Apple’s announcement of “Apple Silicon” is important for many reasons. Delivering on such an undertaking is the result of remarkable product engineering. An annotated thread…

苹果宣布“ Apple Silicon”很重要，原因有很多。 完成这项任务是卓越的产品工程的结果。 带注释的线程…

Amidst all the details, installing pre-release, and commentary (including my own) I want to take a moment to reflect on #WWDC putting it in context of the past two decades. Quite simply, what we’re seeing is some of the most remarkable product engineering over time in history. 1/

在所有细节中，安装预发行版和评论(包括我自己的评论)，我想花一点时间来回顾#WWDC，以将其作为过去二十年的背景。 很简单，我们所看到的是历史上一些最杰出的产品工程。 1 /

2/ It is easy to get wrapped up in debates about specifics, excited by tweaks or surprises, even an occasional scandal, or to wonder about the quality (is this is a good beta?). Under the hood, is a team that over time has done more and executed better than any I can name, ever.

2 /很容易陷入关于细节的辩论中，由于微妙的调整或惊奇，甚至是偶然的丑闻，或者对质量感到疑惑(这是一个很好的beta吗？)。 在幕后，是一支团队，随着时间的推移，他们做得比以往任何时候都做得更好，并且执行得比我能说的任何人都要好。

3/ Having walked in similar shoes for many years, and importantly starting from when Mac was a hammer smashing through a screen, through the lowest lows (fine, we’ll keep doing Office), resurrection, and reinvention, it’s wild for me to consider what makes it so amazing to me.

3 /穿了多年类似的鞋子，重要的是，从Mac锤子砸破屏幕，穿过最低的最低点(很好，我们将继续使用Office)，复活和重新发明开始，对于我来说，考虑什么使我感到如此惊奇。

My first Mac software was an app called “Mac Mendeleev” which was a visualization tool for over 50 periodic properties of elements. It was written in Pascal before the Mac Programmers Workbench of MacApp existed. Like so many people hired into “Applications” at Microsoft, I was hired from college as and to be a Mac programmer. Most everyone in Apps seemed to be a Mac person back then. Half of Microsoft’s business was selling Mac Word and Mac Excel.

我的第一个Mac软件是一个名为“ Mac Mendeleev”的应用程序，它是一个可视化工具，可用于50多个元素的周期性属性。 它是在MacApp的Mac程序员工作台存在之前用Pascal编写的。 就像在Microsoft招聘到许多“应用程序”的人一样，我从大学毕业并成为Mac程序员。 当时，Apps中的大多数人似乎都是Mac。 微软一半的业务是出售Mac Word和Mac Excel。

Many might remember this book:

许多人可能还记得这本书：

4/ Many have their own ideas for why Apple is doing so well, but I want to share what I think of as what got them to today from a kind of unique vantage point. I’ll focus on making the products, not to take away from marketing, manufacturing, selling which all have equal roles.

4 /许多人对于苹果为何如此出色有自己的想法，但我想分享我的想法，从一个独特的角度出发，这些想法将他们带到了今天。 我将专注于制造产品，而不是从营销，制造，销售这三者均具有同等作用的产品中脱颖而出。

5/ Three factors continue to blow me away (for lack of a better expression), especially after today.• Fearless multi-year strategy• Clear unified planning/prioritization• Wildly unprecedented execution

5 /三个因素继续让我震惊(因为缺乏更好的表达方式)，尤其是在今天之后。•无畏的多年战略•明确的统一计划/优先级•前所未有的执行

Many tend to focus on “strategy” alone (such as vertical integration), or “manufacturing execution” (eg Tim Cook’s legendary supply chain work when he joined the company), or “marketing” (“Get a Mac”). All of those on their own were amazing and critical. I am choosing to look at the overall arc of product development as that underpins everything that I believe is singularly unique.

许多人倾向于只关注“战略”(例如垂直整合)或“制造执行”(例如蒂姆·库克加入公司时的传奇供应链工作)或“营销”(“买一台Mac”)。 所有这些都是令人惊奇和批评的。 我选择查看产品开发的总体思路，因为这是我认为独特的一切的基础。

6/ My jaw dropped when Tim Cook discussed the transition to Apple Silicon (ASi) as a two year journey. First, that’s like no time at all. Second, that’s an incredibly long time to tell everyone how long it will take and that they should be patient. Seriously.

6 /当蒂姆·库克(Tim Cook)讨论了为期两年的过渡到苹果硅(ASi)的过程时，我下了决心。 首先，这根本就没有时间。 其次，这是一个令人难以置信的时间，要告诉每个人需要多长时间，并且他们应该耐心等待。 说真的

To put this in context. The transition from PowerPC to Intel was announced in Spring 2005. The first PCs shipped in January 2006 and by August the whole line switched to Intel (about one year). By Summer 2009, OS X no longer supported PPC and by 2011 Rosetta emulation was entirely gone. The entire transition looks like it took 5 years on paper, but in reality the biggest thing holding up was Adobe. I believe had Adobe been on board sooner the transition would have been accelerated (rather than delayed as it was). Much of that feeds into the timeline we saw discussed this week, including Tim’s “2 year” time scale.

为了说明这一点。 从PowerPC到Intel的过渡是在2005年Spring宣布的。第一台PC于2006年1月交付，到8月，整个生产线都转移到了Intel(大约一年)。 到2009年夏季，OS X不再支持PPC，到2011年，Rosetta仿真完全消失了。 整个过渡过程似乎花了5年时间，但实际上最大的障碍是Adobe。 我相信，如果Adobe早日加入董事会，过渡将会加速(而不是像现在那样拖延)。 我们将在本周讨论的时间表中纳入其中的大部分内容，包括蒂姆的“两年”时间表。

7/ But really that is incredibly brave when so much could potentially change, more importantly could go wrong. Every big company does multi-year planning (I did) but everyone knows those plans mean little after a fiscal year. Apple is entirely different in that regard.

7 /但实际上，当如此之多的事物可能发生变化，更重要的是可能出错时，这真是太勇敢了。 每个大公司都执行多年计划(我曾经做过)，但是每个人都知道这些计划在一个财政年度后几乎没有意义。 苹果在这方面完全不同。

8/ The big thing about this is how Apple’s overall model of enables this to work. Every aspect of the system has to come together to create an environment where choices can be made AND supported that allow these plans to have integrity.

8 /与此相关的最大问题是Apple的整体模型如何使其能够正常工作。 系统的各个方面必须齐心协力，以创建一个环境，在此环境中可以做出选择并提供支持，以使这些计划具有完整性。

What I mean by Apple’s model is not about its direct to consumer business or vertical integration, but the culture of having a “point of view.” Apple makes products that customers love and are delighted by, but it makes them by studying technology, the market, and usage to arrive at plans and strategies. Unlike what you read in textbooks, Apple is much less about responding to micro changes, hype cycles, or even “feedback.” In fact you can see often how Apple’s model does not work so well when it rushes products to market or listens too closely to hype (eg Home Pod). Apple is a company that has a point of view — when the point of view lines up with a great product people love, it can become an unstoppable force.

我所说的苹果模式并不是要直接面向消费者业务或垂直整合，而是要有一种“观点”文化。 苹果公司生产的产品深受客户的喜爱和满意，但它通过研究技术，市场和用途来制定计划和策略来生产产品。 与您在教科书中阅读的内容不同，Apple不太会响应微观变化，炒作周期甚至“反馈”。 实际上，您经常会看到当苹果公司将产品推向市场或过于密切地宣传时(例如Home Pod)，它的模式不能很好地工作。 苹果是一家有观点的公司-当观点与人们喜爱的伟大产品保持一致时，它就可能成为不可阻挡的力量。

9/ For example, while Office reliably shipped for decades planning with Windows was super difficult because Windows had a different view of planning and shipping. Plus enterprise versus OEM customers. It was a miracle when we got the summer of ’95 done.

9 /例如，尽管Office可靠地交付了数十年，但使用Windows进行计划是非常困难的，因为Windows的计划和交付方式不同。 加上企业客户与OEM客户。 当我们完成了95年的夏天时，这是一个奇迹。

Here is where the difference in distribution channels totally changes how products are made. First, in the 90’s Office optimized for releasing products to retail channels, which meant a large number of country specific “customers” each requiring lead time, including time to develop print advertising, and more. Windows focused on OEMs which work with even longer lead time and also had seasonality (back to school, holiday, spring refresh) that required working backwards as much as 3 or 4 months. Lining all this up became futile when in fact the Windows project completion date was a moving target. This is the downside of teams with business goals pulling in different directions and working with an ecosystem of large independent companies as partners. The upside, however, should be obvious.

在这里，分销渠道的差异会完全改变产品的制造方式。 首先，在90年代办公室针对将产品发布到零售渠道进行了优化，这意味着大量特定于国家/地区的“客户”每个人都需要提前期，包括开发平面广告的时间等。 Windows重点关注OEM，这些OEM的交货时间更长，并且季节性(返校，放假，春假)需要倒退多达3个月或4个月。 实际上，当Windows项目完成日期是一个移动的目标时，所有这些工作变得徒劳无功。 这是业务目标朝着不同方向发展并与大型独立公司的生态系统作为合作伙伴一起工作的团队的缺点。 然而，上行空间应该显而易见。

10/ The transition to NT started in 95, was supposed to take a year. Windows XP was 2001(!) So we ended up shipping ever decreasing quality products we (eg Office) had to support for that time (9x). Still Win2000 was supposed to be “it”, then XP, then XP SP2, delaying all else.

10 /向新台币的过渡始于95年，原本需要一年的时间。 Windows XP是2001(！)。因此，我们最终交付了质量下降的产品(例如Office)，在那段时间(9倍)。 仍然应该说Win2000是“ it”，然后是XP，然后是XP SP2，从而延迟了所有其他操作。

Note: There was an org chart divide between Windows NT and 95 that needed to be resolved as NT was developed as the server strategy and in an isolated org (based on a smart choice in hindsight, but one that only postponed the reconciliation of strategy). The idea was to slide the NT kernel under the Windows 9x kernel, but as it would turn out that was not so straight forward. As a result, the 9x team shipped 98, 98 SE, and Me to continue to evolve the hardware ecosystem and try to keep the momentum going. Windows 2000 was the first reconciled kernel+GUI except it fell short in compatibility. Finally Windows XP in 2001, but that had significant security issues at launch. In the interim Office shipped, Office 97, Office 2000, and Office XP, and Office 2003 — all of which were 32 bit apps though it wasn’t until Office 2003 (shipped August 2003, a year before XP SP2!) that we finally stopped supporting the 9x platform (8 years after it released).

注意：Windows NT和95之间存在一个组织结构图鸿沟，这需要解决，因为NT是作为服务器策略和一个孤立的组织而开发的(基于事后的明智选择，但只是推迟了策略的协调) 。 想法是将NT内核滑到Windows 9x内核下，但事实证明这并不是那么简单。 结果，9x团队交付了98、98 SE和Me，以继续发展硬件生态系统并努力保持发展势头。 Windows 2000是第一个协调的内核+ GUI，但在兼容性方面达不到要求。 终于在2001年推出Windows XP，但是在启动时存在重大的安全问题。 在临时发布的Office，Office 97，Office 2000，Office XP和Office 2003中，所有这些都是32位应用程序，尽管直到Office 2003(2003年8月发布，比XP SP2早一年！)停止支持9x平台(发布8年后)。

11/ Example: the 64-bit transition. It took 20 [ed., 25] years for it to happen. 20 [ed., 25] years. It still isn’t done. OTOH Excel 2.2 still runs on 32 bit Windows, so does WordPerfect MS-DOS, which is a miraculous achievement AND honestly highly valued by HUGE customers. Different worlds.

11 /示例：64位转换。 它花费了20 [ed。，25]年。 20 [ed。，25]年。 仍然没有完成。 OTOH Excel 2.2仍可在32位Windows上运行，WordPerfect MS-DOS仍可运行，这是一个了不起的成就，并且受到了广大客户的高度评价。 不同的世界。

It is rather incredible how different the 64 bit transitions were for each company. Microsoft pioneered 64-bit computing — by working with AMD it drove the compatible industry standard that in a sense Intel was fighting (to avoid commoditization of their IA64). Yet the “patience” shown in maintaining compatibility has been remarkable. Even today, Office installs the 32 bit product by default and recommends it. Our team made that choice in 2003. It is still the case [Correction: That changed according to this post https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/deployment/office-proplus-and-office-2019-now-install-64-bit-as-default/m-p/363394 in spring 2019, though my own experience and Surface Pro that I bought last Fall disagree.]

令人难以置信的是，每个公司的64位转换有多么不同。 微软开创了64位计算的先河-通过与AMD合作，推动了兼容行业标准的发展，从某种意义上说，英特尔正在为之奋斗(以避免IA64的商品化)。 然而，在保持兼容性方面表现出的“耐心”却是卓著的。 即使在今天，Office仍默认安装32位产品并推荐它。 我们的团队在2003年做出了这个选择。现在仍然是[更正：根据这篇文章，情况发生了变化 https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/deployment/office-proplus-and-office-2019-now-install-尽管我自己的经验和我去年秋天购买的Surface Pro意见不同，但在2019年Spring，它的默认值为64-bit / as / mp / 363394 。

Apple began requiring 64 bit apps in 2017. Two years later 32 bit apps were no longer supported. [Error. I should have also said that the equivalent of Apple starting 64-bit was in Snow Leopard in 2009, meaning the entire development was a decade. I incorrectly focused on the transition time. Microsoft only just announced a transition for application ISVs to 64-bit only.]

苹果从2017年开始要求64位应用程序。两年后，不再支持32位应用程序。 [错误。 我还应该说，相当于苹果从64位开始的版本是在2009年的Snow Leopard中，这意味着整个开发过程是十年。 我错误地专注于过渡时间。 微软只是宣布将应用程序ISV转换为仅64位。]

An important part of the Apple model is “fearless” in that Apple is willing to turn over its partners and ecosystem members to new ones in an effort to stay on strategy. This is a key benefit of having committed consumers as everyone’s customers — consumers replace devices on their own. The enterprise computing model does not let you turn over customers, because there are only 2000 global companies.

苹果模式的重要组成部分是“无所畏惧”，因为苹果愿意将其合作伙伴和生态系统成员移交给新成员，以保持战略不变。 这是使消费者成为每个人的消费者的主要好处-消费者自己更换设备。 企业计算模型不允许您移交客户，因为全球只有2000家公司。

12/ We didn’t do anything wrong. Many argue a commitment to compatibility and bringing forward customers made Microsoft unique. In agree and believe that. What it does though is make it much less interesting/important for customers to move forward with you. Different worlds.

12 /我们没有做错任何事情。 许多人争辩说对兼容性的承诺和提升客户使Microsoft独树一帜。 同意并相信。 不过，这样做的目的是使客户与您一起前进变得不那么有趣/重要了。 不同的世界。

There’s a whole book to be written about the “deal” a company makes to become an enterprise company and to promise compatibility. The reward of success is extremely high, but it is almost a Faustian bargain because you will absolutely cede the right to innovate. One of the things I have talked a great deal about is how SaaS will evolve in the enterprise space. Many believe the benefit of SaaS is that you can keep the product up to date and change it, yet few enterprise products that reached mass scale (beyond technology savvy users) have gone through a deployment of a substantial change by just flipping a switch. This is a “TBD” right now for many companies. It turns out it is often very difficult or impossible to decompose a major initiative into a lot of very small features and roll that out — each roll out has friction.

关于公司为成为一家企业公司并承诺兼容性的“交易”，有一整本书要写。 成功的回报是极高的，但这几乎是浮士德式的讨价还价，因为您将绝对放弃创新的权利。 我已经谈论很多的事情之一是SaaS将如何在企业领域发展。 许多人认为，SaaS的好处是您可以使产品保持最新并进行更改，但是，只有轻按一下开关，即可达到大规模规模的企业产品(超越了精通技术的用户)就已经进行了重大更改。 对于许多公司来说，这是一个“待定”。 事实证明，将一项主要举措分解为很多非常小的功能并加以推广通常非常困难或不可能，因为每次推出都会产生摩擦。

13/ Watching today’s WWDC you can see a clear and relentless prioritization of that multi-year strategy across a MASSIVE product development team. It is really amazing to see and I really believe under appreciated. I am fond of the expression “don’t ship the org chart”…

13 /观看今天的WWDC，您可以在MASSIVE产品开发团队中清楚，毫不留情地确定该多年战略的优先级。 看到它真是太神奇了，我真的很感激。 我喜欢“不发送组织结构图”这一表达……

14/ Shipping an org chart is one of the greatest forces one must work against in any team of more than 100. We’re talking a product “team” of (maybe?) 20,000. That’s twice as big as anything I did and more like the size of MS when I left.

14 /交付组织结构图是任何一支超过100人的团队都必须与之抗衡的最大力量之一。我们所说的是一个(可能是)20,000个产品“团队”。 那是我做的任何事情的两倍，更像是我离开时的MS大小。

I have no idea how big Apple’s R&D team is or how many work on what we saw at WWDC. For many years all of Apple was the size or smaller than the Office or Windows teams I was part of. I watched this closely as a competitor. Now Apple has such breadth, like Microsoft, it is difficult to compare without inside details.

我不知道苹果的研发团队有多大，或者我们在WWDC上看到了多少工作。 多年来，苹果公司的所有规模都小于或等于我所在的Office或Windows团队的大小。 作为竞争对手，我密切关注了这一情况。 现在，苹果公司拥有像微软这样的广度，如果没有内部细节，很难进行比较。

15/ It is incredibly clear that everyone at Apple puts strategy requirements above anything “local”. When you wonder why there isn’t more new in Notes or why Mail is missing stuff it’s because supporting a multi-year strategy trumps individual teams and that’s a good thing.

15 /令人难以置信的是，苹果公司的每个人都将战略要求放在“本地”之上。 当您想知道为什么Notes中没有更多新功能或Mail缺少内容时，是因为支持多年战略要胜过各个团队，这是一件好事。

16/ To execute requires everything in the company to operate as though strategy matters most. It means communication. Performance reviews and rewards. It means management top down reinforces it and isn’t “random” or “inconsistent”. That is so difficult internally. Painful even.

16 /要执行就需要公司的一切运作，就像战略最重要。 这意味着交流。 绩效评估和奖励。 这意味着自上而下的管理可以加强管理，而不是“随机”或“不一致”。 内部很难做到这一点。 甚至痛苦。

17/ My experience was so different. Again not worse but different. Microsoft operated much more locally and hence was far more resilient, in many other businesses, and served many different customers types. Some would even say more responsive to customers. Activity v. progress?

17 /我的经历是如此不同。 再次不差但不同。 微软在本地的业务要多得多，因此在许多其他业务中的适应力要强得多，并为许多不同的客户类型提供服务。 有人甚至说对客户的React更快。 活动与进度？

18/ In BigCo when you’re asked to do things that don’t seem “as” relevant to your success, it is a tax — when one group “requires” another to do something. Ppl at a BigCo (not Apple) know what a tax is. Apple operates like taxes are good. That’s unique and worth appreciating.

18 /在BigCo中，当您被要求去做与您的成功无关的事情时，这是一种征税-当一个团队“要求”另一个人去做某件事时。 BigCo(不是Apple)的Ppl知道什么是税收。 苹果公司像税收一样运作良好。 这是独特的，值得赞赏。

A way I think of this is that, as an example, Windows was broken down into 50 or so teams. Each team owned an area of the product (Office ran the same way about 35 teams). Each team was about 50 engineers. You could think of a team as media platform or device support. At some point you balance resource allocation with continuity for individuals AND also maintaining expertise. This means at some point you will have a tough time figuring out what every member of a team might do if you don’t need or want something from a technology area in a release (eg maybe stability is good). One way to do this is to minimally staff a team to only offer what is required at the strategy level, which is one way to balance those conflicting goals — which is why the team does not act like a “product team” and have their own research and goals, they simply work on the strategic goals. In this era of WFH and remote, this challenge is going to be front and center much more than I believe people are considering.

我想到的一种方式是，例如，Windows被细分为50个左右的团队。 每个团队都拥有该产品的一个区域(Office大约以35个团队的方式运行)。 每个团队大约有50名工程师。 您可以将团队视为媒体平台或设备支持。 在某些时候，您可以在资源分配与个人连续性之间保持平衡，也可以保持专业知识。 这意味着在某个时候，您将很难确定团队中的每个成员在您不需要或不希望发布中的某个技术领域有什么要求时会做什么(例如，稳定性很好)。 做到这一点的一种方法是最小化团队，只提供战略级别所需的东西，这是平衡那些冲突目标的一种方法，这就是为什么团队不像“产品团队”那样拥有自己的团队研究和目标，他们只是在战略目标上工作。 在WFH和遥远的时代，这一挑战将比我相信的人们所考虑的要多得多。

19/ There was so little “random” stuff today or most releases. That really matters — it means in 5 years there’s nothing to clean up, nothing to obsolete causing pain with no value. The hardest thing for me was getting rid of something no one used (MediaCenter!)

19 /今天或大多数发行版中的“随机”内容很少。 这确实很重要-这意味着在5年内没有需要清理的东西，也没有要废弃的东西，不会造成痛苦，没有任何价值。 对我而言，最难的事情是摆脱没人使用的东西(MediaCenter！)

It is literally impossible to end something at Microsoft. I can’t tell you how many times I (or we) tried. A running joke was how long the Excel team kept doing bug fixes on OS/2 Excel for a European bank. It was long after no one used OS/2 (except that bank). Media Center was a classic example and when I tweeted that I knew I would get tweets from people saying “I used it.” We even published the usage data which of course no believed :-)

在微软结束某件事实际上是不可能的。 我无法告诉您我(或我们)尝试了多少次。 一个笑话是Excel团队在一家欧洲银行的OS / 2 Excel上进行错误修复的时间。 很久以后，没有人使用OS / 2(除了那家银行)。 Media Center是一个典型的例子，当我发推文时，我知道我会收到别人说“我用过”的推文。 我们甚至发布了使用数据，当然不相信:-)

20/ Finally, the image in (1) is the Wikipedia roadmap of Apple releases since 1984. Every single person reading this should look at it and marvel at a work of art. No company in software has done so much, so regularly, for so long, and certainly not at billions.

20 /最后，(1)中的图片是1984年以来Apple发行的Wikipedia路线图。每个阅读此书的人都应该看着它，并惊叹于艺术品。 没有一家软件公司如此长时间，如此定期地做如此长时间，而且肯定没有数十亿。

21/ This isn’t scrum or agile or… — most would call it waterfall BUT IT IS NOT. It is planning, iterating, prioritizing, discarding, restarting, and more. I argued most of my career that having a strategy and prioritizing is the only way to execute to have this impact. QED.

21 /这不是Scrum或敏捷，还是……–大多数人称其为瀑布，但事实并非如此。 它正在计划，迭代，确定优先级，丢弃，重新启动等等。 我在我的职业生涯的大部分时间都认为，制定战略和确定优先次序是执行产生这种影响的唯一方法。 QED。

Many pushed back on this. Very quickly every dialog about methods turns into a discussion of definitions or “not doing it right.” What Apple does is unique — it is a long term goal, broken up into short term AND useful steps that go to market, and a relentless focus on not going off plan. They can do this because their view of the market is the same as their point of view — there’s no fear of being confused by hype cycles, movements of competitors, etc.

许多人对此表示反对。 每个关于方法的对话很快就会变成对定义的讨论或“做得不好”。 苹果公司所做的是独特的-这是一个长期目标，分为短期和有用的上市步骤，以及对不超出计划的不懈关注。 他们之所以这样做，是因为他们对市场的看法与他们的观点相同–不用担心被炒作周期，竞争对手的动作等所迷惑。

Microsoft has a long history of making products over three releases “finally” work. That is quite different. The two biggest strategic bets Microsoft made, in my view, were on the graphical interface which started around the same time Apple began (with Multiplan being the first product, and Excel the first major new product). You know a bet is strategic if people quit over disagreeing and that happened! The second bet was on building an entire new OS for the future. What’s so interesting about the bet was how the convergence of that bet with the client GUI bet (Windows 9x) was that it came almost “later”. This was decidedly not Apple-like and much more about responding to the changes in the product. NT was a product that had the same relentless focus on execution as Apple did. Aligning with the client impacted that ability.

微软拥有使三个以上版本的产品“最终”运行的悠久历史。 那是完全不同的。 在我看来，微软做出的两个最大的战略赌注是在图形界面上进行的，该界面大约是在苹果公司成立的同一时间开始的(Multiplan是第一个产品，Excel是第一个主要的新产品)。 您知道，如果人们因分歧而辞职，那么下注就是战略选择！ 第二个押注是为将来构建一个全新的操作系统。 关于该赌注的有趣之处在于，该赌注与客户端GUI赌注(Windows 9x)的融合如何使它几乎“晚了”。 这绝对不像苹果，而是更多地响应产品的变化。 NT是一种与苹果一样对执行力始终如一的产品。 与客户保持一致影响了这一能力。

22/ One look at any other company that tried to do pre-committed release cadence maybe a company does well, but slows down. Or the scope dramatically shrinks. Or quality declines. Apple had ups and downs but look at that! I know big ex-apple execs that count this as *the* thing.

22 /看看任何其他尝试执行预先承诺的发布节奏的公司，也许一家公司表现不错，但速度变慢。 或范围急剧缩小。 或质量下降。 苹果起起伏伏，但看看！ 我知道前苹果高管认为这是“事”。

I spent a lot of time marveling at the execution of Apple and after I left Microsoft I had a chance to talk to some ex-NeXT and ex-Apple people and it was awesome to hear how much they did to make that happen. Amazing.

我花了很多时间惊叹于Apple的执行情况，离开微软后，我有机会与一些前NeXT和前Apple的人交谈，很高兴听到他们为实现这一目标付出了多少。 惊人。

Some ask why Microsoft did not commit to yearly releases. First, the history of Windows was, unfortunately, not even being able to get one release done on time (except Windows XP which did make the August 2001 release, but that was hampered by the need to retreat to doing a security service pack that went from a 3 month project to a 30 month.)

有人问为什么微软不承诺年度发布。 首先，不幸的是，Windows的历史甚至无法按时完成一个发行版(确实制作了2001年8月发行版的Windows XP除外，但这受到了退缩以制作安全服务包的需求的阻碍)从3个月的项目到30个月。)

Beyond our own capability to execute, a real challenge was the ability for the ecosystem to absorb regular releases. This included the end-users who had bought a PC year earlier and not having a “free upgrade” model (so it was economics). Apple famously made the OS free which was quite a conundrum at the time for us.

除了我们自己的执行能力之外，一个真正的挑战是生态系统吸收正常释放的能力。 其中包括一年前购买PC且没有“免费升级”模式的最终用户(因此很经济)。 苹果以免费提供了著名的操作系统，这在当时对我们来说是一个难题。

In Office we released on sort of 24–36 month schedules because the enterprise business did not want that much new software. Even though customers were on ARR payment (known as enterprise agreements) they did not have the bandwidth to deploy and train their employees.

在Office中，我们按24到36个月的时间表发布，因为企业业务不需要那么多新软件。 即使客户使用ARR付款(称为企业协议)，他们也没有带宽来部署和培训员工。

Taken together it meant that at any given time only about 1/3rd of customers were on the most current software. The other 2/3rds were on software that might be 6–8 years old. That’s why compatibility becomes important. It means if a team was developing something today it needed to work on an 8 year old computer.

综上所述，这意味着在任何给定时间，只有大约1/3的客户使用的是最新软件。 其他2 / 3rds使用的软件可能使用6-8年。 这就是为什么兼容性变得重要的原因。 这意味着，如果一个团队今天正在开发某些东西，则需要使用8岁的计算机。

Or did it. As it would turn out we finally had a breakthrough in this in coming to grips with the fact that an 8 year old computer was also not a computer that would ever get new software. So why bother? Well, with an enterprise agreement customer all they have to do is ask. Microsoft was in fact beholden to these customers.

还是做到了。 事实证明，我们终于在这方面取得了突破，以应对这样一个事实，即拥有8年历史的计算机也不是能够获得新软件的计算机。 那为什么要打扰呢？ 好吧，有了企业协议，客户所要做的就是询问。 微软实际上吸引了这些客户。

23/ Before everyone cargo cults these concepts the thing about them is that they work and are magical because of two things. First, the people at Apple are amazing. Yes everyone says that and believes that but boy everyone at Apple is the world’s best at their thing.

23 /在每个人都崇拜这些概念之前，关于它们的事情是它们起作用并且由于两件事而具有魔力。 首先，苹果公司的人很棒。 是的，每个人都这么说，并相信，但是苹果公​​司的每个人都是世界上最擅长的事情。

I mean it.

我是认真的。

24/ Second, many think vertical integration or design focused or some attribute is it. Too many proof points exist as to why those aren’t enough. Sony focused on design. DEC was vertically integrated (they made floppies). Even IBM. Vertical is a means to an end, not a cause.

24 /其次，许多人认为垂直整合或专注于设计或其某些属性。 关于为什么这些证据不足的证据太多。 索尼专注于设计。 DEC是垂直集成的(他们制作了软盘)。 甚至IBM。 垂直是达到目的的手段，而不是原因。

There’s only one Apple. Don’t try to copy. Read the stories just for inspiration though. A great recent book is Creative Selection: Inside Apple’s Design Process During the Golden Age of Steve Jobs by Ken Kocienda.

只有一个苹果。 不要尝试复制。 阅读故事只是为了启发。 肯·科辛达(Ken Kocienda) 近期出版的一本很棒的书是《 创意选择：史蒂夫·乔布斯 ( Steve Jobs)黄金时代的苹果设计过程的 内幕》。

25/ Anyway, I wanted to end today sharing why what Apple is doing not only makes great products for a billion people but is doing so in a way that sets the highest bar for *how* things are made and what it looks like for me. // END. Discuss.

25 /无论如何，我今天想结束今天的分享，为什么苹果公司所做的不仅会为十亿人口生产优质的产品，而且这样做的方式为*如何*制作事物以及对我来说看起来是什么设定了最高标准。 // 结束。 讨论。

Wow there is so much more. But this is too long an annotated thread. Someone should write a book.

哇，还有更多。 但是，这个注释线程太长了。 有人应该写一本书。

Finally, this post discussing historical engineering process has nothing to do with the stock market, investing, or anything recommendations along those lines.

最后，这篇讨论历史工程过程的文章与股票市场，投资或任何类似的建议无关。