最近,Syamntec发布了一份有关APT***的新报告——《The Nitro Attacks,Stealing Secrets from the Chemical Industry 》。这次***行动目前主要针对全球的化工厂商,已经持续了数月。该行动之前还针对过其它行业,例如NGO,汽车业等。报道说:

The attackers first researched desired targets and then sent an email specifically to the target. Each organization typically only saw a handful of employees at the receiving end of these emails. However, in one organization almost 500 recipients received a mail, while in two other organizations, more than 100 were selected. While the attackers used different pretexts when sending these malicious emails, two methodologies stood out. First, when a specific recipient was targeted, the mails often purported to be meeting invitations from established business partners. Secondly, when the emails were being sent to a broad set of recipients, the mails purported to be a necessary security update. The emails then contained an attachment that was either an executable that appeared to be a text file based on the file name and icon, or a password-protected archive containing an executable file with the password provided in the email. In both cases, the executable file was a self-extracting executable containing PoisonIvy, a common backdoor Trojan developed by a Chinese speaker.
When the recipient attempted to open the attachment, they would inadvertently execute the file, causing PoisonIvy to be installed. Once PoisonIvy was installed, it contacted a C&C server on TCP port 80 using an encrypted communication protocol. Using the C&C server, the attackers then instructed the compromised computer to provide the infected computer’s IP address, the names of all other computers in the workgroup or domain, and dumps of Windows cached password hashes.
By using access to additional computers through the currently logged on user or cracked passwords through dumped hashes, the attackers then began traversing the network infecting additional computers. Typically, their primary goal is to obtain domain administrator credentials and/or gain access to a system storing intellectual property. Domain administrator credentials make it easier for the attacker to find servers hosting the desired intellectual property and gain access to the sensitive materials. The attackers may have also downloaded and installed additional tools to penetrate the network further.
While the behavior of the attackers differs slightly in each compromise, generally once the attackers have identified the desired intellectual property, they copy the content to archives on internal systems they use as internal staging servers. This content is then uploaded to a remote site outside of the compromised organization completing the attack.

而趋势科技也在今天发布了一个博文,谈到了这个行动,并进行了补充分析。

总体上,这个行动与之前公布出来的APT***行动手法基本类似。都是以钓鱼邮件开始,只是越来越精致。

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