Human history is a long saga of people learning to harness ever-increasing amounts of energy to maintain ever more complex, ordered systems, punctuated by periodic collapses. The Romans, the Maya — when civilizations became more complex than they could maintain, with the energy and technologies they had, in the face of changing conditions.

^ h乌曼历史是人们学习线束的能量不断增加长的传奇，以保持更加复杂，有序的系统，通过定期崩溃打断。 罗马人，玛雅人，面对不断变化的条件，利用其拥有的能量和技术，使文明变得比其所能维持的更加复杂。

At that point, small stresses sent overstretched social systems into a rapid downward spiral, which ended with major losses of people and social organization, as one stable complex system made a rapid nonlinear descent to a less complex one. But after a setback, humanity always innovated and rebuilt, a little bigger and more complex than before.

在这一点上，小的压力发送overstretche 研发社会系统整合到一个快速下降通道，这与人们和社会组织的重大损失结束，因为一个稳定的复杂系统进行快速非线性下降到一个不太复杂的一个。 但是，在遭受挫折之后，人类总是不断创新和重建，比以前更大，更复杂。

This process is integral to how we should understand pandemics. We now live in the most complex civilization the world has ever seen and the first to encompass the entire planet. Many believe that this makes us resilient to shocks. But, say the complexity theorists, the more complex systems get — the more tightly coupled their component parts, the faster and denser the communication and transport links that keep them all coordinated, the more closely each part relies on many other parts — then the more rigid the system gets overall, the less resilient, the more likely to collapse.

这个过程是我们了解流行病不可或缺的部分。 我们现在生活在世界上见过的最复杂的文明之中，并且是第一个涵盖整个地球的文明。 许多人认为，这使我们能够抵御冲击。 但是，复杂性理论家说， 系统越复杂-各个组成部分之间的耦合越紧密，使它们保持协调一致的通信和传输链接越快且越密集，则每个部分对其他许多部分的依赖就越紧密-那么系统的整体刚性就越强，弹性越差，崩溃的可能性就越大。

Moreover, complex systems — natural ecosystems as much as human societies — tend to become more efficient, with more specialized components and fewer redundant linkages, because that saves money or energy. Thomas Homer-Dixon, a Canadian expert in complex systems and author of The Upside of Down, notes that a mature forest may have one kind of bacteria fixing its soil nitrogen, whereas at an earlier stage of development, it had a dozen.

此外，复杂的系统(自然生态系统与人类社会一样)往往会变得更加高效，具有更专业的组件和更少的冗余链接，因为这样可以节省金钱或能源。 加拿大复杂系统专家， 《颠倒的向上》一书的作者托马斯·霍默·迪克森(Thomas Homer-Dixon)指出，成熟的森林可能具有一种固定土壤氮素的细菌，而在发展的早期阶段，它只有十几种细菌。

Similarly, protective medical gear and the active ingredients for common, emergency drugs used to be produced widely. Michael Osterholm is an epidemiologist who has studied the possible impacts of pandemics. He explained to me that now, a few factories in China make nearly all of these vital supplies, as the global industry takes advantage of low labor costs and economies of scale. This is efficient. Hospitals rely on constant, just-in-time deliveries of these items, too: keeping stocks costs money, so this is also efficient.

同样，防护医疗器械和常用紧急药物的活性成分也被广泛生产。 迈克尔·奥斯特霍尔姆(Michael Osterholm)是一名流行病学家，他研究了大流行的可能影响。 他向我解释说，由于全球工业利用低廉的劳动力成本和规模经济优势，现在，中国的几家工厂几乎供应了所有这些至关重要的产品。 这是有效的。 医院也依赖于这些物品的定期，及时交付：保持库存会花钱，因此这也是有效的。

During the early days of the Covid-19 pandemic when much of China was affected, there were fears deliveries would stop, either because China needed more of these things than usual or because factories might have to shut down as employees were quarantined. If things had gotten much worse or the shutdown had lasted longer, they might well have. There were no alternate sources. Efficient coupling between parts of the system would have led to a breakdown.

在Covid-19大流行的初期，中国大部分地区受到影响，人们担心交付会停止，这可能是因为中国比平时需要更多的东西，或者是由于隔离工人而不得不关闭工厂。 如果情况变得更糟，或者关闭持续了更长的时间，那么他们可能会遇到。 没有其他来源。 系统各部分之间的有效耦合会导致故障。

Homer-Dixon says increasing complexity makes societies more resilient only up to a point. Connections between villages might mean one comes to the other’s aid in an attack. But as the villages become more tightly coupled, both may suffer when one is attacked. A loose network absorbs shock; a tightly coupled one transmits it. That is happening in the Covid-19 pandemic.

荷马·迪克森(Homer-Dixon)说，日益复杂的社会只会使社会在一定程度上更具弹性。 村庄之间的联系可能意味着一个人在另一个人的帮助下发动了进攻。 但是随着村庄之间的紧密联系，当一个村庄遭到袭击时，两个村庄都可能遭受痛苦。 松散的网络会吸收冲击； 一个紧密耦合的人发送它。 在Covid-19大流行中就是这种情况。

Countries go into lockdown; people stop shopping, traveling, and producing; and the effects ricochet through a tightly coupled global economy. The global supply chains of money, materials, people, energy, and component parts that underpin industries falter and break.

各国处于封锁状态； 人们停止购物，旅行和生产； 以及紧密耦合的全球经济带来的影响。 支撑行业步履蹒跚和破裂的货币，材料，人员，能源和零部件的全球供应链。

Airlines go under as they are not set up to weather even a temporary disappearance of travelers. Malaria worsens in Africa as insecticide and antimalarial bed net deliveries falter. Microcredit that underpins small businesses throughout the developing world defaults because payment collectors are locked down, causing ramifications throughout an economy.

航空公司倒闭是因为他们没有准备好承受天气的压力，甚至旅客暂时失踪。 在非洲，由于杀虫剂和抗疟疾床的净投放量减少，疟疾恶化。 支持整个发展中国家小企业的小额信贷违约，是因为付款收款人被锁定，造成整个经济的后果。

The number of people facing starvation threatened to double in April 2020, warned the World Food Programme, even though the same amount of food was available. Lockdowns meant poor people, from tuk-tuk drivers to cleaners to food vendors, could no longer earn money to buy it — and this happened just as restricted global transport made it hard to get donated food to them.

世界粮食计划署警告，即使有同样数量的食物，面临饥饿的人数也有可能在2020年4月翻一番。 封锁意味着从三轮车司机到清洁工再到食品供应商的穷人再也无法赚钱买它了-发生这种情况的原因是全球运输受到限制，使向他们捐赠食物变得困难。

Just the fact that an outbreak in China went pandemic as quickly as it did is a testament to the tight coupling in our global system. For human viruses, the vector is people and airplanes. Scientists tracked this pandemic using computer models and databases of global air passengers. Alessandro Vespignani of Northeastern University calculated that the countries at highest risk of importing a case of Covid-19 were in Asia, followed by North America and Europe — that is exactly how the virus traveled.

中国爆发疫情的速度如此之快就是事实，这证明了我们全球体系的紧密联系。 对于人类病毒，媒介是人和飞机。 科学家使用计算机模型和全球航空旅客数据库跟踪了这种流行病。 东北大学的亚历山德罗·韦斯皮尼亚尼(Alessandro Vespignani)计算出，进口Covid-19病例风险最高的国家是亚洲，其次是北美和欧洲，这正是病毒传播的方式。

Vittoria Colizza of Sorbonne University in Paris calculated that the African country most likely to import a case was Egypt, followed by Algeria. Those countries, in that order, got Africa’s first cases.

巴黎索邦大学的维多利亚·科里扎(Vittoria Colizza)计算得出，最可能进口案件的非洲国家是埃及，其次是阿尔及利亚。 这些国家按此顺序获得了非洲的第一批案件。

The fact that the world is a complex system helps explain how this pandemic happened.

世界是一个复杂的系统这一事实有助于解释这种流行病是如何发生的。

First, it means our system has a management problem. People tend to see things in a simple linear way. That’s not a criticism — we can’t usually control anything but a few, simple, direct interactions within our complex social system. So faced with a problem, those are the solutions on offer. We cannot always anticipate how the rest of the complex system will impinge.

首先，这意味着我们的系统存在管理问题。 人们倾向于以简单的线性方式看到事物。 这不是批评-我们通常无法控制任何东西，而只能在我们复杂的社会系统中进行一些简单，直接的交互。 因此，面对问题，这些就是提供的解决方案。 我们不能总是预见到复杂系统的其余部分将如何受到影响。

Chinese medical authorities said, “we had a close call with SARS and we have bird flu, let’s have doctors signal any unexplained pneumonia, and we’ll see any clusters of cases faster.” Scientists said, “we have a problem with animal viruses infecting people, let’s swab a lot of animals and see what they’re carrying.” Pandemic planners said, “if we have a flu pandemic, we’ll need ventilators and masks, so we’ll stockpile them.”

中国医疗机构表示：“我们与SARS保持了密切联系，我们感染了禽流感，让医生发出任何无法解释的肺炎的信号，并且我们会更快地发现所有病例。” 科学家们说：“我们在感染动物病毒方面遇到了问题，让我们拭去很多动物，看看它们携带的是什么。” 大流行计划者说：“如果我们有流感大流行，我们将需要呼吸机和口罩，因此我们要储备它们。”

All great ideas, and it was a good thing people did or tried to do all of them. But complex interactions took an unexpected hand. In December 2019, when it was clear the unexplained pneumonia wasn’t bird flu, for some reason Wuhan doctors were told not to use the alert system. Scientists found a virus much like Covid-19 in bats and warned of its pandemic potential, but that didn’t nudge research agencies to fund renewed work on coronavirus vaccines. The 2008 market crash — itself a textbook product of complexity and tight coupling in the global financial system — triggered government cuts that tightened health budgets. Then the 2009 flu pandemic was less than catastrophic. Result: hospitals, with few exceptions, did not get the pandemic stockpiles envisioned in 2006.

所有伟大的想法，人们做或尝试去做所有的事情都是一件好事。 但是复杂的交互却出人意料。 2019年12月，很明显无法解释的肺炎不是禽流感，出于某种原因，武汉医生被告知不要使用警报系统。 科学家在蝙蝠中发现了一种类似于Covid-19的病毒，并警告了其大流行的可能性，但并没有推动研究机构为冠状病毒疫苗的新研究提供资金。 2008年的市场崩盘本身就是全球金融体系中复杂性和紧密耦合的教科书产品，引发了政府削减预算，从而收紧了卫生预算。 然后，2009年的流感大流行还没有带来灾难性的后果。 结果：除了少数例外，医院没有获得2006年所设想的大流行疫苗库存。

Western countries have been talking about pandemic preparedness since bird flu rang alarms in the early 2000s. This was especially true in the U.S., which was widely expected to be the country best prepared for something like this. But when Covid-19 hit the U.S., the plan was largely abandoned, while unexpected complications set in everywhere.

自从2000年代初禽流感警报响起以来，西方国家一直在谈论大流行的防范措施。 在美国尤其如此，人们普遍认为美国是为此类事情做好最充分准备的国家。 但是，当Covid-19进入美国市场时，该计划在很大程度上被放弃了，而到处都有意想不到的麻烦。

Health workers didn’t have enough protective gear and ended up sick or in quarantine. Insurance rules meant people couldn’t afford to get tested. For weeks, they couldn’t get tests in any case because of problems with one test at the U.S. CDC in Atlanta. Employees with no paid vacation came in to work, hoping it was just flu. The virus spread earlier and farther than surveillance systems could detect, partly due to years of cuts to public health.

卫生工作者没有足够的防护装备，最终生病或被隔离。 保险规则意味着人们负担不起接受测试的费用。 数周以来，由于在亚特兰大美国疾病预防控制中心进行的一项测试存在问题，他们无论如何都无法获得测试。 没有带薪假期的员工上班，希望只是流感。 该病毒传播得比监视系统所能检测到的更早和更远，部分原因是多年来削减了公共卫生。

Pandemic planners actually warned about many of those problems. But no one could change enough of the system to head them off, and when a severe pandemic didn’t materialize after years of warnings, leaders lost interest. We can’t prepare a complex system for events like pandemics with small, linear solutions to local parts of the problem — we also can’t prepare when we lose focus on any given risk after a few years.

大流行性疾病的计划者实际上警告了其中许多问题。 但是没有人可以改变这个体系，以阻止他们采取行动。当经过多年的警告后，一场严重的大流行没有实现时，领导人就失去了兴趣。 我们无法为诸如流行病之类的事件准备复杂的系统，而无法针对问题的局部问题采用小型线性解决方案-我们也无法在几年后失去对任何给定风险的关注时进行准备。