Facebook’s $1 billion acquisition of Instagram was a watershed moment for Big Tech. It demonstrated just how much wealth and power the industry holds — and how it could be wielded. Secret emails, published as part of a historic antitrust hearing, revealed that Mark Zuckerberg viewed the app as a threat to his own social network, and one to be neutralized at great cost. In this excerpt from No Filter: The Inside Story of Instagram, author Sarah Frier offers a window into how this monumental deal unfolded behind the scenes — and what Silicon Valley power looks like in action.

Facebook以10亿美元收购Instagram是Big Tech的分水岭。 它展示了该行业拥有多少财富和力量，以及如何利用它。 作为历史性 反托拉斯听证会的 一部分而 发布的 秘密电子邮件 显示，马克·扎克伯格(Mark Zuckerberg)将该应用程序视为对其自身社交网络的威胁，并且要付出高昂的代价才能消除该应用程序。 在摘录自《 No Filter：Instagram内幕》的 摘录中 ， 作家萨拉·弗里尔(Sarah Frier)提供了一个窗口，可以了解这一巨大的交易如何在幕后进行-以及硅谷的力量在行动中是什么样子。

In early 2012, Twitter had been aggressively courting Instagram for a potential acquisition. Instagram’s founders, Kevin Systrom and Mike Krieger, were wined and dined over sushi and breakfast at the St. Regis hotel. Twitter even put together a term sheet to acquire them for 7% to 10% of its stock, worth $500 million to $700 million. CEO Dick Costolo explained his vision: that Systrom would get to continue running Instagram, but could also be head of Twitter’s product, and help Twitter become a more visual destination.

2012年初，Twitter一直在积极地向Instagram求购潜在的收购。 Instagram创始人Kevin Systrom和Mike Krieger在瑞吉酒店(St.Regis hotel)上用寿司和早餐酒后用餐。 Twitter甚至还制定了一份条款书，以其股份的7％至10％的价格收购，价值在5亿至7亿美元之间。 首席执行官Dick Costolo解释了他的愿景：Systrom可以继续运行I​​nstagram，但也可以成为Twitter产品的负责人，并帮助Twitter成为更具视觉效果的目的地。

Systrom told Jack Dorsey, his friend and then-executive chairman of Twitter, that he couldn’t sell now. He wanted to make Instagram so big and important, it would be too expensive to be acquired by anybody. Dorsey said he understood. He introduced Systrom to Roelof Botha, a partner at Sequoia Capital, who started negotiating to put the venture firm’s money into Instagram.

塞斯特罗姆告诉他的朋友，当时的Twitter执行主席杰克·多尔西(Jack Dorsey)，他现在不能卖了。 他想让Instagram变得如此庞大和重要，因为它太昂贵了，无法被任何人收购。 多尔西说他明白。 他将Systrom介绍给红杉资本(Sequoia Capital)的合伙人罗洛夫·博塔(Roelof Botha)，后者开始进行谈判，将风险投资公司的资金投入Instagram。

Systrom would tell his friends that Twitter never made a serious offer. In reality, they never offered him anything he wanted to take seriously. Only Mark Zuckerberg understood what would appeal to Systrom: independence.

Systrom会告诉他的朋友，Twitter从未提出过认真的报价。 实际上，他们从未向他提供他要认真对待的任何东西。 只有马克·扎克伯格(Mark Zuckerberg)才能理解西斯特罗姆的吸引力：独立。

The road to the Facebook deal started the first week of April 2012. Sequoia was going to back a $50 million venture round at a $500 million valuation, close to the Twitter offer price, and all Systrom had to do was sign the papers. But first, Zuckerberg called.

吨他的道路，Facebook的交易开始的第一周2012年4月的红杉打算在5亿$的估值来支持5000万$的风险一轮，接近Twitter的报价，以及所有Systrom所要做的就是在文件上签字。 但首先，扎克伯格打来电话。

“I’ve thought about it and I want to buy your company,” Zuckerberg said, getting straight to the point. He wanted to meet as soon as possible. “I’ll give you double whatever you’re raising your round at.”

扎克伯格说：“我已经考虑过了，我想收购您的公司。” 他想尽快见面。 “无论您要提高自己的实力，我都会给您加倍。”

Zuckerberg could buy, copy, or kill competitive apps, making sure there were fewer opportunities for other companies to encroach on anyone’s Facebook habit.

扎克伯格可以购买，复制或杀死具有竞争性的应用程序，以确保其他公司侵占任何人的Facebook习惯的机会减少。

Systrom panicked and called his board. Matt Cohler from Benchmark told him that whatever happened with Zuckerberg, he needed to sign the papers for the round of venture capital, or his reputation in Silicon Valley would never recover.

塞斯特罗姆惊慌失措，并宣布董事会。 Benchmark公司的马特·科勒(Matt Cohler)告诉他，扎克伯格发生的任何事情，他都需要签署该轮风险投资的文件，否则他在硅谷的声誉将永远无法恢复。

“Look,” Steve Anderson, the other board member, reasoned, “you just raised a lot of money. And if the current king of the internet wants to meet you… sure, why not? There’s little reason not to take a meeting like that.”

“看，”另一位董事会成员史蒂夫·安德森(Steve Anderson)说道：“您刚刚筹集了很多钱。 如果现在的互联网之王想见你……当然，为什么不呢？ 没有理由不参加这样的会议。”

Anderson had been telling Systrom that he was just as much of a visionary leader as Zuckerberg, maybe even smarter. Over time, as Instagram grew, that would become clear to everyone else, Anderson thought. He didn’t think Instagram should sell — at least not yet. But for now, he might as well go kiss the ring.

安德森一直在告诉西斯特罗姆，他和扎克伯格一样是一个有远见的领导人，甚至更聪明。 随着时间的流逝，随着Instagram发展，其他所有人都会明白这一点。 他认为Instagram不应该出售-至少现在还不出售。 但是就目前而言，他还是最好去亲吻戒指。

Systrom signed to finalize the Sequoia round, and then called Zuckerberg back. As Facebook was publicly gearing up for its initial public offering, which would be one of the biggest in internet history only a few weeks later, Zuckerberg was forced to think about the long-term realities of his business. Facebook had created one of the most ubiquitous internet services, but its users were moving over to mobile devices fast. Facebook had an app, but, unlike Google and Apple, it didn’t make phones. That meant that unless Facebook rushed into the expensive, complicated hardware business, Zuckerberg would forever be building his company inside territory ultimately owned by other companies.

塞斯特罗姆(Systrom)签署合同以完成红杉资本交易，然后召回扎克伯格。 随着Facebook公开筹备其首次公开募股(这仅是几周后的互联网历史上最大规模的公开募股)，扎克伯格被迫考虑其业务的长期现实。 Facebook创造了最普遍的互联网服务之一，但其用户正在Swift向移动设备转移。 Facebook拥有一个应用程序，但是与Google和Apple不同，它没有生产手机。 这意味着，除非Facebook进入昂贵，复杂的硬件业务，否则扎克伯格将永远在最终由其他公司拥有的领土内建立自己的公司。

Which left only two ways to win. One, his engineers could make Facebook so entertaining and useful that it took up more and more of people’s time on their phones. And two, he could buy, copy, or kill competitive apps, making sure there were fewer opportunities for other companies to encroach on anyone’s Facebook habit.

剩下的只有两种方式获胜。 第一，他的工程师可以使Facebook如此有趣和有用，以至于它占用了越来越多的人在手机上的时间。 第二，他可以购买，复制或杀死竞争性应用程序，以确保其他公司没有更多机会侵犯任何人的Facebook习惯。

When he heard about Instagram’s $500 million valuation fundraise, he realized that this tiny, buzzy competitor, flush with new cash, could quickly become a greater threat. The only answer was to buy it.

当他听到Instagram5亿美元估值融资时，他意识到这个小小的，嗡嗡作响的竞争对手充斥着新的现金，很快就会成为更大的威胁。 唯一的答案是购买它。

Zuckerberg had already tried this before — unsuccessfully, back in 2008, when Twitter CEO Ev Williams [who is founder and CEO of Medium, which owns OneZero] had indicated he would accept an offer worth about $500 million. But then Williams got cold feet, and now Twitter was a major competitor. Zuckerberg was upset about the outcome, but had done the same thing himself once. In 2006, when Facebook was about Instagram’s age, Yahoo! had offered him $1 billion. He went against the advice of his board and said no, confident that he could build Facebook to be bigger on his own. Zuckerberg derived much of his confidence from that pivotal moment of defiance. It affirmed that a founder’s instincts — his own instincts — should be trusted above all else.

扎克伯格之前已经尝试过这一点-失败了，早在2008年，当时Twitter首席执行官Ev Williams(谁是拥有OneZero的Medium的创始人兼首席执行官)表示，他将接受价值约5亿美元的报价。 但是随后威廉姆斯开始感到冷漠，现在推特成为了主要竞争对手。 扎克伯格对结果感到不满，但是他自己曾经做过同样的事情。 在2006年，当Facebook大约是Instagram时代时，Yahoo！ 给了他10亿美元。 他违背董事会的建议，并拒绝了，并坚信自己可以建立Facebook自己做大。 扎克伯格从那个关键的反抗时刻中获得了很大的信心。 它肯定了创始人的本能-他自己的本能-首先应该被信任。

Armed with those experiences, Zuckerberg thought he knew how to talk to Systrom, founder to founder. Systrom didn’t want to run a Facebook product. He wanted to keep his company, and to keep being the Instagram visionary, just with none of the risks of independence. Facebook’s network was already helping Instagram grow — and if Instagram was part of Facebook, they’d have unimaginable resources to keep growing, faster.

有了这些经验，扎克伯格认为他知道如何与创始人Systrom交谈。 Systrom不想运行Facebook产品。 他想保留自己的公司，并保持Instagram远见卓识，而没有任何独立风险。 Facebook的网络已经在帮助Instagram成长-如果Instagram是Facebook的一部分，他们将拥有难以想象的资源来保持更快的增长。

This argument seemed to appeal to Systrom. But it would take some serious negotiating: That Thursday night, at Zuckerberg’s new home in the tree-lined Crescent Park neighborhood of Palo Alto, Systrom started out by asking for $2 billion.

这种说法似乎吸引了席斯特罗姆。 但是，这需要进行认真的谈判：那个星期四晚上，在扎克伯格在绿树成荫的新月公园附近帕洛阿尔托的新房子里，西斯特罗姆开始要价20亿美元。

Zuckerberg was whittling down the number with Systrom when he decided to loop in others. He invited Facebook COO Sheryl Sandberg and CFO David Ebersman over for a serious meeting. They told him they trusted his instincts, but first they would need to alert deals director Amin Zoufonoun, who could make everything happen.

扎克伯格决定与其他人聊天时，他正与西斯特罗姆(Systrom)讨价还价。 他邀请了Facebook的首席运营官Sheryl Sandberg和首席财务官David Ebersman进行了认真的会晤。 他们告诉他，他们相信自己的直觉，但首先，他们需要提醒交易总监Amin Zoufonoun，他可以让一切都变得可行。

“Mark would like to buy Instagram,” Sandberg explained on their conference call, getting straight to the point.

“马克希望购买Instagram，”桑德伯格在电话会议上解释道，直截了当。

A wonderful choice, Zoufonoun thought — it had been on his radar since he joined Facebook from Google as director of corporate development a year earlier, and he remembered Systrom from his time on the deals team.

Zoufonoun认为，这是一个绝妙的选择-自从一年前从Google加入Facebook担任企业发展总监以来，这一直是他的关注之举，而他回想起Systrom在交易团队中的经历。

“He’s already spoken to Kevin and they’ve converged on a price range at a high level,” she continued. He wanted to make a deal that would value Instagram at about 1% of Facebook.

她继续说：“他已经与凯文(Kevin)进行了交谈，他们已经集中在一个高价位上。” 他想达成一项交易，将Instagram估值为Facebook的1％左右。

Zoufonoun was shocked silent. Facebook’s private market valuation, a month before its planned IPO, was about $100 billion. That would mean an Instagram deal worth $1 billion. Nobody had ever paid that for a mobile app before.

Zoufonoun震惊不语。 在计划进行IPO的一个月前，Facebook的私募市场估值约为1000亿美元。 这意味着Instagram交易价值10亿美元。 以前没有人为移动应用程序付钱。

Even though the app had a mere 25 million registered users, compared to Facebook’s hundreds of millions, businesses were already using Instagram to post photos of their products, and their followers were actually interacting and commenting.

尽管该应用仅拥有2500万注册用户，而Facebook拥有数亿注册用户，但企业已经在使用Instagram发布其产品的照片，并且其追随者实际上是在互动和发表评论。

“You seem skeptical,” Sandberg observed. “I’ll call you later tonight once you’ve had a chance to think about it and do some analysis.”

“您似乎对此表示怀疑，”桑德伯格观察到。 “一旦您有机会考虑一下并做一些分析，我会在今晚晚些时候给您打电话。”

Zoufonoun thought about it, but still couldn’t make the math work in his head. Usually there are similar deals to compare to, or a public company’s value to match against. When Sandberg called back, Zoufonoun asked for clarification.

Zoufonoun考虑了一下，但仍无法使数学发挥作用。 通常，有一些类似的交易可与之比较，或者有一家上市公司的价值可与之比较。 桑德伯格打回电话时，祖佛诺要求澄清。

“The price is really huge,” he said. “I’d love to understand where Zuckerberg is coming from on this — how did they arrive at that number?”

他说：“价格确实很高。” “我很想了解扎克伯格从何而来-他们是怎么得出这个数字的？”

Sandberg conferenced Zuckerberg into the call, who suggested he and Zoufonoun meet in person the next morning.

桑德伯格召集了扎克伯格参加会议，后者建议他和祖弗诺恩第二天早上亲自见面。

That night, Zoufonoun couldn’t sleep. He’d never done a deal this big, and his nerves were getting to him. He passed the hours until his meeting with Zuckerberg with his phone in hand, scrolling through Instagram, trying to predict its future.

那天晚上，Zoufonoun无法入睡。 他从来没有做过这么大的事情，他的神经也开始吸引他。 他花了几个小时才拿到手机与扎克伯格会面，在Instagram上滚动浏览，试图预测其未来。

In the darkness, he realized this wasn’t just an app for people to post pictures of their meals, but a potentially viable business. Even though the app had a mere 25 million registered users, compared to Facebook’s hundreds of millions, businesses were already using Instagram to post photos of their products, and their followers were actually interacting and commenting.

在黑暗中，他意识到这不仅是人们发布餐食照片的应用程序，而且是一项可能可行的业务。 尽管该应用仅拥有2500万注册用户，而Facebook拥有数亿注册用户，但企业已经在使用Instagram发布其产品的照片，并且其追随者实际上是在互动和发表评论。

Instagram didn’t make money yet, but Zoufonoun surmised that because the Instagram product provided its users with the ability to endlessly scroll through posts, just like the Facebook news feed, they could eventually develop the same kind of advertising capabilities. They could use Facebook’s infrastructure to grow faster, the way YouTube did at Google.

Instagram尚未赚钱，但Zoufonoun推测，因为Instagram产品为用户提供了无休止地滚动帖子的功能，就像Facebook新闻源一样，他们最终可以开发出相同的广告功能。 他们可以使用Facebook的基础架构来更快地发展，就像YouTube在Google上所做的那样。

The next morning, in a conference room at Facebook headquarters, Zuckerberg and Zoufonoun appeared as scheduled.

第二天早上，扎克伯格和祖佛诺在Facebook总部的会议室如期出现。

“Hey, what’s up?” Zuckerberg asked him. “I understand you have concerns.”

“嘿，怎么了？” 扎克伯格问他。 “我知道您有顾虑。”

“Actually, I think your instinct is spot-on,” Zoufonoun concluded. “We absolutely should buy this company.”

“实际上，我认为您的直觉是随波逐流的，” Zoufonoun总结道。 “我们绝对应该收购这家公司。”

“Okay, so what’s next?” Zuckerberg said, unsurprised at being right. “We should probably do this quickly. How quickly do you think we can get this done?”

“好吧，接下来要做什么？” 扎克伯格说，没错是正确的。 “我们可能应该Swift做到这一点。 您认为我们能多快完成这项工作？”

Zoufonoun got up, went to the whiteboard in the conference room, and started writing out the steps: convening the lawyers, figuring out the details of the cash and stock in the payment, and determining how much risk Facebook was willing to take on by shortening the timeline for due diligence. Often companies spend weeks or months evaluating a prospect, but if Facebook hustled, they could get this done in a single weekend, without any outside bankers.

Zoufonoun起身，走到会议室的白板上，并开始写出以下步骤：召集律师，弄清付款中现金和股票的详细信息，并确定Facebook愿意通过缩短风险承担多少风险尽职调查的时间表。 通常，公司会花费数周或数月的时间来评估潜在客户，但如果Facebook忙碌起来，他们可以在一个周末内完成这项工作，而无需任何外部银行家。

Zuckerberg wanted to hustle. If Facebook took too long to negotiate, Systrom would start calling his friends and mentors.

扎克伯格想忙。 如果Facebook花太长时间进行谈判，Systrom将开始打电话给他的朋友和导师。

Zuckerberg knew that Systrom was close with Twitter’s Jack Dorsey. The faster he made the deal, the less likely Systrom was to call someone who would give advice unfavorable to Facebook — or a counteroffer.

扎克伯格知道Systrom与Twitter的杰克·多尔西(Jack Dorsey)关系密切。 他达成交易的速度越快，Systrom打电话给提供不利于Facebook的建议的人的可能性就越小，或者还价。

As the lawyers were hammering out details at Facebook headquarters, Systrom went with Krieger so his co-founder could meet Zuckerberg for the first time. Afterward, the two of them sat for about an hour at the Palo Alto Caltrain station, talking about the gravity of the decision.

律师们在Facebook总部敲定细节时，西斯特罗姆(Systrom)和克里格(Krieger)一起去了，因此他的联合创始人可以第一次与扎克伯格见面。 之后，他们两个在Palo Alto Caltrain车站坐了大约一个小时，谈论决定的严重性。

Without Facebook, Instagram would have to very quickly grow its team and its infrastructure if it were to have any hope of delivering a return for the new investors — and meanwhile, there was a chance it wouldn’t work, or that Facebook would perfect its own version of Instagram. Krieger deeply respected Facebook’s engineering team. If they joined Facebook, they would have the resources to reach a lot more potential users, with support, so that there would be fewer service outages.

如果没有Facebook，Instagram要想为新投资者带来回报，就必须非常Swift地发展其团队和基础设施-同时，它有可能无法运作，或者Facebook会完善其自己的Instagram版本。 克里格非常尊重Facebook的工程团队。 如果他们加入Facebook，他们将有资源在支持下接触更多潜在用户，从而减少服务中断。

Zuckerberg, Zoufonoun, and Systrom continued discussions at Zuckerberg’s sparsely furnished $7 million home that Saturday. Krieger stayed in San Francisco, but spent the weekend handling Facebook’s appraisals of Instagram’s technical infrastructure. He answered questions over the phone about how Instagram’s systems were architected, and what kind of software and services the company used. Facebook never asked to look at the code. We could be running this company on Legos and they wouldn’t know, Krieger thought.

žuckerberg，Zoufonoun和Systrom继续在扎克伯格的布置简约的$ 700万家庭星期六的讨论。 克里格留在旧金山，但度过了一个周末，处理了Facebook对Instagram技术基础设施的评估。 他通过电话回答了有关Instagram系统的架构以及该公司使用哪种软件和服务的问题。 Facebook从不要求查看代码。 Krieger想，我们可能在Legos上经营这家公司，而他们不知道 。

In Palo Alto, there was a disagreement about the cash versus stock portion of the deal. Cash in hand is tough to pass up compared to the riskier offer of potential future gains. Zuckerberg was working to convince Systrom that with stock, the price of the deal would be worth much more in the future. One percent of Facebook was only worth $1 billion if you thought Facebook’s growth was flatlining. But Facebook was planning on growing, making that stock worth closer to Systrom’s original $2 billion number or more.

在帕洛阿尔托，这笔交易的现金与股票部分存在分歧。 与潜在的未来收益的高风险报价相比，手头的现金很难流失。 扎克伯格正在努力说服Systrom相信，有了股票，这笔交易的价格在将来会变得更加有价值。 如果您认为Facebook的增长趋于平稳，那么只有1％的Facebook价值10亿美元。 但是Facebook正计划发展，使这只股票的价值更接近西斯特罗姆最初的20亿美元甚至更高。

Systrom knew if Facebook took measures to copy Instagram or target the app directly, that would make it a lot more difficult to grow.

Systrom知道Facebook是否采取措施复制Instagram或直接将其定位为应用程序，这会使它的发展变得更加困难。

Still, Zuckerberg even admitted to Systrom that he was surprised at Facebook’s $100 billion private market valuation. While he thought Facebook would continue to grow, and that it was fair to base Instagram’s price off Facebook’s, he was concerned over the acquisition price tag. If he valued Instagram so highly, with its tiny team and no revenue, he might create a bubble in Silicon Valley, raising the price of every related company he might want to buy in the future. (He was partially right. In 2013, venture capitalist Aileen Lee came up with a name for startups with billion-dollar values: “unicorns.” At the time, there were 37. When she wrote an update on the rare breeds in 2015, there were 84. By 2019, there were hundreds. But if it is a bubble, it hasn’t burst.)

扎克伯格仍然向西斯特罗姆(Systrom)承认，他对Facebook的1000亿美元的私募市场估值感到惊讶。 尽管他认为Facebook会继续增长，并且以Instagram价格为基础确定Instagram价格是公平的，但他仍对收购价格感到担忧。 如果他对Instagram如此之高的估值，拥有一支很小的团队，却没有任何收入的话，他可能会在硅谷制造泡沫，从而抬高他将来可能想要收购的所有相关公司的价格。 (他的观点是正确的。2013年，风险投资家Aileen Lee提出了一个价值十亿美元的初创公司的名字：“独角兽”。当时有37家。当她在2015年撰写关于稀有品种的更新时，有84个。到2019年，有数百个。但如果是泡沫，它就不会破裂。)

Zuckerberg fired off an email to the Facebook board, letting them know the deal was happening. It was the first they were hearing of the massive deal, which was all but completed. Because Zuckerberg held the majority voting power in the company, the board’s role was merely to put a rubber stamp on his decisions.

扎克伯格向Facebook董事会发出了一封电子邮件，让他们知道这笔交易正在进行中。 这是他们第一次听到这笔大笔交易的消息，交易几乎完成了。 由于扎克伯格在公司中拥有多数表决权，因此董事会的职责仅仅是在其决策上加盖橡皮图章。

Systrom’s board conversations faced more resistance. Anderson, in particular, was confused and opposed to the deal. Just a week prior, Systrom had been raising money to grow the company for the long term. And a month before, he’d been rejecting Twitter.

小号 ystrom董事会对话面临更多的阻力。 尤其是安德森(Anderson)感到困惑，反对这项交易。 就在一周前，Systrom一直在筹集资金以长期发展公司。 而一个月前，他一直拒绝推特。

“What’s up with this change of heart?” he asked, with Systrom on the phone from his car in Zuckerberg’s driveway. “If it’s about the money, I know I can raise you money at whatever valuation Zuckerberg’s willing to pay.” Anderson thought taking Instagram out as a competitor could be worth $5 billion to Facebook if they just waited a little longer.

“这种改变的心怎么了？” 他问道，塞斯特罗姆(Systrom)正在扎克伯格车道上的汽车上打电话。 “如果是关于钱的话，我知道我可以以扎克伯格愿意支付的任何估值为您筹集资金。” 安德森(Anderson)认为，如果Instagram等一会儿，让Instagram脱颖而出，可能会给Facebook带来50亿美元的价值。

Systrom gave four reasons for the sale. First, he reiterated Zuckerberg’s argument: that Facebook’s stock value was likely to go up, so the value of the acquisition would grow over time. Second, he’d take a large competitor out of the picture. If Facebook took measures to copy Instagram or target the app directly, that would make it a lot more difficult to grow. Third, Instagram would benefit from Facebook’s entire operations infrastructure, not just data centers but also people who already knew how to do all the things Instagram would need to learn in the future.

Systrom给出了出售的四个原因。 首先，他重申了扎克伯格的论点：Facebook的股票价值可能会上升，因此收购的价值会随着时间增长。 第二，他会把一个大竞争对手排除在外。 如果Facebook采取措施复制Instagram或直接将其定位为应用程序，那将使其增长变得更加困难。 第三，Instagram将从Facebook的整个运营基础架构中受益，不仅是数据中心，还包括那些已经知道如何做Instagram未来需要学习的一切的人们。

Fourth, and most importantly, he and Krieger would have independence.

第四，也是最重要的是，他和克里格将拥有独立性。

“The internet is not a friendly place. Things that don’t stay relevant don’t even get the luxury of leaving ruins. They disappear.”

“互联网不是一个友好的地方。 无关紧要的事物甚至都无法摆脱废墟。 他们消失了。”

“Zuckerberg has promised me that he will let us run Instagram like a separate company,” Systrom said.

塞斯特罗姆说：“扎克伯格向我保证，他会让我们像一个独立的公司那样经营Instagram。”

“Do you believe that?” Anderson asked skeptically. He’d seen enough buyers say whatever they needed to say to get a deal done, then renege later.

“你相信吗？” 安德森怀疑地问。 他已经看到足够多的买家说出要完成交易需要说什么，然后再放弃。

“Yes,” Systrom replied. “Yes, I really do believe that.”

“是的，”西斯特罗姆回答。 “是的，我确实相信这一点。”

Back in Palo Alto, the terms were pretty much settled in time for Zuckerberg to host a small evening gathering of friends to screen that night’s episode of Game of Thrones. Systrom didn’t watch the show. He signed the contract late that evening in Zuckerberg’s living room.

回到帕洛阿尔托(Palo Alto)，这些条款很快就确定了，扎克伯格(Juckerberg)举办了一个小型的夜间朋友聚会，以播放当晚《权力的游戏》 ( Game of Thrones)的节目。 Systrom没有看演出。 他那天傍晚在扎克伯格的客厅里签了合同。

The structure of the Instagram acquisition — a company purchased not to be integrated — would become an important precedent in technology M&A, especially as giant companies got even more giant, and small companies like Instagram wanted to find some alternative to competing with them or dying. In the coming years, Twitter would buy Vine and Periscope, keeping the apps separate and the founders in charge, at least for a little while. Google would buy Nest, keeping it separate. Amazon would buy Whole Foods, keeping it separate. And so many corporate development teams would court startups, promising to “do it like Instagram,” only to change their minds about granting independence once everyone was in the building.

吨他结构的Instagram收购-一个公司购买不 整合将成为技术并购的重要先例，特别是随着大型公司变得更加庞大，而像Instagram这样的小型公司希望找到一些替代方案，以与其竞争或垂死。 在未来的几年中，Twitter将收购Vine和Periscope，以将应用程序分开并由创始人负责，至少要一小会儿。 谷歌将收购Nest，将其分开。 亚马逊会购买全食超市，将其分开出售。 如此众多的企业开发团队会向初创公司求助，承诺“像Instagram一样做”，只是在所有人都进入大楼后改变了关于授予独立性的想法。

Instagram’s perceived independence at Facebook would help Zuckerberg win some otherwise impossible deals with headstrong founders, especially in 2014, with the chat app WhatsApp and the virtual reality company Oculus VR.

Instagram在Facebook上的独立性将帮助扎克伯格与强大的创始人赢得一些原本不可能达成的交易，尤其是在2014年，借助聊天应用程序WhatsApp和虚拟现实公司Oculus VR。

But mostly, the Instagram deal would give Zuckerberg a tremendous competitive advantage.

但最重要的是，Instagram交易将给扎克伯格带来巨大的竞争优势。

Zuckerberg wasn’t sure how things would play out. But his motivation is outlined in a little red-orange book, handed to new Facebook employees at every orientation. On one of the last pages, against a navy backdrop, there are a few sentences in light blue writing that explain Zuckerberg’s paranoid leadership: “If we don’t create the thing that kills Facebook, someone else will. The internet is not a friendly place. Things that don’t stay relevant don’t even get the luxury of leaving ruins. They disappear.”

扎克伯格不确定事情会如何发展。 但是，他的动机在一本橙红色的书中概述了，该书在各个方向都交给了Facebook新员工。 在海军背景下的最后一页中，有一些浅蓝色的句子解释了扎克伯格的偏执领导： “如果我们不创造杀死Facebook的东西，那么其他人将会。 互联网不是一个友好的地方。 无关紧要的事物甚至都无法摆脱废墟。 他们消失了。”

The question that Systrom would be asking, six years later, was whether Zuckerberg considered Instagram part of the “we,” or the “someone else.”

六年后，塞斯特罗姆会问的问题是，扎克伯格是否认为Instagram是“我们”或“其他人”的一部分。