__ClientLpkDrawTextEx

77d12a90 77d59135 USER32!__ClientExtTextOutW

77d12a94 77d5919a USER32!__ClientGetTextExtentPointW

77d12a98 77d59019 USER32!__ClientCharToWchar

77d12a9c 77d1ed14 USER32!__ClientAddFontResourceW

77d12aa0 77d1a13e USER32!__ClientThreadSetup

77d12aa4 77d59253 USER32!__ClientDeliverUserApc

77d12aa8 77d591f1 USER32!__ClientNoMemoryPopup

77d12aac 77d2a740 USER32!__ClientMonitorEnumProc

77d12ab0 77d5944a USER32!__ClientCallWinEventProc

77d12ab4 77d58e15 USER32!__ClientWaitMessageExMPH

77d12ab8 77d2cf8e USER32!__ClientWOWGetProcModule

77d12abc 77d5948d USER32!__ClientWOWTask16SchedNotify

77d12ac0 77d59266 USER32!__ClientImmLoadLayout

77d12ac4 77d592c2 USER32!__ClientImmProcessKey

77d12ac8 77d59302 USER32!__fnIMECONTROL

77d12acc 77d58896 USER32!__fnINWPARAMDBCSCHAR

77d12ad0 77d3b84d USER32!__fnGETTEXTLENGTHS

77d12ad4 77d58bdc USER32!__fnINLPKDRAWSWITCHWND

77d12ad8 77d21805 USER32!__ClientLoadStringW

77d12adc 77d65827 USER32!__ClientLoadOLE

77d12ae0 77d65704 USER32!__ClientRegisterDragDrop

77d12ae4 77d65743 USER32!__ClientRevokeDragDrop

0:001> dds 77d12ae4

77d12ae4 77d65743 USER32!__ClientRevokeDragDrop

77d12ae8 77d593b2 USER32!__fnINOUTMENUGETOBJECT

77d12aec 77d303f7 USER32!__ClientPrinterThunk

77d12af0 77d594cc USER32!__fnOUTLPCOMBOBOXINFO

77d12af4 77d5950c USER32!__fnOUTLPSCROLLBARINFO

我们可以找到__ClientLoadLibrary函数对应的位置:

77d12a78 77d28023 USER32!__ClientLoadLibrary

相对于KernelCallbackTable的起始位置77d12970偏移为0x108,保护软件一般是直接把这一行的77d28023换成自己的函数地址，然后判断传入参数，合法就在自己函数中跳回USER32!__ClientLoadLibrary

摘了一篇文章快照：(自己加点理解)

Anti SetWindowsHookEx DLL injection made possible

Read on.

After spending some time reversing the user32 internals, I discovered this undocumented function. This function is responsible to load the SetWindowsHookEx() registered DLL into your process. This blog will only focus on usermode, where the actual DLL loading takes place.

user32.__ClientLoadLibrary(lpHook)

This function takes only 1 argument, a pointer to an undocumented structure allocated in process stack. It holds the path of the DLL, pointer to notification function and some yet to be known data.

typedefstruct

{

DWORDunknow_0;// 0x00

DWORDunknow_4;// 0x04

DWORDnCount;// 0x08

DWORDunknow_c;// 0x0C

DWORDoffCbKPtrs;// 0x10

DWORDbFixed;// 0x14

UNICODE_STRING lpDllPath; // 0x18

DWORDlpfnNotiy;// 0x20

}USERHOOK;

At the beginning of function, it checks for _USERHOOK.nCount and _USERHOOK.bFixed value. Then it calls toFixupCallbackPointers.

user32.FixupCallbackPointers(lpHook)

It takes only 1 argument, the same argument passed to __ClientLoadLibrary. This function “fix up” the pointers in a pretty interesting way. First it locate the address of callback pointers.

lpCbkPtrs = lpHook + offCbkPtrs

Then it loops through the a list of pointers and fix it up by resolving the offset to actual address.

newaddress = lpHook + offset

After fixing up all the pointers, we return to __ClientLoadLibrary and then it calls to InitUserApiHook.

一般都是自己写FixupCallbackPointers：(其实后dumpbin一看，就会发现这个函数不是导出函数，所以没法直接调用)

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