这么多的功能，很少的时间 (So many features, so little time)

In the past couple of years, super apps have taken much of Asia by storm.

在过去的几年中，超级应用程序席卷了整个亚洲。

WeChat, AliPay, Grab, and Go-jek are a couple examples of super apps. They have Facebook Messenger-like features. They also have Grubhub-like features. And Uber. And Venmo. AirBnB. Lime Bike. Slack.

微信，AliPay，Grab和Go-jek是超级应用程序的几个示例。 它们具有类似于Facebook Messenger的功能。 它们还具有类似Grubhub的功能。 还有优步 还有文莫 AirBnB。 石灰自行车。 松弛。

Many even offer extremely niche services. For example, users can get medical insurance on Grab or request massages on Gojek. All merged into unicorn Frankensteins.

许多人甚至提供极其利基的服务。 例如，用户可以在Grab上获得医疗保险，或在Gojek上要求按摩。 全部合并为独角兽科学怪人。

Since its 2011 release, WeChat quickly ballooned to over 1.1 billion users in 2018 and boasts incredible engagement — over 1/3 of users spend 4+ hours daily in the app, with 64 of those minutes spent in WeChat’s ‘mini programs’ (2019) or third party integrations, handily beating Instagram’s average of 53 minutes a day (2018). Furthermore, 93% of mobile payments in China come from WeChat Pay and AliPay serving 900 million and 500 million unique MAU respectively. These success stories have then been further repeated by a handful of super apps across Asia.

自2011年发布以来，微信在2018年Swift激增至超过11亿用户，并拥有令人难以置信的参与度-超过1/3的用户每天在该应用中花费4小时以上 ，其中64分钟用于微信的“迷你计划” (2019年)或第三方集成，轻松击败Instagram平均每天53分钟 (2018年)。 此外，中国93％的移动支付来自微信支付和支付宝，分别为9亿和5亿独特MAU提供服务。 然后，亚洲各地的一些超级应用程序进一步重复了这些成功案例。

These apps’ target demographic is everyone, yet years of successful entrepreneurs have repeated the sentiment that you can’t target everyone, or you’ll end up with no one.

这些应用程序的目标人群是每个人，但是多年成功的企业家反复表达了这样的观点：您不能以所有人为目标，否则您将一无所有。

This phenomenon begs the question — why do these super apps stand at odds with this sentiment? How did this happen? And will it happen in the United States?

这种现象引出了一个问题-这些超级应用程序为何与这种观点背道而驰？ 这怎么发生的？ 它将在美国发生吗？

什么是超级应用程序的超级？ (What’s Super about the Super App?)

First, let’s examine the anatomy of a super app. There are two main categories of super apps.

首先，让我们检查一下超级应用程序的结构。 超级应用程序主要有两个类别。

1. Regular ol’ Super App — Single app that has many tangentially related functions. Usually enabled by connecting a payment feature. Examples include Gojek, Meituan, Grab.常规ol'超级应用程序-具有许多与切向相关的功能的单个应用程序。 通常通过连接付款功能启用。 例如Gojek，Meituan，Grab。

2. Super App + Integrations — Like the first type, but also allows third-party developers to build internal apps, or ‘mini programs’, and release them on the main platform. Examples include WeChat and AliPay. These super apps are essentially operating systems. It’d be like downloading the Google Play Store on your iPhone, and then downloading all of your favorite apps there. This has proven to be an incredibly powerful idea. WeChat has around a million mini programs, while AliPay has over 100,000.

   超级应用程序+集成-与第一种类型一样，但也允许第三方开发人员构建内部应用程序或“微型程序”，并在主平台上发布它们。 示例包括微信和支付宝。 这些超级应用实质上是操作系统。 这就像在您的iPhone上下载Google Play商店，然后在那里下载所有您喜欢的应用程序一样。 事实证明，这是一个非常强大的想法。 微信有大约一百万个迷你程序 ，而支付宝有十万多个。

For the purposes of this article, I’ll be focusing on the composition of the second type. All references to super apps are to those with integrations.

为了本文的目的，我将重点介绍第二种类型的组成。 对超级应用程序的所有引用均指那些具有集成功能的应用程序。

中国超级应用程序成功秘诀 (Recipe for Chinese Super App Success)

At first, WeChat was a messenger service and AliPay was an escrow service. But why have super apps become successful in Asia, and why haven’t we seen Facebook achieve the same success? We’ll explore three commonly cited reasons below.

最初，微信是一个Messenger服务，而AliPay是一个托管服务。 但是，为什么超级应用程序在亚洲变得成功，为什么我们没有看到Facebook取得同样的成功？ 我们将在下面探讨三个常见的原因。

隐私 (Privacy)

Although many people say super apps succeeded because Chinese consumers are not privacy-conscious, this reason is hardly sufficient. Today Chinese consumers want more privacy than ever before. In 2016, China passed its Cybersecurity Law, which has some similarities to Europe’s GDPR, but is less prescriptive about standards. Highlights include data collection consent, types of data that may be collected, storage requirements, and right to erasure. It’s important to note that the Chinese government sits in between app services. In China, tech companies must monitor their platforms for certain prohibited activities.

尽管许多人说超级应用程序之所以成功是因为中国消费者对隐私的意识不足，但是这还不够。 今天，中国消费者比以往任何时候都想要更多的隐私。 2016年，中国通过了《 网络安全法》 ，该法与欧洲的GDPR有一些相似之处，但对标准的规定较少。 重点包括数据收集同意书，可能收集的数据类型，存储要求和擦除权。 值得注意的是，中国政府位于应用服务之间。 在中国，科技公司必须监控其平台上是否存在某些违禁活动。

By itself, differing privacy standards do not explain super apps. The US has also seen major privacy concerns; American tech companies have been rocked with data security scandals like Cambridge Analytica and Equifax, while Snowden revealed the extent of NSA data collection. The capability for WeChat to be a surveillance tool is a function of its status as a super app, and not the other way around.

就其本身而言，不同的隐私标准并不能解释超级应用程序。 美国也看到了主要的隐私问题。 美国科技公司为之震惊，例如Cambridge Analytica和Equifax等数据安全丑闻，而Snowden透露了NSA数据收集的范围。 微信成为监视工具的能力取决于它作为超级应用程序的地位，而不是相反。

移动优先 (Mobile First)

Many Chinese apps are designed to be mobile first, which really has two meanings.

许多中文应用程序的设计宗旨是首先移动，这实际上有两个含义。

First, apps are designed to use smartphone exclusive features, like the camera, accelerometer, and GPS. In contrast, many US tech companies designed their products for desktop, and then added mobile offerings as consumer preferences shifted.

首先，应用程序被设计为使用智能手机专有功能，例如相机，加速度计和GPS。 相比之下，许多美国科技公司为台式机设计产品，然后随着消费者喜好的变化而增加了移动产品。

Second, mobile phones catalyzed internet penetration in China. When the iPhone launched in China in 2009, only 28% of Chinese consumers had internet access. The US had almost 80% penetration the same year. Furthermore, many Chinese citizens have lower buying power and PC’s are generally more expensive than smart phones. This meant that many Chinese consumers skipped desktops to go directly to mobile computing.

其次，手机促进了中国的互联网渗透。 当iPhone在2009年在中国推出时，只有28％的中国消费者可以上网。 同年，美国的渗透率接近80％ 。 此外，许多中国公民的购买力较低，而PC的价格通常比智能手机贵。 这意味着许多中国消费者跳过了台式机，直接使用移动​​计算。

While in the US, smartphones are ubiquitous, desktop webapps are still a high sales driver for many companies. Domestically 53% of consumer retail sales happen on desktop, with an average higher spend of $73 than on mobile. Some industries struggle more than others. Travel customers are 64% more likely to convert a sale on desktop!

在美国，智能手机无处不在，而台式机网络应用仍然是许多公司的高销售额驱动力。 在国内， 53％的消费者零售发生在台式机上，平均支出比移动设备高73美元 。 有些行业比其他行业挣扎更多。 旅游客户在台式机上转换销售的可能性要高64％！

Many optimized desktop tools exist in the US — but few truly mobile first solutions exist. Amazon, AirBnB, Facebook- all started on desktop. However, as smartphone owners become younger and as smartphone saturation increases in the US, companies must design for a mobile-first future.

美国存在许多经过优化的桌面工具-但几乎没有真正的移动优先解决方案。 亚马逊，AirBnB，Facebook-都在台式机上启动。 但是，随着智能手机所有者的年龄越来越小，以及美国智能手机饱和度的提高，公司必须为移动优先的未来而设计。

连接你的钱包 (Connecting your wallet)

The Lunar New Year in China is a party of unimaginable scale — generations of family and friends gather for a week to celebrate, exchanging hongbao, or red cash envelopes parents give to children for the New Year. Every year, Asian parents give billions of dollars worth of hongbao.

农历新年在中国是难以想象规模的聚会-家庭的几代和朋友聚集了一个星期来庆祝，交换红包，或红色信封现金家长给孩子的新年。 每年，亚洲父母都会捐赠价值数十亿美元的宏宝。

WeChat saw an opportunity in this. In 2014, it partnered with CCTV, a Chinese TV network that hosts the chunjiewanhui, the New Year’s Gala. It is a cultural icon of an event that features celebrities, politicians, businesses, and performances of every imaginable genre. Every year since 2018, when this show airs on New Year’s, over 1 billion people have tuned in.

微信看到了机会。 在2014年，它与中央电视台合作，成为中国电视网络承载chunjiewanhui，新年晚会。 它是一项活动的文化标志，其中包括名人，政客，企业和各种可以想象的流派的表演。 自2018年以来，每年的新年节目都会在新年期间播出，每年有超过10亿人收听。

Billion, with a ‘b’.

十亿，带有“ b”。

WeChat seized the moment to roll out WeChat hongbao. Users that registered to WeChat wallet could shake their phone for a chance to win cash prizes totaling $83 million. At peak frequency, WeChat registered 810 million unique shakes per minute.

微信抓住时机推出微信宏宝。 注册到微信钱包的用户可以摇动手机，有机会赢得总计8300万美元的现金奖励。 在峰值频率，微信每分钟记录8.1亿次唯一震动。

This stunt cemented the social media as the leader in digital payments. WeChat started by allowing users to make native purchases from official brand pages. It then expanded its physical presence, encouraging shops to take payments through QR codes. As customers became accustomed to spending more money and time on the platform, app developers and businesses started demanding more monetization flexibility on WeChat. Thus came mini programs. Today’s Chinese app developers must develop apps on the WeChat platform to stay competitive.

这种特技巩固了社交媒体作为数字支付领导者的地位。 微信首先允许用户从官方品牌页面进行本地购买。 然后，它扩大了实体店的存在，鼓励商店通过QR码付款。 随着客户习惯在平台上花费更多的金钱和时间，应用程序开发人员和企业开始要求在微信上实现更多的货币化灵活性。 于是出现了小程序。 当今的中国应用程序开发人员必须在微信平台上开发应用程序才能保持竞争力。

In the US, Americans are still warming up to digital wallets, such as Venmo, Apple Pay, Zelle, even Starbucks. Currently, 78% of Americans believe that mobile payments are not secure enough. Though I’m an evangelist for mobile payments like Apple Pay and Venmo — storing more than a couple hundred on Venmo bothers me, though I’ve never lost a cent. Mobile payments in the US are nascent, while credit cards are ancient. As digital natives make up more of the population, this uneasiness will gradually disappear, much as it has for credit cards, paving the way for digital wallets, mobile payments, and perhaps even a cashless society.

在美国，美国人仍在热衷于使用电子钱包，例如Venmo，Apple Pay，Zelle甚至是星巴克。 目前，有78％的美国人认为移动支付不够安全 。 尽管我是Apple Pay和Venmo等移动支付​​的推广者，但在Venmo上存储超过200令我感到困扰，尽管我从未损失过一分钱。 在美国，移动支付是新生事物，而信用卡是古老的事物。 随着数字原住民占人口的更多，这种不安感将逐渐消失，就像信用卡一样，为数字钱包，移动支付乃至无现金社会铺平了道路。

美国公司的下一步：构建社交电子商务Super-ish App (Next steps for US companies: building the social ecommerce Super-ish App)

Although US companies are far from building a super app as defined above, many are taking the same early steps that WeChat took to combine its social features with ecommerce. Although these aren’t quite the super apps of Asia, American apps can still evolve into super-ish apps that capitalize on integrating payments into a platform that already sees high user retention and stickiness.

尽管美国公司距离构建如上所述的超级应用程序还很遥远，但许多公司正在采取与微信将其社交功能与电子商务相结合的早期步骤。 尽管这些还不是亚洲的超级应用程序，但美国应用程序仍然可以演变成超级流行的应用程序，它们可以利用将付款集成到已经具有很高的用户保留率和粘性的平台中来。

Messenger Pay, which is basically Venmo, has evolved into Facebook Pay, adding features such as purchasing goods on Facebook’s platform. Instagram is doubling down on its shopping section, integrating native shopping into posts and brands. Twitch built tipping into its platform after the company noticed streamers promoting their PayPal. All of these social ecommerce features open up tremendous opportunities, allowing users to spend money without leaving an app they know and love, while sharing purchases with their friends and family. Imagine seeing a shirt you like on a business page. You can buy it in one click. You’re given the option to share this purchase with friends, creating network effects. The store gets actionable insight on ads that work and ads that don’t. This type of super-ish app is a logical step in the future.

Messenger Pay(基本上是Venmo)已经演变为Facebook Pay，增加了在Facebook平台上购买商品等功能。 Instagram正在其购物区增加一倍，将本地购物整合到帖子和品牌中。 在公司注意到彩带宣传他们的PayPal之后，Twitch在平台上建立了小费。 所有这些社交电子商务功能都带来了巨大的机会，使用户可以花钱而不必离开自己熟悉和喜爱的应用，同时与亲朋好友共享购物。 想象一下，在业务页面上看到您喜欢的衬衫。 您可以一键购买。 您可以选择与朋友分享此次购买，以创建网络效果。 该商店可对有效的广告和无效的广告提供可行的见解。 这种类型的超级应用程序是未来的必然步骤。

So will full-fledged super apps with those fancy integrations come to the US? It’s hard to say, but the stars seem to indicate a degree of alignment. If they do appear, there’s still a long way to go- US apps will face a quagmire of legal challenges and cutthroat competition, but that won’t stop companies from trying. Facebook has been more than clear about its ambitions. Social ecommerce turned WeChat into a behemoth, and it might just do the same for US companies.

那么具有这些高级集成功能的成熟超级应用程序是否会进入美国？ 很难说，但是星星似乎表明有一定程度的对准。 如果它们出现了，那么还有很长的路要走-美国应用程序将面临法律挑战和残酷竞争的泥潭，但这不会阻止公司尝试。 Facebook对其雄心勃勃的想法已经非常清楚了。 社交电子商务将微信变成了一个庞然大物，它可能对美国公司也是如此。