I'm ashamed to even post this, as Dare and Oleg will likely balk at the audacity and pure poo of the solution.

我什至不敢发布此消息，因为Dare和Oleg可能会对解决方案的胆大妄为和纯洁无情。

That said, sometimes you have to support a legacy evil, er, solution and one's (mine) overdeveloped sense of code smell must be supressed.

就是说，有时候您必须支持一种传统的邪恶，错误，解决方案，并且必须抑制一个人(我的)过度开发的代码气味。

So, there's some XML, it's as a schema and it's cool and strongly typed. It might look something like:

因此，有一些XML，它是一种架构，非常酷且类型强。 它可能看起来像：

<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-16"?><ns0:SignOnResponse xmlns:ns0="http://www.corillian.com/Voyager/Authentication/Messages/2004/05"><ns1:Header xmlns:ns1=http://www.corillian.com/operations/2004/11">
<ns1:Something>somethingCoolio</ns1:Something>
...blah blah blah...
</ns0:SignOnResponse>

<？xml版本=“ 1.0”编码=“ utf-16”？> <ns0：SignOnResponse xmlns：ns0 =“ http://www.corillian.com/Voyager/Authentication/Messages/2004/05”> <ns1：标题xmlns：ns1 = http：//www.corillian.com/operations/2004/11“> <ns1：Something>某事很酷</ ns1：Something> ...等等等等等等... </ ns0：SignOnResponse>

You get the idea...it's generated, but it's legit. Here's the weird part...for a legacy app, another XML Document (arguably a Fragment) is "tunnelled" within one of the the larger document's elements:

您明白了...产生了主意，但这是合法的。 这是一个奇怪的部分...对于旧版应用程序，另一个XML文档(可以说是Fragment)被“隧道化”在较大文档的元素之一中：

<ns1:Something><![CDATA[<holycrap><sweetlord>it's another xml document! hiding inside! Wow, it has no namespace? Oy.</sweetlord></holycrap>]]</ns1:Something>

<ns1：Something> <！[CDATA [<holycrap> <sweetlord>这是另一个xml文档！ 躲在里面！ 哇，它没有名称空间吗？ Oy。</ sweetlord> </ holycrap>]] </ ns1：Something>

Notice above that there's another entirely different document inside the larger one.  Additionally the fragment has a root node of "sweetlord" perhaps I want it to be deserialized into a "SomethingType." Since "SomethingType" was defined in XSD and generated earlier, I can't change it's [XmlRoot] without editing the generated code.

请注意，在上面的文档中，还有一个完全不同的文档。 另外，该片段的根节点为“ sweetlord”，也许我希望将其反序列化为“ SomethingType”。 由于“ SomethingType”是在XSD中定义的，并且是较早生成的，因此，如果不编辑生成的代码，便无法更改其[XmlRoot]。

But, I can override it. So, this technique below shows two things.

但是，我可以覆盖它。 因此，下面的这项技术展示了两件事。

• Taking an Xml fragment that has no namespace and fooling the XmlSerializer (or any XmlTextReader consumer) into thinking it does using Clemen's/Chris's (dasBlog's/BlogX's) XmlNamespaceUpgrading Reader.拿一个没有名称空间的Xml片段，并欺骗XmlSerializer(或任何XmlTextReader使用者)，使其认为使用Clemen / Chris(dasBlog / BlogX)的XmlNamespaceUpgrading Reader确实起作用。
• Using XmlAttributeOverrides to force the XmlSerializer to "no no, use THIS XmlRootAttribute!"使用XmlAttributeOverrides强制XmlSerializer设置为“否，请使用XmlRootAttribute！”

Here's the XmlNamespaceUpgradeReader. Notice that it's used above passing in String.Empty as the oldNamespaceUri, and the namespace we WISH it had as the newNamespaceUri. That's the namespace we told the XmlSerializer in the AttributeOverrides.

这是XmlNamespaceUpgradeReader。 请注意，上面使用它时将String.Empty传递为oldNamespaceUri，而我们希望它具有的命名空间为newNamespaceUri。 那就是我们在AttributeOverrides中告诉XmlSerializer的名称空间。

Note also that we save away the XmlSerializer because of the XmlSerializer leak for its complex constructor overrides. As an alternative to saving it off, we could use the very cool Mvp.Xml.XmlSerializerCache.

还要注意，由于XmlSerializer泄漏了它的复杂构造函数，所以我们省去了XmlSerializer。 作为保存它的替代方法，我们可以使用非常酷的Mvp.Xml.XmlSerializerCache 。

翻译自: https://www.hanselman.com/blog/enabling-evil-tunnelling-xml-within-xml-using-the-xmlserializer-and-some-magic