The age-old question of how the mind works is a fascinating one. Yet researchers have been ignoring it strategically in the hopes of achieving AGI (artificial general intelligence) through an ever larger repertoire of tricks (Deutsch 2012). But there is no way around explaining intelligence if we want to program it.

关于大脑如何运作的古老问题是一个令人着迷的问题。 然而，研究人员一直在战略上忽略它，希望通过更多的技巧来实现AGI(人工智能)。(Deutsch，2012年)。 但是，如果我们要对智能进行编程，就无法解释智能。

Here, I take the challenge head-on with what I call the neo-Darwinian theory of the mind. It simply states that minds create new knowledge through the neo-Darwinian evolution of self-replicating ideas. It builds on philosopher Karl Popper’s guess that knowledge evolves through alternating conjecture and criticism (1983), but considers that a rather high-level explanation of a richer, underlying phenomenon. It solves several open problems in Popperian epistemology in addition to some others, such as how people evolved, how memory works, what it means to believe one thing rather than another, and why we are conscious of some phenomena and not others. Last but not least, it upholds and strengthens the Popperian notion that what’s central to the mind — the thing intelligence researchers have been bending over backward to ignore for the past 70 years — is knowledge creation.

在这里，我以所谓的新达尔文主义心智理论迎接挑战。 它只是简单地指出，思想是通过新达尔文主义自我复制思想的演变而创造新知识的。 它建立在哲学家卡尔·波普尔(Karl Popper)的猜测之上，即知识是通过交替的猜想和批评而发展的(1983)，但认为这是对一个更丰富的潜在现象的相当高级的解释。 除其他问题外，它还解决了波普尔认识论中的几个未解决的问题，例如人们的进化方式，记忆的工作方式，相信一件事情而不是另一件事情意味着什么，以及为什么我们意识到某些现象而没有意识到其他现象。 最后但并非最不重要的一点是，它坚持并加强了Popperian的观念，即知识创造是头脑中最重要的知识(情报研究人员在过去70年来一直在向后弯腰忽略)。

Neo-Darwinism in general starts with a remarkably simple core concept — replication — yet it is rich in implications.

一般来说，新达尔文主义始于一个非常简单的核心概念- 复制 -但蕴含着丰富的含义。

The first implication is that if you start with a single self-replicating something—anything, it need not be biological—pretty soon, you will have a population of them. I will call that something an instance of a replicator. A single instance creates another, each of which repeats this process, and so on. One turns into two, then four, eight, etc.

第一个含义是，如果您从一个单一的自我复制开始，那么任何东西都不需要是生物学的，那么很快您就会拥有其中的一个。 我将其称为复制器的实例 。 单个实例创建另一个实例，每个实例都重复此过程，依此类推。 一变成二，然后变成四，八，依此类推。

The second implication is that, because the world is messy and mistakes are inevitable, an instance of even the best replicator will eventually make a mistake during replication. That mistake changes the information the replica contains compared to the original. This change — a mutation — is inherited by all of its offspring (if it manages to replicate further). Mutations introduce variations. A mutated instance is called a variant. Usually, a mutation impedes any replicator’s ability to spread. Why? Because the replicator is already adapted to spreading, meaning any slight change would lessen its ability to do so (compare Paley’s remarks on adaptation, 1813). Also, keep in mind that mutations are accidental. A good replicator prevents them from happening.

第二个含义是，由于世界是混乱的，错误是不可避免的，即使是最好的复制器实例也会在复制期间最终犯错误。 与原始副本相比，该错误更改了副本包含的信息。 这种变化-一种突变 -由其所有后代继承(如果能够成功复制的话)。 变异会引入变异 。 变异的实例称为Variant 。 通常，突变会阻碍任何复制子的传播能力。 为什么？ 因为复制器已经适应了传播，这意味着任何细微的变化都会降低其传播的能力(比较Paley关于适应的评论，1813年)。 另外，请记住，突变是偶然的。 一个好的复制者可以防止它们发生。

Sometimes, however, a mistake can be beneficial. Beneficial for what? For the replicator’s ability to spread. That is its primary concern. Remember this crucial point, as many people tend to think of biological evolution in particular as optimizing “the good of the individual organism” or even “the good of the species.” Neither is the case (compare Dawkins 2016 and Deutsch 2012). Evolution does not optimize anything — it merely favors good replicators. That’s it. In biological evolution, that replicator is the gene, not an organism, nor any group of organisms (Dawkins 2016).

但是，有时错误可能是有益的 。 有益于什么？ 用于复制者的传播能力。 这是它的主要关注点。 请记住这一关键点，因为许多人倾向于认为生物进化特别是在优化“个体生物的益处”或什至“物种的益处”。 情况并非如此(比较Dawkins 2016和Deutsch 2012)。 进化并不能优化任何东西，它只是有利于优秀的复制者。 而已。 在生物进化中，复制子是基因，而不是生物，也不是任何生物体(Dawkins 2016)。

The third implication is that better replicators will spread through the population. This fact may sound tautologically true, and neo-Darwinism has repeatedly gotten a bad rap for it. It doesn’t matter. This fact — that better replicators will spread through the population — is the most critical thing you can realize not just about biological evolution, but also about meme evolution and the evolution of ideas in a mind. I will get to those other types of evolution a bit later. For now, just know that it’s that simple: better replicators will spread through the population at the expense of their rivals. Worse replicators will fall behind. We call these differences in the rate of replication selection (Dawkins 2016). Selection can result from competition, predation, mutations, changes in the environment, etc.

第三个含义是，更好的复制者将在整个人群中传播。 从事实上讲，这个事实听起来似乎是正确的，新达尔文主义一再对其说唱不好。 没关系 这个事实-更好的复制者将在整个人群中传播-是您不仅可以认识到生物进化，而且还可以了解模因进化和思想中思想进化的最关键的事情。 稍后我将介绍其他类型的演化。 现在，只知道这很简单：更好的复制者将以牺牲他们的竞争对手为代价在整个人群中传播。 更糟糕的复制者将落伍。 我们将这些差异称为复制选择率(Dawkins 2016)。 选择可以来自竞争，掠夺，突变，环境变化等。

The fourth implication is that because of this repeating interplay of variation and selection, complex adaptations can emerge, and replicators can gain abilities beyond mere replication. Each adaptation will always be in the service of the primary purpose: replication (otherwise, it would not have been selected). Still, sometimes adaptations are complex enough to have sub-purposes that distract from this primary purpose. (Remember this below when I discuss the question of why we believe some things and not others.)

第四个含义是，由于变异和选择之间不断重复的相互作用，可能出现复杂的适应，复制者可以获得的能力不只是复制。 每种改编将始终出于以下主要目的：复制(否则将不会被选择)。 但是，有时候适应很复杂，以至于具有次要目的的次要目的。 (在下面讨论为什么我们相信某些事物而不是其他事物的问题时，请记住以下内容。)

An age-old example of a curious adaptation that doesn’t serve any apparent purpose is the peacock’s tail. Why do peacocks have such beautiful and conspicuous tails? We could conjecture that it’s because their feathers are pigmented (WebExhibits n.d.), or because they “impress the opposite sex” (Peacock 2014 — yes, if you can believe it, the author’s name is Peacock and she wrote about peacocks), or whatever. These reasons are true, but they do not get at the heart of the matter. The primary reason is the same not just for peacocks’ tails, but also for why baboons have such prominent butts, why birds can fly, why bats hang upside down, and any other arbitrary trait: it happened to help the organism’s genes spread through the population at the expense of their rivals. I say “happened” because adaptations are not planned. Peacock genes that happened to code for slightly more colorful tails spread better through the population (i.e., gene pool) than those that didn’t. Baboon genes that happened to code for slightly more prominent butts spread better through the population than those that didn’t. Etc. Generally speaking: the reason any arbitrary trait x exists in some organism y is that genes that happened to code for slightly more of x in y spread better through the population than those that didn’t.

Kong雀尾巴是一个古老的例子，它没有任何明显的用途，但没有任何明显的目的。 为什么Kong雀的尾巴如此美丽而显眼？ 我们可以推测是因为它们的羽毛是有色的(WebExhibits nd)，或者是因为它们“给异性留下了深刻的印象”(Peacock，2014年-是的，如果您可以相信，作者的名字是Peacock ，她写了关于Kong雀的话)，或者其他。 这些原因是正确的，但并不是问题的核心。 主要原因不仅是Kong雀尾巴，而且是为什么狒狒有如此突出的屁股，为什么鸟类可以飞翔，为什么蝙蝠倒挂，以及其他任意特征的原因： 它恰好有助于有机体的基因通过人口牺牲了他们的竞争对手。 我说“发生”是因为没有计划进行适应。 Kong雀基因恰好编码着五颜六色的尾巴，比那些没有编码的Kong雀更好地在整个种群(即基因库)中传播。 狒狒基因恰好能编码出更为突出的屁股，因此在整个种群中的传播要比那些没有的更好。 等等。一般而言：某个生物y中存在任意性状x的原因是，恰好在y中x编码更多的基因比不具有x的基因在人群中的传播更好。

What does all of this have to do with the mind? Popper discovered that human knowledge evolves (1983). In other words, evolution as a phenomenon is not limited to the biosphere; it also explains how people create new knowledge. (Dawkins later added that evolution also explains how ideas change and spread between people (2016). He calls such ideas memes.) Popper offered a strict analogy between genetic mutations and conjectures on one hand and natural selection and criticism on the other. His explanation was a huge epistemological breakthrough. That’s why I have called (2020b) Popper the foremost AGI researcher of his time, even though he wouldn’t have called himself that.

所有这些与思想有什么关系？ 波普尔发现人类知识在发展(1983年)。 换句话说，进化作为一种​​现象并不局限于生物圈。 它还说明了人们如何创造新知识。 (道金斯后来补充说，进化也解释了观念是如何在人之间改变和传播的(2016)。他称这种观念为模因 。)波普尔一方面严格地将基因突变和猜想与自然选择和批评相提并论。 他的解释是认识论上的巨大突破。 这就是为什么我称 (2020b)Popper为当时他最重要的AGI研究者，尽管他不会这么称呼自己。

Popper’s epistemology is problem-driven. He argued that we create knowledge by conjecturing solutions to problems, then criticizing them, and finally adopting them tentatively if we fail to criticize them. He considered the quest for certainty and the notion that we should try to confirm our theories justificationist mistakes.

波普尔的认识论是问题驱动的 。 他认为，我们通过猜测问题的解决方案来创造知识，然后对其进行批评，如果我们未能批评它们，则最终尝试性地采用它们。 他考虑了对确定性的追求，以及认为我们应该尝试确认我们的理论辩证法错误的观念。

I think he was correct about all of these things. Nonetheless, there are open problems with Popperian epistemology.

我认为他对所有这些事情都是正确的。 尽管如此，波普尔认识论仍然存在未解决的问题。

First, where do conjectures come from? They have the appearance of design (compare Paley 1813 and Hackethal 2020a), and so we need to explain their emergence as the result of evolution. Therefore, saying that human knowledge evolves using conjecture and criticism just kicks the can down the road, for, conjectures are themselves a product of the evolution that happens in a mind. (The same is true for criticism, as it is conjectural as well and also has the appearance of design.)

首先，猜想从何而来？ 它们具有外观设计(与Paley 1813和Hackethal 2020a进行比较)，因此我们需要解释它们的出现是进化的结果。 因此，说人类知识是利用猜想和批评来发展的，这只是开罐的路，因为，猜想本身就是思想中发生的进化的产物。 (批评也是如此，因为它也是推测性的，并且也具有设计的外观。)

Second, Popper’s evolutionary model lacks the neo-Darwinian notion of a replicator. There may be a historical reason for this: he started developing his theories before the modern synthesis of neo-Darwinism was completed and before the discovery of DNA. That discovery was the first of a physical instance of a replicator (although it was known from theory beforehand). It wasn’t until the modern synthesis that the importance of replication was widely recognized. I have not read all of Popper’s books, but as far as I am aware, he did not introduce replication into his theory of human knowledge. (There has been an ongoing, friendly point of contention between the intelligence researcher Ella Hoeppner and me about the role of replication in any theory of evolution. Citing Donald Campbell’s evolutionary epistemology, she argues that replication can drive evolution, but is not necessary. All that’s needed, she argues, is variation and selective retention. I am agnostic on the question of necessity and think that if we introduce replication in a mind, we can explain a great many things that we couldn’t (at least not as well and as easily) without it. Hoeppner and I discussed this topic in more detail on my podcast (Hoeppner 2020).)

其次，波普尔的进化模型缺乏复制者的新达尔文主义概念。 这可能是有历史原因的：他在新达尔文主义的现代综合完成之前和DNA发现之前就开始发展自己的理论。 该发现是复制器物理实例的第一个(尽管事先从理论上是已知的)。 直到现代综合之后，复制的重要性才被广泛认可。 我还没有阅读波普尔的所有著作，但据我所知，他没有将复制法引入人类知识理论中。 (情报研究人员埃拉·霍普纳(Ella Hoeppner)和我之间一直存在着关于复制在任何进化论中的作用的持续友好争论。她引用唐纳德·坎贝尔(Donald Campbell)的进化认识论，指出复制可以推动进化，但并非必须 。所有她认为，这是变异和选择性保留。我对必要性的问题一无所知，并认为， 如果我们在思想中引入复制，就可以解释很多我们做不到的事情(至少同样不能做到)和没有这个问题。Hoeppner和我在播客中更详细地讨论了这个话题(Hoeppner 2020)。

Third, some other problems aren’t directly related to Popperian epistemology but are nonetheless fascinating and in dire need of solving. Some of them relate to memory. For example: why do we remember some things but not others? Why do some people remember some things better than others? Why do some memories last longer than others? Why are they so notoriously unreliable? Further open problems relate to the question of beliefs: why do some people believe some things over others? Why is it easier to convince one person of idea x than it is another? (Popperian readers may recognize that the issue of “beliefs,” and especially “reasons for belief,” is foreign to Popperian epistemology — for good reasons, as they pave the way to justificationism. I do not intend to reinstate the traditionally important but undeserved and justificationist role of beliefs — instead, I want to understand why some people hold some ideas dearer than others. That’s all I mean by “belief.”)

第三，其他一些问题与波普尔认识论并没有直接关系，但是仍然很着迷，并且迫切需要解决。 其中一些与记忆有关。 例如：为什么我们记得一些东西，但不记得其他东西？ 为什么有些人对某些事情的记忆比其他人好？ 为什么有些记忆比其他记忆能持续更长的时间？ 为什么他们如此出名的不可靠？ 进一步开放的问题与信仰问题有关：为什么有些人比其他人相信某些东西？ 为什么更容易说服想法x的一个人比另一个？ (波普尔的读者可能会意识到，“信仰”，尤其是“信仰的原因”问题，对于波普尔的认识论来说是陌生的，这是有充分的理由，因为它们为正义主义铺平了道路。和信仰的正义主义角色-相反，我想了解为什么有些人持有比其他人更有价值的某些想法。这就是我所说的“信仰”。)

To solve these problems, I propose the following conjecture: the mind contains an arena of self-replicating ideas. This conjecture is at the heart of my theory.

为了解决这些问题，我提出以下猜想： 头脑包含一个 自我复制的想法 。 这个猜想是我理论的核心。

When we hear “replicating ideas,” we may immediately think of memes (Dawkins 2016), but they are not what I mean. Memes are ideas that spread between people. I am concerned here only with the dynamics within a single mind. The neo-Darwinian theory of the mind is not about meme evolution (though, like any theory of creativity, it does lay the groundwork for explaining how complex memes can spread between people at all: it takes creative minds to do that).

当我们听到“复制想法”时，我们可能会立即想到模因(Dawkins，2016年)，但这并不是我的意思。 模因是在人与人之间传播的观念。 我只用一个单一的头脑中的动态这里关注。 新达尔文主义的心理理论与模因进化论无关(尽管像任何创造力理论一样，它的确为解释复杂的模因素如何在人与人之间传播奠定了基础：它需要创造性的思维才能做到)。

We start with the same, simple concept at the core of neo-Darwinism: replication. Then we apply its implications to the mind.

我们以新达尔文主义的核心相同，简单的概念开始：复制。 然后我们将其含义应用到头脑中。

First, one self-replicating idea will generate a pool of ideas in a mind: an “idea pool.” (Since a single such idea is sufficient to do so, of all the inborn ideas we have, perhaps only one of them self-replicates.)

首先，一个自我复制的想法会在脑海中产生一个想法池：“想法池”。 (由于只有一个这样的想法足以做到这一点，所以在我们拥有的所有先天想法中，也许只有其中一个可以自我复制。)

Second, because the mind is messy and mistakes are inevitable, sooner or later, an idea will make a mistake during replication: a mutation occurs. This mutation results in a variant idea. Usually, the variant will have a harder time spreading than the original. But now and then, the variant is better at spreading.

其次，由于思维混乱，迟早不可避免，错误在复制过程中会出错：发生突变。 这种突变导致了一个不同的想法。 通常，该变体的传播时间会比原始变体困难。 但是，这种变体有时会更好地传播。

Third, ideas that are better at spreading will spread through the mind’s idea pool. There will be selection because some are better at spreading than others.

第三，传播能力更强的思想将在思想的思想库中传播。 之所以会有选择，是因为有些人比其他人更擅长传播。

Fourth, because of the repeating interplay of variation and selection, complex adaptations can emerge, and ideas can gain abilities beyond mere replication. Such adaptations do not necessarily benefit the mind: evolution, as always, merely favors better replicators.

第四，由于变异和选择的反复相互作用，可能会出现复杂的改编，并且思想可以获得超越单纯复制的能力。 这样的适应并不一定有益于头脑：与往常一样，进化只倾向于更好的复制者。

I believe it’s truly as simple as that. We can now solve the problems mentioned above:

我相信它真的就是这么简单。 现在，我们可以解决上述问题：

Where do conjectures come from? They are newly-evolved variants of ideas.

猜想从哪里来？ 它们是新近发展的观念变体。

Why do we remember some things but not others? Because some ideas are better replicators. Memories are not some distinct type of idea. They are simply self-replicating ideas of high longevity and relatively high copying fidelity. In other words, they manage to stick around for longer than most other ideas in the mind, and they manage to stay more or less the same for longer periods. Ideas that have these characteristics are the ones we call “memories.”

为什么我们会记住一些事情，而不会记住其他事情？ 因为有些想法是更好的复制者。 记忆并不是某些独特的观念。 它们只是自我复制的高寿命和较高复制保真度的想法。 换句话说，他们设法比头脑中的大多数其他想法停留更长的时间，并且他们设法在更长的时间内保持大致相同。 具有这些特征的想法被我们称为“记忆”。

Why do some people remember some things better than others? Let’s say a husband and wife both remember their last vacation generally, but the wife remembers many more details. Why? Because her mind happens to be a suitable environment for the ideas encoding those details — meaning they can spread through her mind relatively smoothly — whereas her husband’s mind is not.

为什么有些人对某些事情的记忆比其他人好？ 假设一对夫妻通常都记得上次假期，但妻子仍记得许多细节。 为什么？ 因为她的思想恰好是编码这些细节的思想的合适环境-意味着它们可以在她的思想中相对平稳地传播-而她丈夫的思想却不是。

Why do some memories last longer than others? Because some replicators — and this is true of any replicator, not just ideas — are longer-lived than others. (However, I suspect that any particular instance of that replicator is usually pretty young. For example, if you are 30 and remembering something that happened when you were three, that particular instance of the idea encoding the event is not 27 years old — it may only be a few seconds old!)

为什么有些记忆比其他记忆能持续更长的时间？ 因为某些复制者(这对任何复制者都是如此，而不仅仅是思想如此)比其他人寿命更长。 (但是，我怀疑该复制器的任何特定实例通常都还很年轻。例如，如果您今年30岁，并且记得三岁时发生的事情，那么对该事件进行编码的特定实例的年龄就不超过27岁了-可能只有几秒钟了！)

Why are memories so notoriously unreliable? Because even the best and most consistent replicator won’t stay consistent forever. Mistakes are made eventually during replication. The same holds for ideas in a mind.

为什么记忆如此不可靠？ 因为即使最好，最一致的复制器也不会永远保持一致。 最终在复制过程中会犯错误。 思想中的想法也是如此。

Why do some people believe some things over others? Because some ideas spread through their minds better than others.

为什么有些人比其他人相信某些东西？ 因为有些想法比其他想法更能在他们的思想中传播。

Why is it easier to convince one person of idea x than it is another? Because one person’s mind makes it easier for idea x to spread through it than another person’s.

为什么说服一个人比另一个想法容易？ 因为一个人的思想比另一个人更容易使想法x在思想中传播。

You may have noticed that questions of belief/conviction have very similar answers as those related to memory. That’s because memories are just long-held beliefs: long-lived self-replicating ideas. While there are significant differences between biological and mental evolution, the neo-Darwinian theory of the mind has a strongly unifying character generally.

您可能已经注意到，信念/信念问题的答案与记忆有关。 那是因为记忆只是长期存在的信念：长期存在的自我复制观念。 尽管生物学和心理进化之间存在显着差异，但新达尔文主义的心理理论通常具有很强的统一性。

As I said before, one answer to the question “why do peacocks have such colorful tails?” is “because their feathers are pigmented.” That answer is correct but misses the point and the central role of replication: again, peacocks have colorful tails because those genes that happened to code for slightly more colorful tails were better able to spread through the gene pool. The primary explanation involves replication, even if we may be tempted to forget that. Observe the same phenomenon when you ask people why they think some idea is true. If you ask someone “how come you think you were born in 1960,” they will almost certainly answer along the lines of “because I really was born in 1960,” or “because it says so on my birth certificate,” or “because my parents told me so.” All of these things may be true, but the primary reason he thinks he was born in 1960 is that the idea encoding this information managed to spread through his mind. Yet he will never give that as the reason.

如我之前所说，一个答案是“为什么Kong雀的尾巴如此鲜艳？” 是“因为他们的羽毛是有色的。” 这个答案是正确的，但没有指出复制的重点和核心作用：Kong雀又有五颜六色的尾巴，因为那些碰巧编码出更多五颜六色的尾巴的基因能够更好地在基因库中传播。 主要的解释涉及复制，即使我们可能会忘记这一点。 当您问人们为什么认为某个主意是正确的时，请观察相同的现象。 如果您问某人“您怎么认为您出生于1960年”，他们几乎肯定会回答“因为我确实是1960年出生”，或“因为它在我的出生证明上这样说”或“因为我父母是这样告诉我的。” 所有这些事情可能是真的，但他认为他出生于1960年的首要原因是，编码这一信息的想法在他脑海里成功地传播。 然而，他绝不会以此为理由。

The same holds for opinions as well. Let’s say Charlotte believes that people should pay their taxes. Why? If we ask her, her answer will invariably relate to why people should, in her opinion, pay taxes, not why she believes they should. To most, there is no difference between these two questions, yet this difference is crucial if we want to begin to understand the mind. She may respond that taxes are a great way to help the poor. Or that “transferring” money from the rich to the poor is a moral imperative. Or that we need to finance the government somehow. Or that everybody has to pitch in and do their part. Whether these statements are morally or factually correct is not at issue here — just note that she will never mention the primary reason: that those ideas have spread through her mind at the expense of their rivals. It is the primary reason anyone holds any arbitrary belief in mental evolution, just like it is the primary reason any organism has any arbitrary trait in biological evolution. Yet it will never occur to her. That is why I said earlier that the phenomenon of complex sub-purposes of adaptations distracting from the primary purpose plays an important role in the mind as well.

意见也是如此。 假设夏洛特(Charlotte)相信人们应该纳税。 为什么？ 如果我们问她，她的回答将始终与人们认为人们为什么应该纳税有关，而不是为什么她认为应该纳税。 在大多数情况下，这两个问题之间没有区别，但是，如果我们想开始理解思维，则这一区别至关重要。 她可能会回答说，税收是帮助穷人的好方法。 或者说把钱从富人“转移”到穷人是道德上的当务之急。 还是我们需要以某种方式为政府融资。 或者，每个人都必须参与其中并尽自己的一份力量。 这些论断在道德上或事实上是否正确，在这里都没有问题-请注意，她永远不会提及主要原因：那些想法已经在她的脑海中流传，以牺牲其竞争对手为代价。 这是任何人对心理进化抱有任意信念的主要原因，就像这是任何生物体在生物学进化中具有任意特性的主要原因一样。 但是她永远不会发生。 这就是为什么我之前说过，适应的复杂子目的现象分散了主要目的，这在思想上也起着重要作用。

But why exactly will the primary reason not occur to Charlotte? I think it’s because she does not know how her mind works. None of us do. That’s the thing we are trying to explain here. And the vast majority of mental activities seem to happen subconsciously. We are unaware of the millions and millions of variants of self-replicating ideas in our minds, some collaborating, some competing, and we are unaware of the replication that occurs there. But we know of all of these things from theory.

但是为什么夏洛特根本不会想到主要原因呢？ 我认为是因为她不知道自己的思维方式。 我们谁都不做。 那就是我们要在这里解释的东西。 绝大多数的心理活动似乎是在潜意识中发生的。 我们意识不到自我复制思想的成千上万种变体，有些是协作的，有些是竞争的，我们也不知道在那里发生的复制。 但是我们从理论上知道所有这些事情。

Awareness brings us to the question of consciousness. It is perhaps the single most fascinating and mysterious phenomenon in the universe yet. Popper (1983) conjectured it has to do with disappointed expectations: we often do not even know we had a particular expectation until it is disappointed. For example, if you go up a flight of stairs and reach the end, thinking there is one more step, you will become acutely aware that there isn’t one and of your disappointed expectation. More broadly speaking, consciousness seems to have to do with error correction. (Error correction generally plays a central role in Popperian epistemology, not just when it comes to consciousness.) I have given the example (2020c) of learning to ride a bike as a child. Initially, you are acutely aware of every little movement you make: steering, keeping your balance, pedaling, etc. The process may be a bit overwhelming at first. Your mind evolves many new ideas for how to develop this new skill. Most of them won’t do the trick, but some variants happen to improve your abilities. Over many iterations, your ideas about how to ride a bike further improve. And as they do — i.e., as you correct errors — you become less aware of riding your bike. After riding thousands of miles, you won’t even know anymore how you do it. You just do it.

意识将我们带到意识问题。 这也许是宇宙中最引人入胜和最神秘的现象。 Popper(1983)推测它与失望的期望有关 ：我们常常甚至不知道自己有特定的期望，直到失望为止。 例如，如果您上楼梯，到达终点，以为又有一步，那么您将敏锐地意识到，没有一个是您失望的期望。 从更广泛的意义上讲，意识似乎与纠错有关 。 (纠错通常在Popperian认识论中起着中心作用，而不仅仅是在意识方面。)我举了一个学习儿童骑自行车的例子(2020c)。 最初，您会敏锐地意识到自己所做的每一个小动作：转向，保持平衡，踩踏板等。起初，这个过程可能有点让人不知所措。 您的大脑为如何发展这项新技能而提出了许多新想法。 他们中的大多数都无法解决问题，但是有些变体会提高您的能力。 经过多次迭代，您关于如何骑自行车的想法得到了进一步的改善。 而且，当他们这样做时(即，纠正错误时)，您对骑自行车的意识就会减弱 。 骑了数千英里之后，您甚至都不知道如何去做。 你就是这么做 。

I believe disappointed expectations will play an essential role in any good upcoming explanation of consciousness, but they do not strike me as sufficient (or even necessary). Whenever you sit down, close your eyes, and observe the thoughts that pop into consciousness, not all of them have to do with disappointed expectations. Some of them are merely memories, for example. However, we do know that all of them are ideas — be they descriptive, argumentative, or explanatory — and they all have the appearance of design. We never seem to be aware of any “junk” ideas, although our minds must contain many of them at any given moment because of imperfect replication. Therefore, I conjecture that a necessary condition for something to pop into consciousness is that it be sufficiently — by some yet-to-be-determined criterion — adapted.

我相信失望的期望将在即将到来的关于意识的任何很好的解释中发挥至关重要的作用，但是它们并不能使我感到足够(甚至是必要)。 每当您坐下，闭上眼睛并观察突然出现的意识时，并不是所有人都与失望的期望有关。 例如，其中一些仅仅是记忆。 但是，我们确实知道所有这些都是想法 -无论是描述性，论证性还是解释性-它们都具有外观设计。 我们似乎从来没有意识到任何“垃圾”思想，尽管由于复制不完善，我们的思想在任何特定时刻都必须包含许多思想。 因此，我猜想某种东西要进入意识的必要条件是，它足以(按照某些尚待确定的标准)适应。

Maybe part of a mind is like a brewing soup of ideas, some of which manage to bubble up here and there. Those may be our conscious thoughts. When competition between ideas is especially fierce, and the soup goes through some turbulent times, it “boils,” and many ideas bubble up to the top, demanding urgent attention and occupying our thoughts. Maybe further development of this theory would explain anxiety.

也许脑子里就像是酝酿中的想法，其中有些设法在这里和那里冒出来。 这些可能是我们的自觉想法。 当想法之间的竞争特别激烈，并且汤经历了一些动荡的时期时，它就“沸腾了”，许多想法冒出了顶峰，需要紧急关注并占据我们的思想。 也许该理论的进一步发展可以解释焦虑症。

Perhaps consciousness takes snapshots of the soup to examine ideas that have bubbled up far enough. Or perhaps it only ever looks at a single instance of an idea at a time. That could be why we are not aware of replication.

也许意识为汤做快照 ，以检查已经冒出足够多的想法。 也许一次只查看一个想法的单个实例。 这可能就是为什么我们不了解复制的原因。

I hinted above that the neo-Darwinian theory of the mind sheds light on how people evolved. For more on that, read my book (2020c), which contains a much more detailed account of the theory generally. Here I will only mention briefly that the explanation involves something very similar to the RNA-World Hypothesis occurring in a single one of our ancestors’ minds. I conjecture that a genetic mutation resulted in a self-replicating idea in that ancestor’s mind. Once he invoked that idea, it replicated and created an idea pool, which kickstarted the first instance of mental evolution.

我在上面暗示过，新达尔文主义的心理理论为人们如何进化提供了启示。 有关更多信息，请阅读我的书 (2020c)，其中包含有关该理论的更详细说明。 在这里，我仅简要提及一下，其解释涉及到与我们祖先心目中的RNA世界假说非常相似的东西。 我猜想，遗传突变会在那个祖先的脑海中产生一个自我复制的想法。 一旦他调用了这个想法，它就会复制并创建一个想法池，从而启动了心理进化的第一个实例。

The theory is incomplete because it doesn’t explain consciousness. I suggest that as the next problem to work on. I conjecture that consciousness is software that can be written like any other software and that, due to computational universality, it can run on any existing universal computer. But whatever the case, we will need the neo-Darwinian theory of the mind — or something like it — to explain the mind and build AGI.

该理论是不完整的，因为它不能解释意识。 我建议将其作为下一个要解决的问题。 我猜想意识是可以像其他任何软件一样编写的软件，并且由于计算的普遍性，它可以在任何现有的通用计算机上运行。 但是无论如何，我们都需要新达尔文式的心智理论或类似理论来解释心智并建立AGI。

Only time (and criticism) will tell whether there is something to this theory. As a solution to the problems I laid out above, I think it works well. All I am doing is taking neo-Darwinism seriously. And all I ask is that you do the same — and help the theory spread.

只有时间(和批评)才能告诉我们这个理论是否有用。 作为我上面提出的问题的一种解决方案，我认为它很好用。 我正在做的就是认真对待新达尔文主义。 我要问的是，您也要这样做-并帮助理论传播。

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